Where a dog had previously growled at a stranger and the owner had stated the dog did not know how to be around other people, there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant owner knew about the dog’s dangerous propensities before it bit the plaintiff.

In Munoz v. Sepulveda, No. M2024-01002-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2025), the plaintiff visited the defendant’s property to purchase a lamb. When the plaintiff arrived, she saw two dogs in a fenced enclosure. She approached the enclosure to look at the dogs, and one of the dogs bit her.

The plaintiff filed this action against the defendant, and the defendant moved for summary judgment, pointing to his testimony that the dog had never bitten anyone before. The trial court granted summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the plaintiff had shown a genuine issue of material fact.

Where an HCLA (medical malpractice) plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to an address that was neither the defendant doctor’s business address nor the place where the plaintiff received treatment, dismissal based on the failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements was affirmed.

In Springfield v. Eton, No. W2024-01024-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2025), the plaintiff filed suit against the defendants based on a failed surgical artery graft which eventually necessitated the amputation of her right leg. Defendant Dr. Eton was the surgeon, who at the time had been placed with UT Regional One Physicians (“UTROP”) through a placement company. Dr. Eton was from Chicago, but he was working with UTROP in Memphis at the time.

The plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to both Dr. Eton and UTROP, with the claim against UTROP based solely on vicarious liability. At the time, Dr. Eton’s address on the Tennessee Department of Health’s website only listed “Chicago, IL 60614.” The plaintiff sent Dr. Eton’s pre-suit notice to the address in Memphis “for an ambulatory outpatient surgery center owned by Regional One.” This was not the address at which the plaintiff had received treatment.

Where the defendant governmental entity admitted in its answer that it owned the vehicle involved in the accident, and that the driver involved was its employee and was “acting within the course and scope of his employment” at the time of the accident, the plaintiff did not have to offer evidence on this issue.

In Butcher v. Shelby County Board of Education, No. W2024-01202-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2025), the plaintiff was injured in a car accident where the other driver was 100% at fault. The other vehicle was owned by the defendant board of education. In its answer, the defendant admitted that it owned the vehicle, that the driver was its employee, and that the driver was acting within the course and scope of his employment.

At the close of the trial, the defendant moved for involuntary dismissal on the basis that the plaintiffs “failed to prove that [the driver] was an employee” of the defendant, which was a prerequisite to removing immunity under the GTLA. The trial court denied the motion and entered a verdict for the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Where the plaintiff fell when exiting a bus, and she stated at the time of the fall that the driver had not properly lowered the ramp and that her lower extremities might be injured, the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the fall.

In Jordan v. East Tennessee Human Resources Agency, Inc., No. E2025-00445-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2025), the plaintiff, who used a wheelchair, frequently used the defendant’s transportation services. On July 13, 2023, the plaintiff was exiting a van in her wheelchair when she fell forward onto her face. The wheelchair allegedly fell onto her legs. Video of the incident captured the plaintiff and a bystander stating that the ramp was not lowered properly, and plaintiff saying that she might have hurt her lower extremities but was not certain due to her paralysis. Later in July, the plaintiff visited the doctor and discovered that she had been injured in the fall.

On July 16, 2024, the plaintiff filed this negligence suit under the GTLA. The defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to the one-year statute of limitations, which the trial court granted and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Where the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant in a car accident case based on the plaintiff’s lack of sufficient evidence as to breach of duty and causation, and the plaintiff’s appellate brief failed to mention duty at all, summary judgment was affirmed.

In Metcalf v. Woodard, No. W2024-01321-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2025), the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision with a UPS tractor trailer. The plaintiff filed a suit asserting several claims, although she eventually voluntarily dismissed all claims except general negligence. The trial court issued a scheduling order, and the plaintiff failed to disclose any expert witnesses by the relevant deadline. The plaintiff identified expert witnesses eleven months after the deadline, after which the defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court held a hearing and granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that the plaintiff had presented insufficient evidence to establish the elements of breach of duty or causation.

The plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment, but in her statement of issues, she focused solely on the exclusion of her causation experts. The plaintiff’s appellate brief “fail[ed] to make any reference to ‘breach’ or ‘duty.’” By failing to make any argument that she established the essential element of breach of duty, the plaintiff waived that argument on appeal. Because summary judgment was granted on two bases, including the failure to show breach of duty, summary judgment was affirmed due to the plaintiff’s failure to address that issue on appeal.

