Articles Posted in Civil Procedure

Plaintiff’s argument that defendant was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense based on vague statements by defendant’s insurance carrier adjuster that a limitations defense would not be raised and that there was no rush in providing releases was rejected.

In Barrett v. Garton, No. M2022-01064-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2023), plaintiff was injured in a car accident with defendant. Plaintiff filed suit within the one-year statute of limitations, but she failed to have service issued at the time of the filing or within one year thereafter. Defendant accordingly moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, which the trial court granted after rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. This ruling was affirmed on appeal.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 states that filing a complaint commences an action, “but if no process is issued upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff must issue process within one year from the filing of the complaint to rely on the filing of the complaint to toll the statute of limitations.” It was undisputed that plaintiff had failed to have process issued within a year of filing her complaint, but she argued that defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting a timeliness defense based on statements made by defendant’s insurance carrier.

My other blog, Practical Procedure and Evidence, has an updated post discussing the law of damages for frivolous appeal.  The post includes citations to cases where damages for frivolous appeal appeal have been granted and denied in the last four months.

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Where defendant moved for a directed verdict after the close of plaintiff’s proof but failed to renew the motion at the close of all proof, and did not file a post-trial motion seeking a new trial, defendant waived review of the denial of the motion for directed verdict as well as review of the sufficiency of the evidence.

In Lebel v. CWS Marketing Group, Inc., No. E2022-01106-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023), plaintiff purchased a home at auction and later brought this claim against defendant, who marketed and facilitated the auction. Plaintiff alleged that defendant knew the home had mold issues and failed to disclose them, and defendant misrepresented the number of acres sold with the home. In addition to contract claims, plaintiff asserted a claim for reckless misrepresentation.

At the end of plaintiff’s proof, defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. Defendant failed to renew its motion at the close of its own proof, and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant did not file a post-trial motion for a new trial, but appealed asserting that the trial court erred in denying the motion for directed verdict and that the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury’s finding. The Court of Appeals ruled that defendant had waived both of these arguments and affirmed the jury’s verdict.

Where “application of the operation-of-law exception would bar a vicarious liability claim that is timely filed within the [HCLA’s] extended statute of limitations solely because the statute of limitations had expired for any claims against the principal’s agents, the exception must give way to the [HCLA].”

In two nearly identical opinions, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the interplay between claims for vicarious liability, common law exceptions to the ability to assert vicarious liability claims, and the HCLA. In Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital Corp., No. M2020-00341-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. July 20, 2023) and Gardner v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital, No. M2019-02237-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. July 20, 2023), the Supreme Court held that a vicarious liability claim filed within the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations could proceed against a principal, even when the relevant agents were not named as defendants, were not given pre-suit notice and thus not subject to an extended statute of limitations, and were barred from being sued by the statute of limitations at the point the complaint was filed against the principal.

In both cases, the plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to the hospital at which they were treated, but did not send pre-suit notices to any agents of said hospitals. The statute of limitations as to claims against the hospitals were extended 120-days pursuant to the HCLA, and the plaintiffs filed their vicarious liability claims against the hospitals beyond the one-year mark but before the 120-day extension had run.

The Tennessee General Assembly has modified Tenn. Code Ann. Section 20-1-119 to make it clear that the plaintiff gets the benefits of the statute even if the fault allegations against a nonparty are made by a uninsured/underinsured motorist insurer.  The new legislation, Public Chapter No. 294, states as follows:

Section 1. Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 20-1-119(a), is amended by

redesignating the current language as subdivision (a)(1) and adding the following new

Have you checked out my newest blog?

Practical Procedure is a blog about, well, practical procedure and evidence issues for trial lawyers.  I have several sources for the issues I discuss on the blog.

First, if I see something in a new Tennessee Court of Appeals or Supreme Court opinion that I think will be helpful to Tennessee lawyers I write up a summary and post it to the blog.

Where plaintiff was in a car accident when she was four years old, and her parents filed a personal injury suit purporting to represent her once she turned 18, the trial court properly granted summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. The parents, who were not attorneys, could not represent plaintiff, and by the time the motion to dismiss had been filed more than one year had passed since plaintiff turned 18, so any claim was time-barred.

