Articles Posted in Medical Negligence

I did not watch the State of The Union Address last night but I read the speech that he was supposed to have delivered.

It was to contain this line: “And because lawsuits are driving many good doctors out of practice – leaving women in nearly 1,500 American counties without a single OB-GYN – I ask the Congress to pass medical liability reform this year.”

How can anyone with a lick of sense suggest that OB-GYNs do not practice in rural American because of medical negligence lawsuits? Doctors practice medicine where there are patients and where there are hospitals. Hospitals need enough patients to establish and maintain a maternity ward. America does not need and cannot afford a hospital in every county with a maternity ward (which must be staffed 24/7).

We all know that that a person who suffers from an “unsound mind” gets the benefit of a tolling of the statute of limitations under T.C.A. Section 28-1-106, which states that “[i]f the person entitled to commence an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either within the age of eighteen (18) years, or of unsound mind, such person, or such person’s representatives and privies, as the case may be, may commence the action, after the removal of such disability, within the time of limitation for the particular cause of action, unless it exceeds three (3) years, and in that case within three (3) years from the removal of such disability.”

But what if the injured party, prior to becoming of “unsound mind,” granted a durable power of attorney that gave an attorney-in-fact the duty “act in my name, place and stead in any way which I myself could do, if I were personally present, with respect to … claims and litigation…?” Does the presence of that durable power of attorney trump the “unsound mind” statute, mandating the statute of limitations begin to run as if the plaintiff were not of unsound mind?

I have worried about this issue for years. We how have an answer from the Eastern Section of our Court of Appeals hearing a case arising out of the Middle Section. The plaintiff in the case held a durable power of attorney from his father. The father was a resident in the defendant’s nursing home and became of “unsound mind.” According to the opinion, “[t]he plaintiff frequently visited the deceased during the latter’s stay at the defendant’s facility. The plaintiff would later testify that, at the time of his visits, he observed problems in the defendant’s care and treatment of his father, which he believed were harmful to him.” More than a year after the father was transferred from the defendant’s nursing home but within one year of the father’s death {when the disability was “removed,” according to the plaintiff) the attorney-in-fact filed a malpractice suit against the nursing home. Defendant sought summary judgment of the statute of limitations issue, arguing that plaintiff had the power and duty to act on behalf of his father and did not do so in a timely fashion. Plaintiff argued that the cause of action was tolled by operation of Section 28-1-106.

The Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled that “[a]s a matter of law … a physician’s raw success rates do not constitute risk information reasonably related to a patient’s medical procedure.”

There apparently was no (or little) evidence of affirmative misrepresentation on the issue.

A verdict for the plaintiff was reversed and the case remanded for trial.

Plaintiff settled a case with the hospital concerning care given by the nurses and proceeded to trial against the doctor. Over the plaintiff’s objection, the judge gave this instruction to the jury:

“Every physician using ordinary care has the right to assume, until the contrary is or reasonably should be apparent, that every other medical care provider will use ordinary care. To act on that assumption is not negligence. As I have used the term ordinary care here, I mean that degree of care required of all physicians or medical care providers, as already explained in my definition of negligence.”

The jury decided in favor of the defendant. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded. They argued as follows:

As I have mentioned in some past posts (the most recent one can be read here) the voters of Florida passed a constitutional amendment one year ago that severely limited the amount of attorneys’ fees in medical negligence actions. Lawyers who believed that a case was valid but who could not afford to prosecute it then asked clients if they would waive the fee cap and, presumably, had them execute a knowing, valid waiver.

Some lawyers with ties to the medical industry then asked the Florida Supreme Court to order that the Florida Bar adopt a ruling prohibiting such conduct.

The Florida Supreme Court ruled Wednesday. It held that an attorney must advise a potential client of the fee cap and that a client may knowingly and voluntarily waive the cap. It directed the Florida Bar to adopt appropriate rules. See the Order here.

Yesterday afternoon the Tennessee Supreme Court said the the 3-year statute of repose found in the “Doctor and Hospital Relief Act of 1975” should be applied to claims made by minors.

Before yesterday, most lawyers assumed that minors had the right to wait until their 19th birthday to file suit. No more.

Our office filed an amicus brief for TTLA in support of the plaintiffs in this case. I argued the case for the plaintiffs.

Do you remember that Florida capped fees in medical negligence litigation? Severely? If not, see this post.

Well, lawyers for plaintiffs gave plaintiffs the opportunity to waive the cap. Certain members of the bar (most of them with connections to health care providers) asked the Florida Supreme Court to adopt a rule prohibiting lawyers from doing so. Arguments were heard on November 30. Read about the arguments here. Read the briefs and other documents cocerning the petition here.

A new study published in Health Affairs found that “[t]he United States often stands out with high medical errors and in-efficient care and has the worst performance for access/cost barriers and financial burdens.”

The study looked at the health care delivery systems in Germany, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the USA.

The study reports that “p]atients in the United States reported the highest rate of disorganized care at doctor’s offices – 33 percent – followed by Germany with 26 percent, Canada with 24 percent and New Zealand with 21 percent. Patients in Britain and Australia reported 19 percent.” The study also found that “U.S. patient-reported lab error rates were significantly higher than the other five countries, with rates double those reported in Germany and the United Kingdom. Lab error rates were also relatively high in Canada.”

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