Where a nursing facility could not authenticate the decedent’s signature on an arbitration agreement, denial of the facility’s motion to compel arbitration was affirmed.

In Niter-Martin v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hospitals d/b/a Methodist University Hospital, No. W2024-01193-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2026), the plaintiff filed claims for negligent care and wrongful death against defendant nursing facility related to the facility’s care of the plaintiff’s mother, who passed away six days after the complaint was filed. The defendant facility filed a motion to compel arbitration, and it attached an arbitration agreement allegedly signed by the decedent to the motion.

In response to the motion to compel arbitration, the plaintiff argued that the facility could not authenticate the arbitration agreement. The trial court agreed and denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Where a car accident defendant failed to file a motion for new trial raising certain evidentiary issues, those issues had been waived on appeal.

In Pajazetovic v. Baker, No. M2024-00372-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2025), the plaintiff was involved in a car accident. The plaintiff filed suit against the driver and the owner of the other car, and the defendant’s underinsured motorist carrier was also served.

Prior to the first trial, the defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude the plaintiff’s accident reconstructionist, arguing that his opinion was based solely on his determination of which witnesses were most credible rather than on “calculations or other scientific explanations.” The trial court denied the motion in limine, the accident reconstructionist testified, and the first trial resulted in a hung jury. The accident reconstructionist passed away before the second trial, and the trial court ruled that the expert was unavailable under Rule 804. The trial court allowed his testimony from the first trial to be used. This second trial resulted in a jury verdict for plaintiff of more than $120,000.

When faced with a TPPA petition to dismiss, a plaintiff must present more than conclusory statements to establish a prima facie case for their claims.

In Blythe v. Forshythe, No. M2023-01463-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2025), the plaintiff was a surgeon and the defendant was a scrub tech. The plaintiff and the defendant had a verbal altercation during a surgery, and the defendant scrub tech stated that the plaintiff grabbed her wrist and physically knocked her off a stool in the operating room.

After the surgery, the defendant gave a statement to the hospital, filed a police report, and filed a complaint with the health board. Based on these verbal and written statements, the plaintiff surgeon filed this case asserting claims for defamation and intentional interference with a business relationship against the defendant scrub tech. The defendant filed a petition to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), which the trial court granted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The sellers of a home were not required to disclose a condition of the home that was apparent through common observation, and their failure to do so did not support a claim of intentional misrepresentation.  Part of the claims were lost because the plaintiffs failed to properly respond to a Rule 56.03 statement of undisputed material facts served by defendants.

In McDaniel v. Frazier, No. W2025-00183-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2025), the plaintiffs purchased a home from the defendants without first visiting or viewing the home. Before closing on the home, the defendants completed a disclosure statement affirming that they were not aware of any material defects. The plaintiff buyers hired a home inspector, who provided a report that mentioned minor defects, fogged windowpanes, and a moisture stain in the ceiling. The home inspector recommended routine maintenance on the wood, but the plaintiff buyers did not ask any additional questions after receiving the inspection. When the plaintiff buyers eventually went to the property after closing, they discovered “rotting exterior siding, rotting windows, [and] rotting doorframes” that they asserted were “readily apparent” at the home.

The plaintiff buyers filed this suit asserting claims against several parties, including a claim for intentional misrepresentation against the defendant sellers. The trial court dismissed this claim on summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

When a nolle prosequi order was entered in a shoplifting case, halting the prosecution of the case, the discharge of the action did not qualify as a favorable termination in order to support a later claim of malicious prosecution.

In Smith v. Dillard Tennessee Operating Limited Partnership, No. W2024-010881-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2025), the plaintiff was charged with shoplifting from the defendant  department store. After criminal proceedings began, the State entered an Order for Expungement of Criminal Offender Record because a nolle prosequi had been entered in the case. The shoplifting case was accordingly discharged.

Based on the shoplifting charges, the plaintiff filed a claim for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant, ruling that the plaintiff could not show that the underlying cause of action was terminated in her favor, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Contact Information