In McCall v. United Parcel Service, No. M2022-01112-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2023), plaintiff was in a car accident when she was four, and after she turned 18, her mother and father filed this personal injury action on her behalf. Plaintiff did not sign the complaint, and neither parent was an attorney. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the one-year statute of limitations. At the hearing, the mother stated that plaintiff had been on an IEP in school but “had never been adjudicated incompetent or disabled.” The trial court granted dismissal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

On appeal, the Court first analyzed whether it would consider certain post-judgment facts submitted by plaintiff. Tenn. R. App. P. 14 provides that “the consideration of post-judgment facts that are ‘unrelated to the merits and not genuinely disputed’ may be ‘necessary to keep the record up to date.’” Post-judgment facts that “could be disputed in the trial court or from which different conclusions could be drawn” should not be considered. (internal citation omitted). The facts presented by plaintiff included a school psychoeducational evaluation, an IEP, a psychologist evaluation, and letters of guardianship and letters of conservatorship dated after the order of dismissal was entered. The Court of Appeals declined to consider any of this evidence, finding that the school evaluation and IEP “existed at the time of the trial court’s ruling” and that the psychologist evaluation and letters were “offered to establish [plaintiff’s] competency, which is a disputed issue in this case,” so did not qualify as being “unrelated to the merits and not genuinely disputed.

Where plaintiff originally filed a health care liability suit under the GTLA against multiple defendants, but before any responsive pleading was filed plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming only the physician as a defendant, a subsequent notice and order of voluntary dismissal entered as to the defendants not named in the amended complaint were “of no legal effect.” The original defendants other than the physician were removed from the action through the filing of the amended complaint.

In Ingram v. Gallagher, — S.W.3d —, No. E2020-01222-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. May 17, 2023), plaintiff filed an HCLA suit against multiple defendants, including the physician and the hospital at which the physician worked. Because the hospital was a governmental entity, the GTLA applied to this case. After filing his original complaint but before any responsive pleading had been filed, plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming only the physician as a defendant. Five minutes after the amended complaint was filed, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to the hospital and other defendants, and an order of voluntary dismissal was entered the following day.

When defendant physician filed his answer to the amended complaint, he raised as a defense that the complaint should be dismissed under the GTLA, as Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b) required that since the physician was an employee of a governmental entity, the governmental entity must also be a party to the action. Subsequently, plaintiff “filed a motion to amend his complaint in an effort to reinstate [the hospital] as a defendant.” Plaintiff also “filed a motion to alter or amend the order dismissing [the hospital] as a defendant on the grounds that ‘[the hospital] was inadvertently dismissed in light of the affirmative defense assertation by a co-defendant…that [the hospital] is a necessary party to this action.’” The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend the dismissal order, but it eventually allowed plaintiff to amend his complaint after a second motion to amend was filed.

Where a GTLA case involves both governmental and non-governmental defendants and a party demands a jury trial, the entire case is to be heard by the jury.

In Vandyke v. Cheek, No. M2022-00938-COA-R10-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 2023), plaintiff filed suit after a car accident caused in part by a malfunctioning traffic light. Defendants in the case included Montgomery County and other governmental entities as well as the other driver, a non-governmental entity. Plaintiff requested a jury trial, and the governmental entities asked for the case to be severed so that the claims against the governmental entities would be heard in a bench trial. The trial court granted the motion, but in this extraordinary appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the order severing the claims and remanded the case to be heard by a jury as a whole.

Before 1994, the GTLA provided that cases against governmental entities were to be heard “without the intervention of a jury,” and it provided that jury demands for claims against non-governmental entities could be severed and heard separately from claims against governmental parties. In 1994, however, the GTLA was amended.

Where the trial court took judicial notice of items from the court case underlying a tort action for invasion of privacy, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, it did not convert the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment and dismissal of the claims based on the statute of limitations was affirmed.

In Doe v. Rosdeutscher, No. M2022-00834-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 27, 2023), plaintiff had filed an underlying HCLA suit. Plaintiff eventually took a voluntary nonsuit in that case, and following a motion by defendants in that case, the trial court assessed Rule 37 and Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel.

Plaintiff then filed this action against the defendants and the defendants’ attorneys from the previous HCLA case. In this case, plaintiff asserted claims for invasion of privacy, abuse of process, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract based on the allegation that defendants “filed Plaintiff’s medical records in the healthcare liability action which included nude photographs of Plaintiff and details about her sexual and mental health history[.]” Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. The trial court also assessed damages against plaintiff and Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff’s attorney. On appeal, these rulings were affirmed.

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