Articles Posted in Civil Procedure

What happens when a personal injury plaintiff files a bankruptcy petition?  What happens if that plaintiff fails to disclose in the bankruptcy petition that he has a personal injury claim that has not yet been filed?    How does a bankruptcy court discharge affect the plaintiff’s rights to later file his personal injury claim?

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently addressed these issues in the case of Reynolds v. Tognetti, No. W2010-00320-COA-R3-CV  (Tenn. Ct. App.  Mar.4, 2011).  When the defendants learned that the now debt-discharged plaintiff was pursuing a tort claim for injuries received before he filed the bankruptcy petition, they filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim on the theory of judicial estoppel.

Plaintiff responded to this motion by (1) petitioning the bankruptcy court to re-open the bankruptcy and (2) filing a motion to amend the complaint to add the bankruptcy trustee as a party plaintiff.  The trustee then moved to intervene or be substituted as a party plaintiff.  

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that the 30-day period  for removing a case to federal court does not begin to run until "the plaintiff serves the defendant with a paper that explicitly identified the amount of damages sought."

Moltner sued Starbucks in state court in New York but did not state the amount of damages he sought. Moltner’s lawyer later sent a three million dollar demand letter to Starbucks.  Starbucks filed a petition to remove the case to federal court more than 30 days after it received the complaint but less than 30 days after receiving the $3 million demand.   The Second Circuit permitted the removal, rejecting the argument that Starbucks should have deduced from reading the complaint that the case sought damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount of the federal courts.

Here is the opinion in Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Company, No. 09-4943 (2nd Cir. Nov. 2, 2010).

FDCC Quarterly,  a publication of the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, has published an article on the impact of the relatively recent decisions of United States Supreme Court in Iqual and Twombly.  

This is how the authors summarize the holdings of the two decisions:  

Together, Iqbal and Twombly held that, to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must allege well-pleaded factual allegations (and not legal conclusions or bare recitations of the elements of a cause of action) that if presumed true ‘plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ Iqbal made clear this test should apply to all civil complaints.  [Footnotes omitted.]

A lawyer called me the other day and asked me if a lawyer’s communications with his or her private investigator are privileged under Tennessee law.   The answer is "yes," as provided in T.C.A. § 24-1-209:

Communication between an attorney and a private detective or investigator hired by such attorney, while acting in their respective professional capacities shall be privileged communications.

Effective July 1, 2010 a party to a litigation may serve papers in Adobe PDF format via electronic mail to the attorney’s email address.  The process is a little more cumbersome than it need be, but it is a step-forward toward increasing the efficiency of law practice and reducing cost.

The rule change is a modification to Rule 5.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.  View this rule change (and the other changes to the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure) here. 

Note:  the amendments proposed to Rules 3, 4 and 26 have not been adopted.

Yesterday I discussed a portion of the opinion S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc. v. Morris,   Appeal No. 2008AP1647  (Wis. Ct. App. Div. II Dec. 2, 2009)  concerning the assertion of the Fifth Amendment in civil litigation.  I wanted to bring to your attention a footnote (Footnote 1) that addressed  the failure of counsel to follow court rules for  writing appellate briefs.  Tennessee appellate courts have rules similar to that of Wisconsin and I have seen several recent opinions chastizing lawyers for failure to follow those rules.

 

We note that neither Russell’s nor Buske’s appellate counsel properly cite to the record. Record cites are often missing. An appellate court is improperly burdened where briefs fail to consistently and accurately cite to the record. Meyer v. Fronimades, 2 Wis. 2d 89, 93-94, 86 N.W.2d 25 (1957). Even more troubling is that both appellate counsel failed to include in the appendix all “the findings or opinion[s] of the circuit court … including oral or written rulings or decisions showing the circuit court’s reasoning regarding those issues,” as required by WIS. STAT.RULE 809.19(2)(a) (2007-08). We had to sift through the voluminous record to find the trial court’s rulings on some of the issues on appeal. We impose a fine of $150 on Buske’s appellate counsel and a fine of $150 on Russell’s appellate counsel. See State v. Bons, 2007 WI App 124, ¶¶21-25, 301 Wis. 2d 227, 731 N.W.2d 367. Both fines are payable to the clerk of this court within thirty days of the release of this opinion. See id., ¶25.

Justice Robert Hansen once wrote the now familiar phrase that “[a]n appellate court is not a performing bear, required to dance to each and every tune played on an appeal.” State v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 564, 261 N.W.2d 147 (1978). We are not required to search for the proverbial needle in the haystack that the appellant asserts exists but has not cited to. See Keplin v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 319, 332, 129 N.W.2d 321 (1964). So to the extent that we may have missed an objection or point of contention, the fault lies with appellate counsel, not this court.

 

The Ohio Court of Appeals has ruled that a trial judge committed error by ordering production of a personal injury plaintiff’s medical records without first doing an in camera review to determine if the records should have been turned over to the defendant.

The opinion is interesting to Tennessee lawyers and should be persuasive in Tennessee even though the physician-patient privilege is statutory in Ohio.

Under Ohio law, "the filing of any civil action waives the physician-patient privilege as to any communication (including a medical record) that relates causally or historically to the injuries at issue in the action. Natl. City Bank v. Rainer (Aug. 12, 1999), 10th Dist. No. 98AP-1170; Ward v. Johnson’s Indus. Caterers, Inc. (June 25, 1998), 10th Dist. No. 97APE11-1531."

What do you do when a party to a lawsuit intentionally refuses to follow the rules?  One judge in Washington State knew what to do: the judge struck the defendant’s answer, entered judgment for $8,000,000, and awarded attorneys’ fees.  Last week the Washington Supreme Court had upheld the award.

The facts are almost impossible to summarize and readers are urged to review the opinion to learn the details.  The bottom line:

The court found (1) there was no agreement between the parties to limit discovery, (2) Hyundai falsely responded to Magaña’s request for production and interrogatories, (3) Magaña was substantially prejudiced in preparing for trial, and (4) evidence was spoiled and forever lost. The trial court considered lesser sanctions but found that the only suitable remedy under the circumstances was a default judgment. Hyundai then appealed.

Winning pre-trial motions means that you have to get relevant data before the Court in the right way. Following the right procedure is not only the way you win motions you should win but is also the way you create a record for a possible appeal.  

Rule 43.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure tells lawyers how to create a proper record when filing a motion on a matter to be considered by the court.  The rule is well-written and self-explanatory. 

When parties supporting or opposing motions before the court present materials not previously filed with the court, such materials shall be submitted as follows:

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