Articles Posted in Medical Negligence

Teresa Sigmon, attorney for the defendant in a medical malpractice case, allegedly pressured one of the plaintiff’s consulting experts in the case into withdrawing from an agreement to testify for the plaintiff. The plaintiff then sued her, her law firm, and the the medical malpractice insurer for “abuse of process, intentional interference with a business relationship, inducement/procurement of a breach of contract, and coercion of a witness.” (The defendant doctor was also sued originally; that claim was dropped.)

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded all of the claims against the lawyer and her law firm for trial except the abuse of process claim.

The Court found the existence of a business relationship between the consultant and the plaintiff and found that a claim existed under both the interference and inducement theories.

It is getting worse. A study of patients in our Medicare population has found an alarming number of incidents and deaths.

The study looked discharge records of Medicare patients and used 16 of “20 indicators for potentially preventable patient safety incidents that could be readily identified in hospital discharge data. This tool set of 20 evidence-based PSIs was created and released to the public in 2003 to be used by various healthcare stakeholders to assess and improve patient safety in U.S. hospitals.”

They found:

The Washington Post tells us that hospital-acquired infections cost more than $600M per year – and that is just in Pennsylvania!

An excerpt from the article: “Doctors, nurses and patients’ relatives have long known the risks of contracting an infection while in a hospital. But there has been little quantifiable data available on the cost of those infections, from a financial or a medical perspective. The average hospital payment for a Pennsylvania patient who did not have an infection was $8,078, compared with $60,678 for patients who did, according to the report by the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council.”

Wouldn’t it be nice if doctors and hospitals spent their time and money trying to prevent infections rather than trying to reduce their financial responsibility for negligence? The cost of malpractice insurance in a drop in the bucket compared to the cost of hospital-acquired infections.

John Ritter died of an aortic aneurysm in 2003. His family filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against various health care providers. It now appears that the case has been settled.

I met John Ritter in New York 5 or 6 years ago. I went to a play and at the end the cast came back onto the stage and auctioned off a prop to raise money for an AIDS group. I “won” the auction and got to go backstage, meet the cast (including Henry Winkler), get photos, etc. It was a good deal of fun.

The reason for that little story is this: John Ritter could not have been more gracious. He spent part of his life in Nashville (his dad was country music legend Tex Ritter), and actually lived in a beautiful house about 4 miles away from my house. We talked about Nashville and he told me what wonderful memories he had of my adoptive home. I could tell that he was a kind, compassionate man.

This op-ed piece from today’s New York Times is so good it needs to be repeated in full in this blog.

The Doctor Will See You for Exactly Seven Minutes
By PETER SALGO

WHEN politicians speak of America’s health care needs, they often miss an important point: the doctor-patient relationship has become frayed. Patients aren’t unhappy just because health care costs too much (though they would certainly like it to be more affordable). Rather, people sense a malaise within the system that has eroded the respect they feel patients deserve.

The locality rule in medical malpractice cases is absolutely ridiculous. It is designed to create an artifical barrier to recovery, to protect doctors and hospitals, particularly those in rural areas, from malpractice suits. It pretends that there is a difference in the standard of care given the size of the community, as if people from smaller towns are entitled to less quality of care than those of bigger towns.

(Don’t get me wrong – there are some services that hospitals in rural towns that are not and should not be provided and there are some doctors in rural areas who lack the practical experience of taking care of some types of patients. The patients who need this help need to referred to a place where such help is routinely given.)

Well, a doctor and his group in Clarksville just got bit by their own dog. A medical malpractice verdict for the plaintiff was reversed because the Court of Appeals found that the defendents’ experts did not meet the qualifications of the locality rule.

Back in 1975 the Tennessee Legislature determined that the only health care providers who could testify against a Tennessee health care provider in a malpractice case where experts from contigious states. This is an assine rule – but it is still the law.

You can avoid the contigious state rule with permission of the trial judge. This opinion in Steele v. Berkman reminds us that we have to have some proof of the efforts made find an expert from a contigious state so that the court can determine that a waiver of the rule is appropriate.

The waiver has been applied in Childress v. Bennett, 816 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tenn.1991) and Steele v. Ft. Sanders Anesthesia Group, 897 S.W. 2d 270, 281 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994). It was denied in Rose v. HCA Health Services of Tennessee, 947 S.W. 2d
144, 148 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996).

The Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 was “was passed with the stated intent of encouraging ‘committees made up of Tennessee’s licensed physicians to candidly, conscientiously, and objectively evaluate and review their peers’ professional conduct, competence, and ability to practice medicine.’ The statute further ‘recognizes that confidentiality is essential both to effective functioning of these peer review committees and to continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients.’ Tenn. Code Ann. ㋔ 63-6-219(b)(1). To this end, the statute creates a privilege for certain documents, etc., which are generated or provided during the peer review process.”

Dr. Moore was summarily suspended from his staff privileges in a Chattanooga hospital and sought information from his creditionals file. The hospital refused to provide it, citing the Peer Review Law. The case went to the Eastern Section of our Court of Appeals and the appellate court remanded to case to the trial judge for further action in consideration of the opinion.

Specifically, the appellate court found even though the creditionals file was covered under the Peer Review Law the wording of the statute itself said that “[n]othing contained in this subsection (e) applies to records made in the regular course of business by a hospital or other provider of health care and information, documents or records otherwise available from original sources are not to be construed as immune from discovery or use in any civil proceedings merely because they were presented during proceedings of such committee.”

The Supreme Court of Mississippi has granted summary judgment in favor of a physician when the plaintiff failed to timely respond to discovery seeking information about plaintiff’s expert witnesses and did not timely file an expert affidavit opposing the summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff maintained that she was entitled to more time to get an affidavit from an expert.

From the opinion: “In his final judgment, the trial judge denied Stallworth’s request for a continuance and granted the Doctors’ summary judgment motion based on Stallworth’s failure to substantiate the claims of medical negligence. The trial judge based his decision on the fact that in June of 2004, the Doctors served Stallworth with interrogatories to identify a medical expert, and Stallworth never filed sworn answers to those interrogatories. Instead, Stallworth served unsigned and unsworn interrogatory answers by facsimile and mail subsequent to the filings on summary judgment. The trial judge also based his decision on the fact that Stallworth acquired records of her condition and had notice of a possible claim as early as March of 2002, and retained counsel in April of 2002. The trial court also stated Stallworth’s attorney’s affidavit filed on October 22, 2004, was not compliant with the rules requesting the supplementation of the answers to the interrogatories and did not excuse Stallworth from having an expert to support her claim. Based on these facts, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion when he denied Stallworth’s request for an additional thirty days to obtain a medical expert’s affidavit. Rule 56(f) is not designed to protect litigants who are lazy or dilatory. We find Stallworth had ample time to locate a medical expert to assist with her claim. Therefore, we find the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Doctors was proper.” [Citations omitted.]

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