Civil Procedure

July 17, 2016

Summary Judgment Ruling Trips Up Plaintiff’s Elevator Case

In Dennis v. Donelson Corp. Centre I, LP, No. M2015-01878-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 13, 2016), the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in a negligence case revolving around injuries plaintiff sustained when exiting an elevator. On appeal, the only relevant defendant was the elevator maintenance company, who provided maintenance to the elevator in question pursuant to a contract with the building owner.

According to plaintiff, she was riding the elevator and, when it stopped, it “did not stop level with the floor.” Plaintiff claimed that the uneven step caused her to fall while exiting the elevator, “resulting in injuries to her knee, ankle and leg.” Maintenance logs stated that the employee of defendant who was assigned to this building had completed routine maintenance on the elevator just two days before, finding no issues, and that no issues had been found on the elevator during the year preceding the accident. After the fall but on the same day, defendant’s employee and a state inspector went to the building to inspect the elevator. “During their inspection, they were unable to recreate the scenario where the elevator stopped three or four inches below the floor.” Defendant’s employee did find that the elevator had a leaking valve, which was replaced, but that was unrelated to the alleged issue that caused the fall.

After discovery, defendant maintenance company moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appealed on two bases: 1) “that a reasonable juror could have concluded that [defendant] was negligent under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,” and 2) that plaintiff had “presented evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to a witness’s credibility.”

July 13, 2016

The “Law of The Case” and Its Exceptions – Tennessee Style

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A recent health care liability case illustrates the importance of putting your best case forward the first time around and not depending on appeals or “do-overs” to save your claims.

In Shipley ex rel. Shipley v. Williams, No. M2014-02279-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 19, 2016), plaintiff brought suit in 2002 alleging that defendant doctor was negligent in failing to assess her condition, failing to provide proper care, failing to admit her to the hospital, and failing to properly follow-up. In 2006, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendant on the failure to admit claim, and after granting defendant’s motion to exclude plaintiff’s expert witnesses, the trial court also granted summary judgment on the remaining claims. The Court of Appeals reversed all of the summary judgment rulings, but the Supreme Court reinstated summary judgment as to the failure to admit claim, allowed the plaintiff’s experts to testify, and allowed the balance of the case to go to the jury. The case was remanded and tried, and the jury found for defendant doctor. Plaintiff appealed.

The first issue on appeal related to the summary judgment on the failure to admit claim. On remand, the trial court initially set aside the summary judgment, “applying the ‘substantially different evidence’ exception to the law of the case doctrine.” After more discovery, though, summary judgment was reinstated, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Court noted that the law of the case doctrine means that “an appellate court’s decision on an issue of law is binding in later trials and appeals of the same case if the facts on the second trial or appeal are substantially the same as the facts in the first trial or appeal.” (internal citation omitted).

May 18, 2016

Refusal to Strike HCLA Expert Affirmed

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Bogle v. Nighthawk Radiology Services, LLC, No. M2014-01933-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 6, 2016), the dispositive issue was whether the trial court should have stricken defendant’s expert testimony in a health care liability case based on a somewhat confusing exchange between plaintiff’s counsel and the expert on cross-examination, wherein plaintiff argued that the expert admitted that he did not know the applicable standard of care. The Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the trial court’s decision to deny plaintiff’s motion to strike and affirmed the jury’s defense verdict.

The facts underlying this case dealt with the reading of a CT scan by defendant radiologist. Plaintiff’s wife, the decedent, had undergone the implantation of a dual-lead pacemaker, and after being discharged, returned to the hospital complaining of severe chest pains. A CT scan of her chest was taken by the hospital, and the images were transmitted electronically to NIghtHawk Radiology Services, one of the defendants in this case. Dr. Jones, a radiologist who was under contract at NightHawk, read the images and sent a report back to the hospital.

Though suit was brought against several parties, at the time of trial the only remaining defendants were Dr. Jones and NightHawk Radiology. Plaintiff’s theory of the case was that “the right ventricle lead of the pacemaker had perforated the wall of the right ventricle, and that this perforation was visible on the CT scan but was not noted or mentioned in the report of Dr. Jones and NightHawk Radiology.” Plaintiff asserted that the failure to report this perforation was a breach of the applicable standard of care. The defendants’ theory, on the other hand, was that while the pacemaker lead did appear to be in one layer of the heart, it did not appear to have perforated the pericardium. Dr. Jones testified that certain criteria had to be met in order for him to report a perforation, one of which was that the pericardium had to be perforated. Dr. Jones testified that he did not report a perforation here because that criterion was not met.

