Motor Vehicle Cases

June 1, 2017

Tennessee Court Studies Independent Contractor Rules

In Rogers v. Hadju, No. W2016-00850-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in a negligence case, finding that defendant companies could not be held liable for the actions for what was determined to be an independent contractor.

Ford Construction was hired by the state to perform road construction. Ford subcontracted with Traf-Mark Industries for part of the work; Traf-Mark subcontracted with Kerr Brothers; and Kerr Brothers subcontracted with RDH Contracting. On the job site, an employee of RDH Contracting was backing up a truck when he hit an employee of Ford Construction. The injured Ford Construction employee filed this negligence suit against Traf-Mark, Kerr Brothers, RDH Contracting and the driver, arguing that the defendant companies were vicariously liable for the incident because the driver of the truck “was acting in the scope of his employment with them at the time of the incident.”

Traf-Mark and Kerr Brothers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were not liable for the driver’s negligence because RDH Contracting and the driver were independent contractors. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

In Tennessee, “the doctrine of respondeat superior permits a principal to be held liable for the negligent acts of its agent.” (internal citation omitted). “While an employer may be held liable for the negligence of its employee, however, they are generally not liable for the negligence of independent contractors.” (internal citation omitted). When determining whether an employment or independent contractor relationship exists, courts should consider “(1) the right to control the conduct of the work, (2) the right of termination, (3) method of payment, (4) whether or not the worker furnishes his own helpers, (5) whether or not the worker furnishes his own tools, (6) self-scheduling of working hours, and (7) freedom to render services to other entities.” (citing Goodale v. Langenberg, 243 S.W.3d 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

March 1, 2017

Plaintiff’s Verdict Affirmed in Head-On Crash Caused by Police

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Turner v. City of Memphis, No. W2015-02510-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016), the Court of Appeals affirmed a verdict for plaintiff following a Tennessee head-on car wreck between plaintiff and a police officer.

In December 2012, plaintiff and a Memphis police officer were traveling in opposite directions along the same road at just after midnight. The road had five lanes, two going in each direction and one turn lane. Plaintiff was driving south in the lane closest to the turn lane, while the officer was driving north in the outer lane. According to plaintiff, the officer “negligently and without warning crossed traffic and struck the vehicle being driven by [plaintiff] head on.” The accident caused plaintiff’s airbag to deploy and both drivers were knocked unconscious. Plaintiff was transported to the hospital by ambulance and was “subjected to a full trauma work-up, was given a neck brace because of whiplash, was given an I.V. for dehydration, and was administered considerable pain medication.” Plaintiff testified that he eventually was treated by a chiropractor and that the accident caused him pain that he had “never experienced before on that scale.” According to plaintiff, his injuries had improved, but they had “decreased his ability to engage in physical activities including cooking, cleaning, and getting his son to and from school, and he still suffered from frequent headaches, anxiety attacks, and unease of rest.”

Plaintiff brought this action against the city of Memphis under the GTLA for the officer’s alleged negligence in causing the accident. Plaintiff sought $300,000 in damages, including $28,421.18 in medical expenses.

January 21, 2017

Court Orders New Trial – Jury Disregarded Expert Testimony

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Kempson v. Casey, No. E2015-02184-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2016), the Court of Appeals vacated a jury’s finding of no damages for a plaintiff who presented uncontroverted expert proof regarding injuries he alleged to have sustained in a car accident.

Plaintiff was rear-ended by defendant when he was sitting in traffic on the interstate. Although defendant did not deny that the collision occurred, the parties had vastly different accounts of what happened. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was going around 50 miles per hour when she hit him, that his car was knocked forward 5-6 car lengths (but that he did not hit the vehicles in front of him), and that after the accident defendant had blood going down her leg. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that she was driving between 10 and 15 miles per hour at the time of the collision, that the impact was “minor,” that her airbag did not deploy, and that she did not bleed. Both parties agreed that both vehicles were driven away from the scene.

Plaintiff sued for negligence, asserting that “as a result of the accident, [he] began experiencing intractable neck and low back pain that ultimately necessitated” surgery. In support of his claims, plaintiff presented testimony from his surgeon and his chiropractor. Both of these experts testified that plaintiff had “preexisting complaints related to his cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine,” and that his “post-accident complaints were similar to his pre-accident complaints.” The surgeon testified, though, that in his opinion “the accident at issue caused [plaintiff’s] medical condition to worsen to the point that surgery was necessary.”

