Articles Posted in Civil Procedure

The medical community in Tennessee doesn’t want judges and juries to know how much money they make from testifying as expert witnesses.   So they have persuaded two members of the General Assembly to introduce legislation that applies not only to medical doctors but to every type of expert witness.

This is the substance of HB 1466:

Except for good cause shown and pursuant to court order, a party may not discover a statement of compensation that is paid to an expert witness for any study and testimony in a case.

In Steele v. Primehealth Med. Center, P.C., No. W2015-00056-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2015), the  Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendant in a premises liability case, “concluding that the plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the sidewalk [at issue] was unreasonably dangerous.”

Plaintiff was an office supply store delivery person, and he was making his first delivery to defendants’ building. The building was owned by one defendant and occupied by another defendant, a medical center. In front of the entrance, the sidewalk had a curb-cut for a wheelchair ramp. One side of the cut sloped down to the incline, but the other side did not slope and instead had a “single step riser approximately 5 inches high.” The ramp, the lower landing, and the curb cut were lighter in color than the surrounding concrete sidewalk, but there were no particular markings. While plaintiff was pulling his dolly down the sidewalk to make a delivery and “looking straight ahead toward the entrance as he walked,” he stepped off the single step riser and broke his leg.

Plaintiff brought this premises liability action, alleging that defendants “fail[ed] to either make the condition safe or warn others of the dangerous condition by appropriate warning signs.” Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment supported primarily by expert testimony. Defendant’s expert stated that the sidewalk in question met all building codes, was inspected and approved by city officials, and that it was “similar in detail to figures shown in the 1999 North Carolina Accessibility Code.” Further, defendant building owner testified that there had been no other incidents between the 2001 construction of the building and sidewalk and this litigation.

Continue reading

In a case that could have only arisen in Shelby County,  Weatherspoon v. Minard, No. W2015-01099-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2015), the Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s decision to dismiss a health care liability claim after excluding the plaintiff’s expert witness five days before trial.

The alleged negligence occurred in 1998, and this case had been pending in different forms for over fifteen years. After defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in 2009 on the basis that plaintiff did not have a standard of care expert, plaintiff responded and provided the affidavit of Dr. Evans. Defendant served a notice of deposition for Dr. Evans on May 22, 2013, with the deposition to occur one week later. “The notice requested that [plaintiff] ensure Dr. Evans produced certain documents at the deposition, including those related to the income he earned as an expert witness.” Dr. Evans failed to provide this information at his deposition, and continued to refuse to do so, even after the trial court granted defendant’s motion to compel production pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum.

The trial was set for February 2, 2015. On January 13th, counsel for defendant appeared at Dr. Evans’s office per the subpoena, but was told that Dr. Evans was not there and that counsel “did not have permission to be on the property.” Three days later, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude Dr. Evans based on his refusal to provide these financial documents. The trial court heard arguments on January 28th and granted defendant’s motion excluding Dr. Evans. Because Dr. Evans was plaintiff’s only standard of care expert, and because standard of care must be proven by expert testimony in an HCLA case, the court dismissed plaintiff’s case.

Continue reading

The HIPAA release required by the Health Care Liability Act and the standards for HIPAA compliance continue to be a litigated issues in this evolving area of Tennessee law.

In Bray v. Khuri, No. W2015-00397-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2015), plaintiff was the surviving spouse of a patient who committed suicide while admitted to a hospital under defendant doctor’s care. Before filing suit, plaintiff sent a notice letter and a medical authorization form to defendant. Once plaintiff filed her complaint, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) because the authorization provided “did not include a description of the information to be used and it failed to identify which health care providers were authorized to make the requested disclosure.” Plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss, asserting that she did not have to provide a HIPAA-compliant authorization since the only health care provider at issue was defendant, and that “the form she provided was not deficient when read in conjunction with the potential claim letter accompanying it.”  The trial court agreed with defendant, dismissing plaintiff’s claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The first issue on appeal was whether plaintiff was required to provide defendant with a HIPAA-compliant authorization when defendant “was the only medical provider being sent the notice of potential claim.” In support of her argument that no medical authorization was required here, plaintiff pointed to the language of the statute, which states that a plaintiff’s written notice “shall include…[a] HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from each other provider being sent a notice.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Plaintiff asserted that “the inclusion of the phrase ‘from each other provider’ signals that it is unnecessary to include an authorization when only one provider is receiving the notice because that provider already has all the relevant records in its possession.”