April 21, 2016

Tennessee Savings Statute Fails to Preserve Claims Not Asserted in Original Filing

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Blondin, No. M2014-01756-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2016), the central issue was whether plaintiff had asserted its claim for personal injury damages in a timely fashion. State Farm was subrogated to its insured’s right to recovery following an accident between the insured and defendant’s daughter. The accident occurred on July 7, 2009, and State Farm filed a civil warrant in general sessions court on May 17, 2010. The warrant stated that State Farm brought the action “to recover damages to the property of plaintiff’s insured, Jenny R. Rone, caused by the negligence of the defendant. The date of loss was July 7, 2009. The amount of damages totaled $7,371.22…”

On July 15, 2010, more than one year after the accident, State Farm filed a motion to amend the warrant to say: “Suit to recover damages to the property and person of plaintiff’s insured…. The amount of damages totaled $24, 999.99…” The general sessions judge denied the motion to amend, writing on the motion that it was “denied as to personal injuries. Statute of limitations has expired.”

Following the denial of the motion to amend, State Farm filed a motion to remove the case to circuit court, which was also denied. State Farm then voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. State Farm refiled in general sessions court within the one-year allowed by the savings statute, but this time the warrant stated that it was “to recover damages to the person and/or property of plaintiff’s insured.” This warrant listed damages at $7,371.22. Defendant moved to dismiss this action based on timeliness, and the general sessions court dismissed the case. State Farm appealed to the circuit court and also filed an Amended Complaint seeking $44,124.57 in damages. Defendant again moved to dismiss, which was denied, and ultimately State Farm got a judgment for $20,575, which was reduced by 20% because the court found the insured to be 20% at fault. Defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ultimately dismissed the personal injury portion of State Farm’s claim.

March 24, 2016

Kitchen Sink Complaint Goes Down Drain.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Goetz v. Autin, No. W2015-00063-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016), plaintiff filed a rather unclear complaint that appeared to assert four causes of action: (1) defamation, (2) malicious prosecution, (3) abuse of process and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed the entire complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Plaintiffs factual allegations were essentially that defendants “made defamatory statements to [his] family members, neighbors and friends, subjecting [him] to contempt and ridicule and threatening his job[;]” that defendants filed suit against plaintiff on May 12, 2010 with “no reasonable basis” for the action and with an “ulterior motive;” that defendants “committed an act in the use of process other than such as would be proper in the regular prosecution of the charges alleged[;]” that defendants eventually voluntarily dismissed their claims; that the lawsuit contained false statements about plaintiff; and that plaintiff suffered “severe physical and emotional injury” due to the defendant’s lawsuit and statements. Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that the complaint failed to state a claim for the causes of action pursued by plaintiff.

On the abuse of process claim, the Court noted that “a plaintiff must allege the existence of an ulterior motive and an act in the use of process other than such as would be proper in the regular prosecution of the charge.” Moreover, “[t]he mere initiation of a lawsuit, though accompanied by a malicious ulterior motive, does not constitute an abuse of process.” (internal citation omitted). Instead, a “plaintiff must allege some misuse of process after the initiation of the lawsuit.” Here, the complaint failed to allege that defendants did anything more than file the “original processes of the court.” Since the institution of a lawsuit alone is not enough to support an abuse of process claim, plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim for this cause of action.

March 9, 2016

TRCP 16 Provides for Scheduling Orders Not Scheduling Suggestions

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A recent Court of Appeals case serves as a great reminder of the importance of disclosing the correct experts in a timely fashion in a Health Care Liability Action. In Mikheil v. Nashville General Hospital, No. M2014-02301-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016), plaintiffs filed an HCLA case against several parties related to the alleged failure to timely diagnose and treat cervical stenosis. Included as defendants were an orthopedic surgeon from Nashville General Hospital, a nurse practitioner, the hospital itself based upon a claim of vicarious liability through the orthopedic surgeon, and a neurologist.

To prove an HCLA claim, a plaintiff must present expert testimony regarding the “standard of care, a failure to act in accordance with the standard of care, and proximate cause.” Throughout the pretrial litigation, plaintiffs had multiple problems with their expert disclosures. First, plaintiffs failed to file their Rule 26 expert witness disclosure by the date set out in the agreed scheduling order, and instead filed a motion requesting an additional 120 days the day after the initial deadline. When the disclosure was eventually filed, plaintiff listed four potential expert witnesses, including Jane Colvin-Roberson who was to be called as a “life care planner expert.” The disclosure stated that “the plaintiffs would furnish a copy of the Life Care Plan when it is completed.”

Defendants moved to strike the experts because plaintiffs did not provide sufficient disclosures regarding the “facts and opinions to which the experts were expected to testify or a summary of the grounds for each opinion.” The Court gave the plaintiffs three days to serve full and complete disclosures. When the supplemental disclosure was given to defendants, rather than including the life care plan by Colvin-Roberson, the plaintiffs named a new life care planning expert, Nurse Lampton. Upon motion of the defendants, Nurse Lampton was stricken, as the plaintiffs did not disclose her in a timely fashion and did not seek leave of the court to substitute her for the life care expert originally named. As plaintiffs had at that point failed to provide full disclosures for a life care planner, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs were “prohibited from offering into evidence…any life care plan and any life care planning testimony.”

