Articles Posted in Civil Procedure

Where a plaintiff filed a personal injury action against the personal representative of the estate of the deceased tortfeasor, but the estate had already been closed and the statute of limitations had run by the time the plaintiff sought to extend the time to file correctly, dismissal based on untimeliness was affirmed.

In Algee v. Craig, No. W2019-00587-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31. 2020), plaintiff was injured in a car accident allegedly caused by Nancy Craig on September 25, 2017. Nancy Craig died the following January, and her estate was opened with Defendant David Craig as her personal representative in February 2018. The estate was closed on July 13, 2018.

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Where plaintiff presented a statement of undisputed material facts that called into question the check cashing policies of defendant, but that statement of facts was ignored by the trial court in granting summary judgment for defendant, summary judgment was reversed.

In Great American Insurance Company v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, No. E2019-00649-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2020), plaintiff filed a negligence suit against defendant in relation to checks that were cashed by defendant’s stores. Plaintiff was a Comdata customer and used the Comdata system to pay certain independent contractors. Using this system, plaintiff would request a code for a Comdata check to be issued, and the check would be printed by defendant Pilot Travel Centers, which was a Comdata vendor. Independent contractors could then retrieve these checks from Pilot stores.

From June 2010 to March 2011, an employee of plaintiff, “without the knowledge or permission of [plaintiff,]” presented 689 codes at Pilot stores and both retrieved and cashed the checks, totaling over $368,000. Neither the employee nor plaintiff were the payee on the checks, and she cashed the checks wearing her work uniform, but defendant’s policy was to allow the “person presenting the code” to cash the check and “did not require that the payee of the check match the identification presented when the Comchek was cashed.” The employee used the controller’s password to request the codes, and there was a General Manager at plaintiff company in charge of “reviewing and signing off on the Comdata transactions.”

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Under what circumstances can a product manufacturer be hauled into state court to defend a products liability claim when the injury occurred in that state ? Or, as put by Ford Motor Company in Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court:

Whether the “arise out of or relate to” requirement for a state court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz is met when none of the defendant’s forum contacts caused the plaintiff’s claims, such that the plaintiff’s claims would be the same even if the defendant had no forum contacts.

The United States Supreme Court has accepted Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court for review, consolidating it with the Minnesota case of Ford Motor Corporation vs. Bandemer.

Where a plaintiff knew how to properly serve a defendant yet chose to delay service of process until after the statute of limitations on his claims had run, summary judgment for defendant was affirmed.

In Fuller v. Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America, No. E2018-02267-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2020), plaintiff filed suit against defendant and Community National Bank in 2015. In that suit, plaintiff initially sent a summons for defendant to CT Corporation System, but CT Corporation informed plaintiff by letter that it was not authorized to accept service for defendant. Plaintiff then successfully served defendant’s general counsel. This first suit was eventually nonsuited, and plaintiff filed second suits against defendant and Community National Bank separately. For the suit against defendant, which was originally filed in August 2017, plaintiff again sent a summons to CT Corporation, who responded by letter in November 2017 that it was not authorized to accept service. “Plaintiff’s counsel did not attempt to properly serve defendant until March 20, 2018, when he returned the unserved summons, and obtained and mailed a second summons to defendant’s general counsel.”

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It is, as the Second District Court of Appeals of Florida said, a “rather arcane”issue: who decides whether a dispute is subject to an arbitration provision – a judge or an arbitrator.  Under the facts presented, the appellate court concluded that because the contract (a clickwrap agreement on AirBNB’s website)  “did not provide clear and unmistakable evidence that only the arbitrator could decide the issue of arbitrability” the issue was one for the judge.

The case is Doe v. Natt and AirBNB, Inc., Case No. 2D19-1383 (Fla. Ct. App. March 25, 2019).  The court reached a result different than several other intermediate appellate courts in Florida and thus is likely to go up on appeal.

Under what circumstances can a Tennessee court insist that an out-of-state defendant submit to the jurisdiction of a Tennessee state court?  The Tennessee Supreme Court is facing this issue in Crouch Railway Consulting, LLC v. LS Energy Fabrication, LLC. 

The case arose when the plaintiff, a Tennessee civil engineering company,  filed an action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against a Texas energy company (referred to in the opinions as “Lonestar” in Williamson County Chancery Court, alleging that the Texas company breached its contract with the Tennessee company by failing to pay for engineering and planning services.  Lonestar filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion, determining that the minimum contacts test had not been satisfied because the Lonestar did not target Tennessee. Additionally, the trial court determined that it would be unfair and unreasonable to require the Lonestar to litigate the dispute in Tennessee.

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The Tennessee Supreme Court recently reversed a Court of Appeals opinion and reinstated a trial court’s refusal to grant a motion to alter or amend. The trial court had granted defendant’s summary judgment motion based on plaintiff’s HCLA expert being unqualified to testify as to causation and plaintiff not obtaining a second expert affidavit until after summary judgment was granted.

In Harmon v. Hickman Community Healthcare Services, Inc., No. M2016-02374-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Jan. 28, 2020), plaintiff filed an HCLA suit after decedent died while in Hickman County jail. Decedent had been arrested on possession of illegal drugs, and while incarcerated, she began suffering drug withdrawal symptoms. She was treated by an R.N. in the jail’s medical unit then sent back to her cell. Later that night, she was found dead on the floor of her cell.

Plaintiff filed suit and identified a “physician who was board-certified in neurology and psychiatry” as her expert, and defendant filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that plaintiff could not prove causation because her expert was not qualified to testify as to causation under the HCLA. The trial court heard oral arguments on the motion on November 2, 2015, denied a motion for partial summary judgment by plaintiff in January 2016, and finally issued an order granting summary judgment to defendant in April 2016. The trial court “held that Plaintiffs’ sole expert witness on causation…was not competent to provide testimony under Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-115.”

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Sometimes companies that do business or cause harm in Tennessee have not registered to do business in Tennessee or have not appointed a registered agent in the state.  If you want to sue them in a civil action (but not a worker’s compensation action), on whom to you serve the summons and complaint?

For “for profit” corporations, the answer is found in Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 48-15-104 (b) :

Whenever a domestic or foreign corporation authorized to do business in this state fails to appoint or maintain a registered agent in this state, whenever its registered agent cannot be found with reasonable diligence, whenever a foreign corporation shall transact business or conduct affairs in this state without first procuring a certificate of authority to do so from the secretary of state, or whenever the certificate of authority of a foreign corporation shall have been withdrawn or revoked, then the secretary of state shall be an agent of such corporation upon whom any such process, notice or demand may be served.  (Emphasis added.)

Motions to amend a complaint or answer are a routine part of trial practice in Tennessee state court.

Here is a recent statement on the law of motions to amend:

Trial courts have broad authority to decide motions to amend pleadings and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Hawkins v. Hart, 86 S.W.3d 522, 532 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001). Under the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Williams v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 193 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Tenn.2006). Numerous factors guide a trial court’s discretionary decision whether to allow a late-filed amendment. Some of these include undue delay, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments and futility of the amendments. Merriman v. Smith, 599 S.W.2d 548, 559 (Tenn.Ct.App.1979).

Rule 15 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure allows complaints and answers to be amended under the conditions set forth in the rule, but amendments do not make the statements in the original pleading disappear.

In Lanier v. Bane, No. M2000-03199-COA-R3CV, 2004 WL 1268956, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 8, 2004), Lanier pleaded that his host driver was drunk and caused a one-car accident, resulting in the death of Bane and injuries to Lanier.  In his amended complaint, Lanier materially changed those allegations and said his host driver was not drunk.  Bane’s estate defended by asserting that Lanier was partially at fault by voluntarily becoming a passenger in a vehicle driven by one he knew to be intoxicated.

In Footnote 1 of the Court of Appeals opinion affirming a 50% finding of fault on Lanier for contributing to his own injuries, the court noted as follows: “How Mr. Lanier came to “un-know” in his amended complaint that which he knew well in the original complaint about his host driver’s intoxication makes for interesting reading.”

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