December 14, 2016

Rental Car Driven by Renter Considered an Uninsured Motor Vehicle

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Martin v. Powers, No. M2014-00647-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2016), the Tennessee Supreme Court analyzed the issue of whether a rental car being driven by a renter qualified as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the plaintiff’s car insurance policy.

Plaintiff owned a bar, and he refused to serve alcohol to the defendant. When plaintiff followed defendant out to the parking lot, defendant got into a rental car that he had rented from Enterprise and intentionally drove into plaintiff, causing a knee injury.

During the course of the litigation, plaintiff “served [his insurance] with a copy of the summons and complaint for the purpose of bringing a claim under his uninsured motorist coverage.” The insurance company argued that Enterprise was a self-insurer under certain Tennessee statutes, and that the accident thus “did not arise out of the ownership or use of an uninsured vehicle.” The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment, but the Supreme Court reversed.

September 19, 2016

Evidence of Intoxication is Not Necessarily Sufficient to Establish Liability

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Denton v. Taylor, No. E2015-01726-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2016), the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in a car accident case because “plaintiff provided no evidence establishing that the decedent’s negligence caused the accident.”

Plaintiff and the decedent, whose wife was the defendant here, were involved in a car accident in March 2013. Plaintiff could not remember anything about the accident, and the other driver was pronounced dead at the scene. In March 2014, plaintiff filed this negligence action.

Defendant moved for summary judgment fifteen months after the complaint was filed, submitting an affidavit from a sheriff’s deputy who stated that there were no witnesses to the accident and that a review of photographs and other evidence “was not able to determine the point of impact.” Defendant argued that plaintiff could not show that decedent’s alleged negligence had caused the accident. Plaintiff responded, relying on the post-mortem toxicology results that showed that decedent had hydrocodone and hydromorphone in his system.

July 27, 2016

Bench Trial Judgment for Plaintiff Reversed Due to Lack of Factual Findings

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Omni Ins. Co. v. Nickoloff, No. E2015-01450-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2016), the Court of Appeals overturned a trial court’s finding of negligence when a vehicle struck a pedestrian walking on a sidewalk. Specifically, it was asserted that plaintiff was walking west on a sidewalk at 10:40 p.m., and defendant was driving west on the road beside the sidewalk. Defendant’s vehicle hit plaintiff, and plaintiff asserted that defendant was liable on the theories of negligence and negligence per se, “due to his violation of Tennessee Code Annotated 55-8-136, which provides in pertinent part that ‘every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway.’”

After a bench trial, the trial court found defendant liable. In its order, the trial court stated: “There was an automobile collision… Plaintiff’’s insured…was walking on the sidewalk. Defendant…acknowledged that he hit [plaintiff] with his vehicle.” Defendant appealed and submitted a statement of the evidence, which was “approved by the trial court as a true and accurate record of the proceedings” and received no objection by plaintiff. The statement of evidence provided only that:

Plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk;

July 19, 2016

Jury Verdict for Plaintiff in Tennessee Truck Accident Case Affirmed

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A Tennessee truck crash case found its way to a jury trial, a plaintiff’s verdict, and a trip to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. In Bachar v. Partin, No. M2015-00724-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2016), the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict finding defendant 60 percent liable for a car accident.

The underlying facts of the case were that defendant truck driver “failed to stop in obedience to a stop sign and drove his truck into the intersection, causing [plaintiff], who had the right-of-way, to swerve and collide with another vehicle.” Although plaintiff and defendant did not actually collide, plaintiff brought suit against defendant alleging that his negligence had caused the accident. After a jury trial, defendant was found to be 60 percent at fault, while plaintiff was held 40 percent liable, and damages were awarded accordingly. Defendant appealed this decision on three grounds: (1) that the evidence did not support the jury’s liability findings; (2) that the evidence did not support the jury’s award of past and future lost wages for plaintiff; and (3) that juror misconduct occurred.

First, the Court of Appeals affirmed the liability apportionment. The Court noted that the evidence showed that the police officer responding to the accident estimated plaintiff’s speed at 43 miles per hour, while the speed limit was 30 miles per hour. The evidence also showed, however, that plaintiff had the right-of-way and that defendant “did not stop or attempt to stop” before entering the intersection. The Court held that “[t]aking the strongest view of the evidence in support of the verdict and affording reasonable inferences to sustain it, the evidence support[ed]” the jury’s finding of fault.

