Articles Posted in Medical Negligence

Plaintiff received neck and spinal cord injuries in a motor vehicle accident.  He was taken to the local ER; the ER doctor thought he needed to be seen by a neurosurgeon.  The on-call neurosurgeon (Ebeling) said he was very tired and would not be coming to the hospital and recommended that Plaintiff be transferred to a trauma center.  Plaintiff was transferred and was determined to have developed C-7 paraplegia.

The ER doctor testified that Ebeling’s refusal to come in was the first time a doctor had refused to come to the ER because of fatigue. 

Plaintiff sued Ebeling (and others); Ebeling defended by saying that there was no physician-patient relationship between him and Plaintiff and that he was not negligent.

Do you remember   Kelley v. Middle Tennessee Emergency Physicians, P.C., 133 S.W.3d 587 (Tenn. 2004), when the defendant tried to claim that he owed no duty to the plaintiff because he was not the plaintiff’s regular doctor?   The defendant was called by the emergency room doctor and gave the doctor advice that allegedly turned out to be wrong.  The defendant said his advise was a "curbside opinion" and did not give rise to a duty of care to the patient.  The Tennessee Supreme Court respectfully disagreed and said an issue of fact existed on the subject.  (Note:  the Court also made it quite clear that they thought the defendant’s argument that  there was a mere "curbside consultation" based on the "undisputed facts" was a stretch – see text accompanying fn. 17 in the opinion).

Well, the nice folks in Mississippi just had a "sidewalk opinion" case.  The defendant doctor there said he did not owe a duty to the patient to give the patient’s treating physician the right advice when the treating physician called and sought and opinion before referring the patient to the defendant for treatment.  In Scafide v. Bazzone, NO. 2004-CA-01658-COA (Miss.Ct. App. 9/12/06) the Court held that the defendant did not have a duty.

The key language from the opinion:

Here is an unusual case out of California – a unique application of the "reasonable person test" when applying the causation standard in an informed consent case.

Wilson was paralyzed from spinal surgery for scoliosis, rendering him a paraplegic. He was wheelchair bound and needed to use his arms and shoulders to get in and out of the wheelchair.  Some five years ago Wilson had a stroke, and thereafter  developed adhesive capsulitis in his shoulder.  His doctor referred him to a chiropractor, who recommended manipulation under anesthesia.  Wilson asked his doctor questions about the risk associated with the procedure, and allegedly was told by his doctor  that the only risk was an infection secondary to an injection that was part of the procedure.  His doctor was present at the procedure performed by the chiropractor. Wilson suffered a fractured shoulder and a torn rotator cuff during the procedure. As a result, he had to undergo surgery to repair the damage.

Wilson sued the doctor, the chiropractor and others, saying that he never gave informed consent to the procedure.  The case went to trial against the doctor, but the trial judge dismissed this case on several grounds, including the failure of Wilson to prove causation in the informed case. 

Timothy Brown sued the United States  alleging that his daughter Melody developed spinal bifida as a result of a military doctor recommending to Deborah Brown (Melody’s mother and a member of the military) than she  (Deborah) stop taking prenatal vitamins during a critical period in his development in utero.  The vitamins contained folic acid, which the Tommy alleged  is intended solely to prevent  neural tube defects in a developing fetus. Neural tube defects can cause serious spinal cord and  brain injury during the first 28 days of gestation, after which the fetal neural tube closes. Deborah Brown sustained no physical injury whatever from the effects of the negligent prenatal treatment, from her pregnancy, or from Melody’s birth.

The United States moved to dismiss, alleging that it was immune from suit under Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).  Feres held that  the government “is not liable under [the Act] for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”   Id. at 146.  Plaintiff argued that the  Feres  doctrine was inapplicable because Melody’s injury was not derivative of any injury to her mother but was, rather, the result of negligence affecting Melody directly(albeit in utero). 

The district court (Judge McCalla in Memphis) dismissed the case, saying the case was controlled by a prior decision of the Sixth Circuit in Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126 (1988), which held that "the treatment accorded to a pregnant member of the military on active duty is inherently inseparable from that accorded to the fetus and that such a claim would therefore force a judge to  question the propriety of decisions or conduct of fellow members of the military."