January 31, 2016

HCLA Claim Dismissed Where One of Eight Providers was Named on HIPAA Form

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A continued problem for HCLA plaintiffs seems to be complying with the requirement to provide a HIPAA authorization with their pre-suit notice. In Dolman v. Donovan, No. W2015-00392-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015), another HCLA claim was dismissed due to the inadequacy of plaintiffs’ HIPAA authorizations.

Plaintiffs’ claims related to the treatment of their father at Methodist Hospital. In their suit, plaintiffs named two doctors, Methodist LeBonheur Healthcare, Memphis Vascular Center, and Memphis Radiological, P.C. as defendants. In addition to the named defendants, pre-suit notice was served on an additional three parties—another doctor, Methodist Healthcare Germantown, and Mid-South Pulmonary Specialists. “The notice letters were accompanied by three Methodist LeBonheur Healthcare medical records authorizations forms. Substantively, the three authorizations were identical, but each was signed by a different [plaintiff].”

After suit was filed, defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that the authorizations did not comply with the HCLA statute in that they “only allow[ed] the release of records from Methodist LeBonheur Healthcare” and “did not enable them to obtain the records from ‘each provider being sent a notice’ as required by statute.” In response, plaintiffs argued that the HIPAA authorizations were compliant because they authorized the release of records from “Methodist LeBonheur Healthcare and its affiliates,” and that “the doctors and other named healthcare providers were ‘affiliates’ of Methodist….” Finding that the authorizations were not statutorily compliant, the trial court dismissed the case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

January 25, 2016

Tolling Due to “Adjudicated Incompetent” Requires That There Was Judicial Intervention

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In 2011, the Tennessee legislature amended Tenn. Code. Ann. § 28-1-106 regarding tolling of statutes of limitations, replacing the language “of unsound mind” and “after the removal of such disability” with “adjudicated incompetent” and “after legal rights are restored.” The current version of the statute reads:

If the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either under eighteen (18) years of age, or adjudicated incompetent, such person, or such person’s representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after legal rights are restored, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from restoration of legal rights.

Recently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals analyzed the meaning of this language change, marking the first time a state court has interpreted the new terms.

In Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, No. W2015-01022-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015), plaintiff filed an HCLA claim related to her late husband’s fall at defendant’s facility. It was uncontested that she gave pre-suit notice more than one year after the cause of action accrued, and that she filed the complaint more than one year and 120 days after the same. Defendant moved to dismiss the claim based on the statute of limitations. Plaintiff opposed the motion on the basis that her husband met the criteria of § 28-1-106 and that the statute of limitations was thus tolled. The trial court dismissed the action, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

January 23, 2016

Tennessee Testimonial Harlot Protection Act of 2016

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The medical community in Tennessee doesn’t want judges and juries to know how much money they make from testifying as expert witnesses. So they have persuaded two members of the General Assembly to introduce legislation that applies not only to medical doctors but to every type of expert witness.

This is the substance of HB 1466:

Except for good cause shown and pursuant to court order, a party may not discover a statement of compensation that is paid to an expert witness for any study and testimony in a case.

January 22, 2016

Curb Cut for Wheelchair Ramp Held Not To Be “Dangerous Condition”

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Steele v. Primehealth Med. Center, P.C., No. W2015-00056-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2015), the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendant in a premises liability case, “concluding that the plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the sidewalk [at issue] was unreasonably dangerous.”

Plaintiff was an office supply store delivery person, and he was making his first delivery to defendants’ building. The building was owned by one defendant and occupied by another defendant, a medical center. In front of the entrance, the sidewalk had a curb-cut for a wheelchair ramp. One side of the cut sloped down to the incline, but the other side did not slope and instead had a “single step riser approximately 5 inches high.” The ramp, the lower landing, and the curb cut were lighter in color than the surrounding concrete sidewalk, but there were no particular markings. While plaintiff was pulling his dolly down the sidewalk to make a delivery and “looking straight ahead toward the entrance as he walked,” he stepped off the single step riser and broke his leg.

Plaintiff brought this premises liability action, alleging that defendants “fail[ed] to either make the condition safe or warn others of the dangerous condition by appropriate warning signs.” Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported primarily by expert testimony. Defendant’s expert stated that the sidewalk in question met all building codes, was inspected and approved by city officials, and that it was “similar in detail to figures shown in the 1999 North Carolina Accessibility Code.” Further, defendant building owner testified that there had been no other incidents between the 2001 construction of the building and sidewalk and this litigation.