April 24, 2016

Public Duty Doctrine Gives Immunity to City When Suspect Stole Police Car

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Holt v. City of Fayetteville, No. M2014-02573-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2016), the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims due to the city’s immunity under the public duty doctrine, a key limitation of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act.

According to plaintiffs, a police officer had arrested a suspect and placed her in a police car, yet failed to property restrain her. The suspect then stole the police car, drove “at a high rate of speed,” and collided with the car carrying plaintiffs, causing one person to die and three minors to be seriously injured. Plaintiffs brought suit against the city based on the negligence of the police officer in failing to properly restrain the suspect as she was taken into custody.

The city moved for dismissal, which the trial court granted, finding that “although the GTLA removed immunity for negligent acts of employees, Plaintiffs’ claims against the City were barred by the public duty doctrine.” The Court of Appeals affirmed this holding.

On appeal, the Court first looked to the GTLA. As a municipality, the city was entitled to immunity under the GTLA unless the situation fit into one of the enumerated exceptions in the statute. Plaintiffs argued that immunity was removed under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-202, which “removes sovereign immunity ‘for injuries resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle…while in the scope of employment.’” The Court rejected this argument, noting that plaintiffs in this case “only allege that Police Officer negligently restrained [suspect] after her arrest.” The Court concluded that they were “unable to create a claim of negligent operation of a motor vehicle solely from an allegation that Police Officer negligently restrained [suspect].”

April 14, 2016

Claims Against an Employer Can Proceed Even After Employer Admits Vicarious Liability

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently considered an issue of first impression in Tennessee—whether a plaintiff who sues an employee and employer for negligence can proceed on direct negligence claims against the employer after the employer admits that they are vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence. After considering arguments both ways, the Court determined that in Tennessee, “an employer’s admission of vicarious liability does not bar a plaintiff from proceeding against the employer on independent claims of negligence.”

In Jones v. Windham, No. W2015-00973-COA-R10-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016), employee, acting within the scope of her employment with a local daycare, was transporting kids in a van when she struck a minor child. The child’s mother, plaintiff, brought an action for negligence against employee, and also asserted claims for negligence per se, negligent hiring, and negligent retention against employers, as well as a claim for punitive damages against all the defendants. In their answer, employers conceded that they were vicariously liable for any negligence attributed to employee. Accordingly, employers moved for summary judgment on the direct negligence claims against them, arguing that Tennessee should adopt a rule adopted by other states “under which a plaintiff would be prevented from proceeding on any direct negligence claim against an employer once vicarious liability has been admitted.” The trial court granted summary judgment as to all direct negligence claims against the employer, though it denied summary judgment on the punitive damages claim. This Rule 10 appeal followed.

April 10, 2016

Vehicle Photos Allowed into Evidence in Rear-End Collision Case.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Garvin v. Malone, No. M2015-00856-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2016), plaintiffs sued defendant after defendant’s van ran into the rear of plaintiffs’ car. After a jury found for defendant, the issue on appeal was whether photographs showing damage to the vehicles should have been admitted since plaintiffs had not made a claim for property damage.

Defendant was traveling behind plaintiffs, a husband and wife, when a police car traveling in the opposite lane allegedly crossed into plaintiffs’ path. Plaintiff husband was driving and slammed on the brakes. Defendant hit her brakes as well, but “was unable to prevent her van from hitting the rear bumper of the [plaintiffs’] vehicle.” Plaintiffs brought a negligence claim seeking personal injury damages and loss of consortium–$825,000 for husband and $75,000 for wife.

During trial, plaintiff husband testified that he felt a “heavy impact,” and that the accident “impacted [him] heavily.” He admitted that he had no cuts or bruises, and that his body did not touch anything during the accident, but that he was “moved around in [his] vehicle.” Likewise, plaintiff wife testified: “I wasn’t thrown; I was just thrown forward…my body didn’t hit anything except to just react.” Defendant testified, however, that the accident was much less substantial, stating that she “tapped the passenger side rear bumper, about maybe an eight-inch mark, but didn’t see any paint off or anything.”