Continue reading

In Hall v. Owens, No. W2014-02214-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015), the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff ran a red light and turned in front of defendant’s truck. As plaintiff approached an intersection, he had a red arrow for turning left. Defendant was approaching the same intersection driving a tractor-trailer truck, and defendant had a green light. Despite the red arrow, plaintiff proceeded into the intersection and turned left, at which time he was hit by defendant’s truck and severely injured.

 

Plaintiff sued defendant and his employer for negligence, asserting that defendant’s negligence was the “direct and proximate cause of the collision.” Defendant moved for summary judgment, relying heavily on the footage of the accident from two traffic cameras. Based on the footage, two experts for defendant testified that defendant was driving approximately 52 miles per hour in the 55 mile per hour zone. Further, it was undisputed that defendant had a green light and plaintiff had a red arrow. It was also undisputed that defendant’s truck was well-illuminated and visible.

 

In response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted expert testimony from an accident reconstructionist asserting that defendant was traveling 60-65 miles per hour, and that defendant had “six to nine seconds of clear visibility of [plaintiff’s] car.” In light of the evidence, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that “no reasonable minds could find anything other than the fact that [plaintiff’s] actions in driving that morning of the accident constituted negligence, and negligence per se, and that his actions were the proximate cause of the accident, at least to the extent of 50% of fault.” The trial court further found that plaintiff’s expert’s testimony regarding defendant’s speed was “fundamentally flawed” in that it failed to consider several relevant factors.

Continue reading

A recent Tennessee  premises liability case reiterated that a trial court cannot grant summary judgment “without making findings of fact or stating the legal basis for its decision.” In McEarl v. City of Brownsville, No. W2015-00077-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2015), plaintiff alleged that while walking from a private home to a public parking area maintained by the city, he was injured when he “stepped into a leaf-filled gutter running between the yard and the parking area.” The city moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. After asking both parties questions at the hearing, the trial judge stated: “I don’t think—I don’t think the City is responsible here. I’m granting [the defendant’s] motion.” The trial judge instructed defendant to prepare an order, and the order eventually entered contained several findings of fact regarding lack of duty and foreseeability.

On appeal, the Court vacated the order granting summary judgment due to the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact and state a legal basis for its decision before asking the defendant to submit a proposed order. The Court relied on Smith v. UHS v. Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303 (Tenn. 2014), where the Tennessee Supreme Court “made clear that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04’s directive that ‘the trial court shall state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grants the motion which shall be included in the order reflecting the court’s ruling’ is mandatory.” In Smith, “the court concluded that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 requires the trial court, upon granting or denying a motion for summary judgment, to state the grounds for its decision before it invites or requests the prevailing party to draft a proposed order.”

Here, the trial court “provided no factual findings or legal grounds for its decision[.]” The Court of Appeals noted that it was “essentially asked to conduct an archaeological dig into the transcript…in order to determine what the court’s comments and questions indicate about its state of mind during the proceeding.” Finding that it had “no ability to know what the court’s actual grounds were when it made its oral ruling,” the Court of Appeals vacated the order and remanded the case.

In Garner v. Coffee County Bank, No. M2014-01956-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2015), the Court of Appeals partially overturned a trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on several claims, including the torts of conversion and trespass to chattels.

Plaintiff and his former wife had purchased a home together, but wife moved out in 2009, taking her belongings with her. The home and its contents were damaged by fire in 2010. Wife was named on the insurance policy, so the checks from the insurer were made to both plaintiff and wife. The checks were for home damage, property loss and living expenses. Plaintiff believed that wife was not entitled to any of the proceeds for personal property loss and living expenses, since wife was not living at the home at the time and did not have any of her belongings there. According to plaintiff, however, the president of the bank where the home mortgage was held told plaintiff that he could not cash the checks and get any money unless he gave wife half of the proceeds. Plaintiff averred that, feeling coerced, he gave wife half the proceeds, and that money was used to pay down wife’s separate loan from the bank. The bank ultimately foreclosed on plaintiff’s home, and plaintiff filed suit for conversion, trespass to chattels, and conspiracy, among other causes of action.

Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff, however, failed to file any response to the summary judgment motion until after the time required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03, and the trial court refused to use its discretion to excuse this delay. While the court acknowledged that plaintiff had been sick in the days leading up to the hearing and that could have affected his ability to sign his affidavit, it also pointed out that no other papers not requiring plaintiff’s signature and no motion for an extension of time were filed. Accordingly, plaintiff’s late-filed responsive documents were not considered in the summary judgment decision.

Continue reading

This week, the Tennessee Supreme Court overruled Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), “return[ing] to a summary judgment standard consistent with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

In Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, PLLC, No. W2013-00804-R11-CV (Oct. 26, 2015), plaintiff had Rh negative blood, and defendant failed to test and subsequently treat her with a specific injection during her third pregnancy. Because she was not treated, plaintiff became Rh-sensitized. The record contained extensive testimony regarding the risks to plaintiff and to any future pregnancies. Essentially, regarding future children, the evidence showed that if several contingencies occurred—“a future pregnancy, an Rh positive fetus, antibodies crossing the placenta—it [was] undisputed that the unborn fetus would face a number of risks, ranging from mild to severe.” Because plaintiff and her husband were Catholic, they asserted that they were limited in what steps they could take to avoid future pregnancies. Regarding the harm or risks to plaintiff herself, plaintiff’s own expert testified that the risk to her was that if she had an emergency situation and needed blood, the transfusion process could be longer because finding a match for sensitized blood could take more time.

Plaintiffs’ complaint asserted causes of action for health care liability, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) for both plaintiff and her husband, and disruption of family planning. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had “no existing actual injuries or damages resulting from the deviation,” that plaintiffs had “failed to allege future injuries to a reasonable medical certainty,” and that plaintiffs did not properly support their NIED claims. The trial court granted summary judgment as to all claims “for future damages to [plaintiff] arising from blood transfusions or future pregnancies,” finding that those damages had “yet to be sustained” and were speculative. The trial court also granted summary judgment on husband’s NIED claim, as he had not suffered physical injury and had not offered the required expert proof for an emotional distress action. Finally, the trial court granted summary judgment as to plaintiff’s “independent cause of action for disruption of family planning,” finding that Tennessee did not recognize such a claim. The court, however, denied summary judgment on plaintiff wife’s NIED claim, ruling that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the change in her blood constituted a physical injury and also holding that she would be allowed to present evidence regarding how her family plans had changed as an element of her damages.

Continue reading

In Jenkins v. Big City Remodeling, No. E2014-01612-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2015), plaintiffs had hired defendant general contractor to construct a home for them.  General contractor, in turn, had hired defendant flooring subcontractor for the project. When the home was almost complete, it caught fire and resulted in a total loss. Plaintiffs sued the general contractor and subcontractor for negligence, including negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment as to the general contractor but reversed as to the claim of negligence against the flooring subcontractor.

The facts established that the day before the fire, the owners had been in the home, and they had retained a key during construction. Further, the construction site was not fenced or otherwise blocked from public access. When the fire occurred, one of the only remaining projects was to stain the wood floors in the home. On the day of the fire, several subcontractors had been working on the house, including Julian Luu, who was working on the floor stain. Based on camera footage from a neighboring property, Mr. Luu was the last person to leave the property at around 6:10 p.m., and the fire started around 7:50 p.m.

Plaintiffs’ theory was that the flooring subcontractors, who had been known to smoke a lot on the site, “allowed flammable rags to remain on or near the exterior deck and also smoked cigarettes in the area.” Plaintiffs claimed that “the improper disposal of cigarette butts resulted in the stain-soaked rags igniting, causing the fire.” Although the fire destroyed any evidence of rags, buckets with staining rags and cigarette butts were found in a dumpster on the property. Plaintiffs’ expert testified that “he believed the fire began on the exterior deck,” but the expert admitted that he could not be certain and that he could not conclusively rule out arson or electrical problems.

Contact Information