Day on Torts

September 5, 2025

Pre-suit notice to former employees not sufficient under Tennessee law.

An HCLA pre-suit notice that was sent to two former employees of a rehabilitation center, rather than to the appropriate address or agent for the rehabilitation center, was not sufficient under the statute.

In Anderson v. Alexian Village of Tennessee, No. E2024-00977-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2025), the plaintiff filed a health care liability suit against the defendant rehabilitation center. Before filing suit, the plaintiff sent two copies of pre-suit notice—one addressed to the CEO of the center and one addressed to the president of the center. Neither of these individuals were named as defendants.

The defendant moved to dismiss the case based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of the HCLA. The defendant asserted that the pre-suit notice had only been sent to two former employees, neither of whom had worked for the defendant for at least five years. The trial court agreed that the pre-suit notice was deficient and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

September 3, 2025

Alleged fraudulent invoice sent from Florida to Tennessee resulted in personal jurisdiction over tort claim.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where a Florida general contractor allegedly used a fraudulent invoice to defraud a Tennessee company, the Court of Appeals ruled that Tennessee could exercise personal jurisdiction over the general contractor for the plaintiffs’ tort claims.

In Hannah Development, LLC v. Maverick General Contractors, LLC, No. M2024-01592-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 21, 2025), the plaintiff, a Tennessee company, had worked with the defendants, a Florida general contractor and its principal, on two homebuilding projects. The homes were built in Florida. During the construction of the homes, the defendants sent an invoice to the plaintiff that included a charge for the painting of the defendant principal’s residential fence. The expense was “fraudulently disguised…as a legitimate business expense” for the home building project. The invoice was sent to the Tennessee company, and it was paid with a Tennessee account.

When the plaintiff later learned of the fraudulent expense, it brought this tort action in Tennessee. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In response, the plaintiff responded with voluminous exhibits including emails, invoices, text messages, money transfers, and other documents purportedly showing that the defendants “knowingly and intentionally engaged in tortious conduct aimed at Tennessee and that they injured a Tennessee domiciliary in the State of Tennessee.” The circuit court granted dismissal, finding a lack of personal jurisdiction, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

August 27, 2025

No duty to remove ice and snow from steps during an ongoing storm.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A restaurant did not have a duty to clear ice and snow from its steps while a winter storm was ongoing.

In Broyles v. Herrin, No. M2024-00592-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 24, 2025), the plaintiff visited defendant restaurant during a winter storm. Snow and ice had been falling for approximately ten to thirty minutes before the plaintiff arrived at the restaurant, and snow and ice had accumulated on the steps. The plaintiff could see the accumulated precipitation, so he used the handrail as he climbed the restaurant steps, but he slipped and fell on an ice patch. This suit followed.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant restaurant “caused his injuries by failing to remove snow and ice from the premises or by failing to follow proper procedures to protect him from the dangerous and unsafe condition.” The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no duty to “remove snow and ice from the premises during an ongoing winter storm.” The trial court agreed with the defendant, granting summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

August 22, 2025

Claim barred by legal malpractice statute of limitations

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim against the attorneys who drafted her fiancé’s will accrued when she filed an answer to the will contest brought by the fiancé’s surviving relatives.

In LaChappelle v. Tual, No. W2024-01234-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 18, 2025), the plaintiff had hired defendant attorneys to draft a will for her fiancé while the fiancé was in the hospital in Tennessee. The fiancé later died, and after the plaintiff filed a petition to probate the will drafted by the defendants, the fiancé’s brother and father filed a complaint to set aside the will based on the failure to comply with certain Mississippi requirements. The plaintiff filed an answer in the will contest case on May 10, 2021.

The plaintiff eventually lost the will contest case, and an earlier will was probated. The plaintiff filed this legal malpractice claim against the defendants as a beneficiary of her fiancé’s will. The legal malpractice complaint was filed on September 14, 2023, but the plaintiff and the defendants had entered a tolling agreement in July 2022. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, arguing that the legal malpractice claim accrued no later than May 2021. The one-year statute of limitations had therefore expired before the tolling agreement was executed, so the tolling agreement “did not affect the timeliness of [the plaintiff’s] complaint.” The trial court agreed, granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

August 13, 2025

Morristown street sweeper driver found 51 percent at fault for collision.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where an 87-year-old driver ran into a street sweeper, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that the street sweeper driver was 51 percent at fault.

In Hurst v. City of Morristown, No. E2024-00779-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2025), the plaintiff brought this suit under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”) on behalf of his father. The father, who was 87 years old at the time of the incident, was driving down a city street when he ran into a street sweeper. After the accident, the father stated that he “never saw a thing.” The father passed away from his injuries.

At trial, the evidence showed that the street sweeper driver stated immediately after the accident that he was kicking up a lot of dust. Further, although the street sweeper was equipped with sprayers to reduce dust, the employee had not turned the sprayers on. Much testimony focused on the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (“MUTCD”), which requires high intensity lighting or a separate vehicle following behind the sweeper. Although the sweeper in question had many lights, they were not high intensity, and there was no vehicle following the sweeper on the day of the accident.

