Articles Posted in Medical Negligence

According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, where an HCLA defendant did not assert in his answer that a non-party physician was the cause-in-fact of plaintiff’s injuries, the trial court did not err by excluding evidence supporting that allegation at trial, even when the defendant did not seek to prove that the other physician was negligent. Further, where plaintiff’s medical bills were discounted due to an insurance policy plaintiff purchased and paid for privately, the collateral source rule was not abrogated under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-119, and plaintiff could use the “full, undiscounted medical bills to satisfy the burden of proving the reasonable value of medical expenses.”

In Crotty v. Flora, 676 S.W.3d 589 (Tenn. 2023), plaintiff filed an HCLA claim against defendant doctor, alleging that her ureter was perforated during a surgery performed by defendant. Five days after the surgery performed by defendant, plaintiff had to have a second surgery, which was performed by Dr. Wiatrak. Plaintiff’s ureter perforation was found during this second surgery.

Plaintiff did not name Dr. Wiatrak as a defendant in her HCLA case. When defendant filed his answer, he reserved the right to amend his answer to assert comparative fault allegations, but he never did so.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has accepted Rule 11 review of Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, No. M2022-00597-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 4451631 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2023).

Plaintiff first filed suit on December 12, 2014, relying on the 120-extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. Sec. 29-26-121. to commence an action that arose in August of 2013.  That case was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on October 4, 2019.  Mandatory pre-suit notice was given again and suit was re-filed on January 28, 2021, with Plaintiff once again relying on the  the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations referenced in the notice statute.
Vanderbilt moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations on the second filing, and therefore the second case must be dismissed because it was not filed within one year of the date of the previous dismissal.  Vanderbilt relied on this language in subsection (c) of the notice statute: “nor shall more than one (1) extension be applicable to any provider.”

Where plaintiff’s HCLA claims were based upon medical care he received while incarcerated, and his only medical expert had never practiced or studied medical care for incarcerated persons, summary judgment for defendant was affirmed.

In Higgins v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. E2022-01101-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2023), plaintiff fell from the top bunk while he was incarcerated and suffered severe injuries. Plaintiff alleged that he should have been given seizure medication and a bottom bunk based on his history of seizures. Plaintiff also asserted that he was injured while being transported from the hospital back to the correctional facility. Plaintiff’s injuries all occurred in April 2017.

Plaintiff brought claims against three defendants in May 2018, including CoreCivic who operated the facility under a contract with Hamilton County, CCS who provided medical treatment to inmates through a contract with CoreCivic, and Hamilton County who ultimately owned the facility. Defendants filed for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on various grounds, all of which were affirmed on appeal.

Where an HCLA pre-suit notice was sent by decedent’s mother, but the notice failed to mention decedent’s two minor children who were the proper parties to bring the action, the trial court should have granted defendant hospital’s motion to dismiss.

In Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge, No. E2023-00027-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2023), decedent died of cardiac arrest shortly after being discharged from defendant hospital. Decedent had two minor children who were then placed with their maternal grandmother (decedent’s mother), and the grandmother was named the temporary custodian of the children.

The grandmother sent pre-suit notice of an HCLA claim to defendants, which listed the grandmother as the claimant. The pre-suit notice did not mention the minor children. The grandmother then filed this HCLA suit as “Decedent’ mother and next friend and individually,” and in the complaint, she alleged for the first time that she was bringing the suit “on behalf of…decedent’s surviving minor children…as Grandmother and Legal Guardian.”

Where plaintiff signed an informed consent document and failed to present any expert testimony regarding the sufficiency or circumstances of the document, summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s informed consent HCLA claim was affirmed.

In Jarnagin v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, No. M2022-01012-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2023), plaintiff met with defendant doctor about a possible procedure related to potential kidney cancer. Plaintiff asserted that during that meeting, the doctor said the only possible side effect was infection at the insertion site, yet the doctor asserted that she went through all of the possible side effects. The notes from the visit supported the doctor’s testimony, and defendants produced an informed consent form signed by plaintiff on the day of the visit that listed the potential side effects of the procedure. Plaintiff stated that he did not specifically remember signing the document, but that the doctor’s assistant had asked him to sign paperwork that explained what the doctor had discussed with him.

After the procedure, plaintiff suffered a complication and later filed this HCLA informed consent action. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of the signed informed consent document, which the trial court granted, finding that the only expert testimony presented by plaintiff did not address the sufficiency or circumstances of the signed document. Summary judgment was affirmed on appeal.

Where an arbitration agreement had been signed by a decedent’s attorney in fact upon the decedent’s admission into a nursing home, and on a motion to compel arbitration filed by the nursing home the trial court considered evidence on whether the decedent had the mental capacity to execute the power of attorney for healthcare, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s consideration of such evidence. The Supreme Court held that the immunity provisions in Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act and the Health Care Decisions Act did not bar the trial court from considering evidence of the decedent’s mental capacity.

In Welch v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center LLC d/b/a Christian Care Centers of Memphis, No. W2020-00917-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. Aug. 31, 2023), plaintiff was decedent’s brother and brought this wrongful death claim against defendant nursing home. Decedent had been diagnosed with down syndrome when he was born, and he could not read and had difficulty understanding instructions. In connection with an eye surgery in 2012, plaintiff had helped decedent scratch his name on a durable power of attorney for healthcare (“POA”). Plaintiff had printed and filled out the POA.

In the subsequent years, plaintiff used the POA several times when assisting decedent with obtaining healthcare. In 2016, plaintiff had decedent admitted to defendant nursing home. Plaintiff filled out several documents in connection with the admission, including an optional arbitration agreement, on behalf of decedent. It was uncontested that plaintiff would have shown defendant the POA during the admission process.

The Tennessee Bar Journal has just published my article, “Tennessee Supreme Court Creates the “Colleague Privilege.”  The article discusses the implications of a brand-new privilege which provides that “a defendant healthcare provider cannot be compelled to provide expert opinion testimony about another defendant provider’s standard of care or deviation from that standard,” and that this holding “stands regardless of any supervisory relationship between the providers.”

Where an HCLA plaintiff failed to establish a breach of the applicable standard of care, the Claims Commissioner’s ruling for the State was affirmed.

In Black v. State, No. M2022-00399-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2023), plaintiff filed suit on behalf of her husband, who died after a short stay in a skilled nursing facility owned and operated by the State of Tennessee. When the husband was admitted to the facility, he was 84-years-old and suffered from Alzheimer’s disease, diabetes, and many other health complications.

Plaintiff visited her husband every day in the facility, and on December 29, 2016, she told the staff that she suspected he had a urinary tract infection. The facility staff ran a test, which was negative, and created care plans for the husband the next day. Four days later, the facility staff completed a more detailed assessment of the husband’s condition and care needs. Four days after this assessment, the husband was taken to the emergency room, where he was found to be suffering from septic shock and aspiration pneumonia. Approximately two weeks later, the husband died at the hospital.

Where “application of the operation-of-law exception would bar a vicarious liability claim that is timely filed within the [HCLA’s] extended statute of limitations solely because the statute of limitations had expired for any claims against the principal’s agents, the exception must give way to the [HCLA].”

In two nearly identical opinions, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the interplay between claims for vicarious liability, common law exceptions to the ability to assert vicarious liability claims, and the HCLA. In Ultsch v. HTI Memorial Hospital Corp., No. M2020-00341-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. July 20, 2023) and Gardner v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital, No. M2019-02237-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. July 20, 2023), the Supreme Court held that a vicarious liability claim filed within the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations could proceed against a principal, even when the relevant agents were not named as defendants, were not given pre-suit notice and thus not subject to an extended statute of limitations, and were barred from being sued by the statute of limitations at the point the complaint was filed against the principal.

In both cases, the plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to the hospital at which they were treated, but did not send pre-suit notices to any agents of said hospitals. The statute of limitations as to claims against the hospitals were extended 120-days pursuant to the HCLA, and the plaintiffs filed their vicarious liability claims against the hospitals beyond the one-year mark but before the 120-day extension had run.

Where an HCLA plaintiff has previously given pre-suit notice, utilized the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, filed suit, voluntarily dismissed the action, then chosen to refile pursuant to the savings statute, that plaintiff is not entitled to rely on the 120-day extension when refiling.  Instead, the action must be re-filed before the expiration of the one-year period for filing granted under the savings statute.

In Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, No. M2022-00597-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2023), plaintiff filed an HCLA case in 2014. When filing that case, plaintiff gave defendant proper pre-suit notice and relied on the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c). Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that action on October 4, 2019, then gave pre-suit notice again and refiled his complaint on January 28, 2021. When refiling under the savings statute, plaintiff again relied on the 120-day statute of limitations extension provided by the HCLA.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that pursuant to the language of the statute, plaintiff was only entitled to utilize the 120-day extension in the original action. The trial court agreed, granting dismissal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

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