From a recent press release issued by the Tennessee Dept. of Commerce and Insurance:

"Public Chapter 744, effective May 23, 2006, contains several important changes to the Medical Malpractice Reporting Law of Tennessee, (Public Chapter 902, adopted in 2004, and codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-54-101). For the first time, it requires “reporting entities” (insurance companies, uninsured health care facilities and professionals) to include the damages and defense expenses incurred from the inception date of the medical malpractice claim until the end of the reporting year in its annual report to the Department of Commerce & Insurance (the “Department”). This change will enable the Department to accurately report on all of the costs to date incurred by reporting entities in its annual report to the General Assembly, rather than just those costs incurred during the reporting calendar year. The law requires reporting entities to re-file 2005 reports by July 1, 2006 to reflect these inception-to-date damages and costs, and also extends the deadline for the Department to report to the General Assembly from September 1 to November 1 of each year.

The legislation places requirements on counsel for claimants to submit their information on medical malpractice fee arrangements directly to the Department by April 1 of each year, beginning in 2007. Counsel for claimants are also included in the definition of “reporting entities” over which the Department has civil penalty authority to levy a fine of $100 a day for failure to report. The law now requires claimant’s counsel to report the portion of settlement or judgment received in the reporting calendar year. Similarly, all reporting entities must now list the name of each attorney representing claimants in its annual report in order to provide the Department with additional enforcement information. All settlement and judgment information submitted to the Department will continue to be held confidential, and reported only in aggregate form.

Efforts to improve teamwork and communication have substantially  reduced births resulting in traumatic injury .

Many of the Seaton hospitals have worked with the Institute for Healthcare Improvement to reduce preventable childbirth injuries by " improving communications, standardizing procedures and reducing risky methods that speed deliveries, including forceps use, vacuum deliveries and medication to induce labor," according to an article in the American-Statesman.

The paper reports that overall the actions have "reduced traumatic birth injuries from 3.2 per 1,000 in 2004 (less than half the national average) to 0.3 injuries per 1,000."

It just makes sense for hospitals and doctors to try to resolve problems with patients before lawyers  get involved, and it looks like they are starting to do it.

This article from www.law.com explains how facilities are starting to aggressively deal with potential claims and avoid litigation. 

Look at what happened to claims at the University of Michigan Hospital when such a program was adopted:  "In August 2001, there were 262 total claims, ranging from presuit notices to active litigation; in August 2002, there were 220 total claims; 193 claims in August 2003; 155 claims in August 2004; 114 claims in August 2005; and since that time, the total number of claims has fallen to fewer than 100…."  This occurred despite an increase in clinical activity.

Dr.  Fullerton made a horrible mistake.  He testified for a patient in a medical malpractice case.  The defendants won the case and turned Dr. Fullerton into the Florida Medical Association "stating, among other things,  that his opinion testimony fell below reasonable professional standards, that it was  made “for the sole purpose of propagating a frivolous lawsuit for financial gain,” and  that he specifically “presented false testimony and false theories about stroke in the  hope to prove negligent medical care in an 80-year-old diabetic with previous strokes  who suffered a stroke despite appropriate care.” Appellees concluded their letter with  a request to the FMA to issue an opinion addressing whether Fullerton’s testimony  “fall[s] below standards,” and, if so, to report its findings to the Board of Medicine for  appropriate disciplinary action in order “to prevent the Medical profession from being  terrorized by similar experts.”

Fullerton (who was not a member of the FMA) responded with litigation, alleging  " that the statements in the  letter were false and were submitted for processing by the FMA’s Expert Witness  Committee (EWC) of FMA’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA), which  was organized for the purpose ‘of intimidating, hindering, and deterring persons, including plaintiff Fullerton, from appearing as expert witnesses on behalf of plaintiffs  in cases involving medical malpractice,’ thereby depriving injured plaintiffs of the  ability to pursue medical-malpractice lawsuits. He continued that because of the  actions of FMA and the defendant doctors, who acted in concert to inhibit expert  testimony in medical malpractice cases, he had suffered damages and would suffer  irreparable harm to his reputation and to his capacity to earn income in the future if  the defendant FMA’s CEJA and EWC programs were permitted to continue their  operations."

The doctors and the FMA claimed they were immune from suit under the peer review statute in Florida.  The trial court dismissed the case.