August 4, 2025

Dismissal of claim against state affirmed based on failure to file appeal within 90 days.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

After receiving a denial of claim for his claim against the State from the Division of Claims and Risk Management, the plaintiff had ninety days to file his notice of appeal, not mail his notice of appeal.

In Ferguson v. State of Tennessee, No. W2024-00831-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 20225), the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident that he alleged was caused by a police officer for a university. The plaintiff filed a claim with the Tennessee Division of Claims and Risk Management (“DCRM”), and the DCRM denied the claim on November 2, 2023. The plaintiff then mailed a notice of appeal to the Claims Commission on January 31, 2024. The notice was filed with the claims commission on February 5, 2024, which was more than ninety days after the November 2 denial.

The State moved to dismiss the claim, asserting that it “had not been filed within the required 90-day period set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(c).” The Claims Commission agreed and dismissed the claim, and that dismissal was affirmed on appeal.

July 29, 2025

Mailman’s notation on certified mail was not sufficient for service of process.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A mailman’s notation on a certified letter sent by the Secretary of State did not constitute proper service of process in a car accident case.

In Lowe v. Harvey, No. E2024-01588-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 2025), the plaintiff and defendant were in a car accident, and the defendant lived in Indiana. The plaintiff attempted to serve the defendant under the Tennessee statutes addressing service of an out-of-state motorist, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-2-203 through -207. Pursuant to the statute, the plaintiff had a summons issued to the Tennessee Secretary of State, who then sent a summons to the defendant by registered mail. At the time of service in 2021, however, the postal service had “suspended its signature requirement for certified mail and registered return receipt mail because of Covid-19.” The letter to the defendant was returned with a marking made by the mail carrier in the signature space.

After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendant moved to dismiss based on insufficient service of process. The trial court agreed that the defendant had not been served and dismissed the case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

July 23, 2025

Tennessee Products Liability Act did not apply to foreign plaintiffs’ claim.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee Products Liability Act (“TPLA”) does not apply extraterritorially, and therefore dismissal of a case where the plaintiffs’ injuries occurred in the Dominican Republic was affirmed.

In Renel v. Drexel Chemical Company, No. W2023-01693-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 6, 2025), the plaintiffs worked in the sugar cane industry. The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant chemical company, claiming they were injured by chemicals produced and sold by the defendant, which was a Tennessee company located in Tennessee.

The trial court granted the defendant company’s motion to dismiss, ruling that “the TPLA does not have extraterritorial application,” and that “even if a case were to proceed in Tennessee, the applicable law would be the law of the Dominican Republic.” The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal.

July 18, 2025

Golf considered recreational activity under TRUS.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The defendant city was immune from suit under the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute for the plaintiff’s personal injuries incurred while he was playing golf on a city golf course.

In Bates v. City of Chattanooga, No. E2024-00857-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 4, 2025), the plaintiff fell down steps while playing golf on a city golf course. He filed this personal injury suit, and the defendant city filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“TRUS”). The trial court granted the motion, ruling that golf was comparable to the activities listed in the TRUS and that no exception applied, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

“The TRUS provides an affirmative defense to a landowner when a person is injured while engaging in a recreational activity on the landowner’s property.” (internal citation omitted). Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102(a) includes a list of activities which qualify for immunity under the TRUS, specifically mentioning “hunting, fishing, …water sports, …hiking, sightseeing,…skeet and trap shooting, sporting clay, shooting sports, and target shooting, …off-road vehicle riding” and others. Based on the language of the statute, the Supreme Court has “stated that the list of activities under Section 102 is neither exclusive nor exhaustive,” and activities that are “comparable to those listed” are also included. (internal citation omitted). Various cases have found attending a concert in a park, swimming and diving in a pool, and playing on a playground to fall within the TRUS.

July 16, 2025

Sanctions against the plaintiffs affirmed in TPPA dismissal.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where the trial court granted a TPPA motion to dismiss on two grounds, but the plaintiffs addressed only one of the grounds in their appeal, dismissal was affirmed.

In Black v. Baldwin, No. M2024-00151-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 3, 2025), the defendant’s daughter moved in with the plaintiffs, causing issues between the plaintiffs and the defendant. The defendant made social media posts claiming that the plaintiffs had kidnapped her daughter, that one plaintiff was a pedophile, that the plaintiffs were grooming the daughter, and that the plaintiffs were in a cult. The defendant also reported the plaintiffs to the Department of Children’s Services.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false light invasion of privacy, intrusion upon section, and other claims. The defendant moved to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”). The trial court granted the TPPA dismissal, finding that the complaint was filed in response to the defendants “exercise of (1) the right to free speech and (2) the right to petition.” In addition to dismissing the case, the trial court awarded the defendant her attorneys’ fees and additional sanctions under the TPPA totaling $40,000. The trial court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal.