Motor Vehicle Cases

February 9, 2016

Plaintiff Wins Case Involving Crash With Fire Rescue Vehicle

In Jones v. Bradley County, No. E2015-00204-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2016), plaintiff sued Bradley County after she collided with a truck responding to a fire at a red-light intersection. Plaintiff had the green light at the intersection. Defendant, a fire rescue employee, was driving a Ford F-250 truck that was equipped with a siren and emergency lights. Defendant proceeded to turn left against a red-light, at which time plaintiff’s car collided with defendant’s truck, causing plaintiff significant injuries.

Bradley County relied on Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-108, which “provides privileges to emergency vehicle drivers under certain circumstances.” This statute allows emergency vehicle drivers to “proceed past a red or stop signal[,]” but still requires the driver “to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons[.]” While analyzing this case, though, the Court pointed out that that “[t]he obligation to exercise due care is, thus, not excused by the fact that the [emergency] driver is responding to an emergency call.” (citation omitted).

Bradley County further asserted that the sole cause of this accident was plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-132, which provides that “upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle making use of audible and visual signals…the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way.” The Court pointed out that, when previously applying this statute, the Court has “noted the requirement of due care when entering an intersection even under authority of a green light” and “observed that if plaintiff should have heard the siren or should have seen the blue lights flashing, she…cannot evade her duty to yield to an emergency vehicle by saying that she did not hear and did not see because she did not look.” (citation and internal quotations omitted). In response to this argument, plaintiff pointed to the County Rescue Service operations manual, claiming that defendant violated the portions of the manual that stated that emergency drivers should “slow to a safe speed at which a stop could be made, and insure that all traffic has yielded” and “change the siren mode” when approaching an intersection. Plaintiff further argued that the evidence showed that defendant did not drive with due care through the intersection.

December 29, 2015

Plaintiff Who Turned Left on Red 50% at Fault as Matter of Law

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Hall v. Owens, No. W2014-02214-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2015), the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff ran a red light and turned in front of defendant’s truck. As plaintiff approached an intersection, he had a red arrow for turning left. Defendant was approaching the same intersection driving a tractor-trailer truck, and defendant had a green light. Despite the red arrow, plaintiff proceeded into the intersection and turned left, at which time he was hit by defendant’s truck and severely injured.

Plaintiff sued defendant and his employer for negligence, asserting that defendant’s negligence was the “direct and proximate cause of the collision.” Defendant moved for summary judgment, relying heavily on the footage of the accident from two traffic cameras. Based on the footage, two experts for defendant testified that defendant was driving approximately 52 miles per hour in the 55 mile per hour zone. Further, it was undisputed that defendant had a green light and plaintiff had a red arrow. It was also undisputed that defendant’s truck was well-illuminated and visible.

In response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted expert testimony from an accident reconstructionist asserting that defendant was traveling 60-65 miles per hour, and that defendant had “six to nine seconds of clear visibility of [plaintiff’s] car.” In light of the evidence, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that “no reasonable minds could find anything other than the fact that [plaintiff’s] actions in driving that morning of the accident constituted negligence, and negligence per se, and that his actions were the proximate cause of the accident, at least to the extent of 50% of fault.” The trial court further found that plaintiff’s expert’s testimony regarding defendant’s speed was “fundamentally flawed” in that it failed to consider several relevant factors.

December 8, 2015

Parents Win Dismissal of Case For Allowing Minor Daughter to Drive ATV

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In Ward v. Ward, No. M2014-02237-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2015), plaintiff sued for injuries her daughter sustained in an ATV accident. Daughter, who was 15 years old, was staying with her step-grandmother, the defendant in this action. Defendant gave daughter permission to drive defendant’s ATV to accompany defendant’s nephew as he drove a friend home. The destination was approximately one mile from defendant’s home. Daughter’s friend rode on the ATV with her. Daughter drove to the destination, but before returning to defendant’s home daughter switched with her friend and her friend drove on the return trip. The friend failed to make a turn and drove the ATV off a cliff.

Plaintiff asserted several theories of liability, but the only claims at issue on appeal were for negligent entrustment and negligent supervision. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant on both of these claims, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

To prove negligent entrustment, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a chattel was entrusted, (2) to a person incompetent to use it, (3) with knowledge that the person is incompetent, and (4) that its use is the proximate cause of injury or damage to another.” (internal citation omitted). Defendant first asserted that she was entitled to summary judgment because she only entrusted the ATV to daughter, not to the friend. Defendant pointed to testimony given by daughter in her first deposition where she testified that Defendant told her to drive. Plaintiff refuted this fact, though, with evidence that during daughter’s second deposition she testified that defendant did not specify who was supposed to drive, and that defendant told daughter and friend that “they” could use the ATV. The Court found that this evidence created a genuine issue of material fact, so summary judgment was not appropriate based on the argument that defendant did not entrust the ATV to the friend.

November 9, 2015

Alleged Road Defect Case Rejected by Tennessee Court of Appeals

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Court of Appeals recently overturned a trial court’s decision that a somewhat recently reconstructed road constituted a dangerous road condition. In Church v. Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc., No. E2014-02077-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2015), plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of two women who died in an automobile accident. The facts showed that a highway had been reconfigured to bypass a town. Before the construction, highway drivers had no stop signs and simply proceeded on a curvy road. The new configuration, which included a stop sign at a “T” style intersection and a subsequent turn, opened on July 13, 2009. When it opened, the new roadway had a stop sign, a white stop bar on the pavement, and a “stop ahead” sign.

After the road opened, the State learned that many drivers were failing to stop at the new sign. In an email from a TDOT engineer to superintendent of maintenance, the engineer said that rumble strips had been suggested as a possible solution at the intersection. Rumble strips were never added, but changes were made following an accident in October 2009. In December, a junction sign was added before the intersection; large “stop ahead” signs were placed 320 feet before the intersection on both sides of the road; a directional sign with an arrow was placed before the intersection; two larger stop signs were placed on both sides of the road; and a two-headed arrow sign was placed across from the intersection.

On January 23, 2010, the driver here failed to stop her car at the stop sign and instead immediately proceeded to the right. She entered the path of oncoming traffic, causing a collision which killed her and her passenger. The evidence suggested that this was most likely her first time to drive through the newly constructed intersection, as she had been recovering from a back surgery.

July 20, 2015

Judgment For Plaintiff in Negligence Case Reversed on Appeal

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In a somewhat rare move, the Tennessee Court of Appeals recently overturned a trial court’s ruling for plaintiff in a negligence case. In Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. a/s/o Couch v. Jackson Madison School System Bd. of Educ., No. W2014-02218-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 2015), plaintiff was driving a crop sprayer on a narrow, rural, unlined road. Plaintiff saw a school bus turn onto the road traveling towards the crop sprayer, and both parties agreed that there was not room for both vehicles on the road. According to the trial testimony, the sprayer would have had time to stop but chose not to do so. Plaintiff testified that had he stopped, the accident probably would have been avoided. Instead, plaintiff moved the right tires of the sprayer off the road and, after clearing the bus, the shoulder gave way and the sprayer fell into a ditch, causing fairly significant property damage. Plaintiff sued the bus driver for negligence, alleging that there was more unpaved shoulder on the bus’s side of the road and that the bus driver did not take reasonable care to move his vehicle as far right as possible to avoid the accident.

The trial court ruled that defendant bus driver “was negligent in failing to take reasonable action to avoid an accident under the circumstances that existed at the time of the accident and that the [bus driver] could have foreseen an accident happening through the use of reasonable care.” The Court of Appeals, however, overturned this ruling.

June 9, 2015

Truck Owner Not Liable for Sister-in-Law’s Tennesssee Truck Accident

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

In a recent Tennessee car accident case, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendant on the theories of family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. In Daniels v. Huffaker, No. E2014-00869-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 12, 2015), plaintiff’s vehicle was hit by a truck driven by Huffaker as Huffaker drove to her boyfriend’s apartment. The truck driven by Huffaker was owned by Mr. Norris, Huffaker’s brother-in-law, who was deployed on active duty to Iraq at the time of the accident. While Mr. Norris was in Iraq, Huffaker split her time between her boyfriend’s apartment and her sister’s (Ms. Norris’s) home. Ms. Norris allowed Huffaker to drive Mr. Norris’s truck during his deployment since the truck was not otherwise in use. By the time of the appeal, Mr. Norris had conceded that Huffaker was a permissive user of the truck.

Plaintiff sued Huffaker and Mr. Norris for her damages related to the accident, making claims against Mr. Norris under the theories of the family purpose doctrine and negligent entrustment. Because Huffaker was never properly served, Mr. Norris was ultimately the only defendant in the case. After a hearing, the trial court granted Mr. Norris’s motion for summary judgment on both of plaintiff’s theories of liability, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

May 13, 2014

You’ll Get Nothing and Like It!

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

It is a classic line in the movie Caddyshack, but it quickly sums up the end result in this case too. This is a two car, intersection case in which both drivers sought damages from the other. After a two day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding both the plaintiff and the defendant 50% at fault. Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial which was denied. An appeal followed.

The following relevant facts were established at trial:

1. Plaintiff was traveling south on U.S. 11-E with the intention of turning right on Allison Road.

April 22, 2014

Tennessee Court Holds that Jury Need Not Be Instructed on Financial Effect of Fault Being Assessed Against a Non-Party That Had Previously Settled

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Recently, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reviewed the case of Lake v. The Memphis Landsmen in its third trip to the court. A number of issues were raised in the appeal, but by far the most interesting one concerned the plaintiffs’ contention that the trial court erred in including a non-party who plaintiffs previously settled with on the jury verdict form. The plaintiffs also contended that to the extent the non-party was properly included on the form, the trial court should have instructed the jury on the effect of allocating negligence to the non-party. Why is this issue important to the plaintiffs? Because the jury handed down an $8,543,530 verdict but attributed 100% fault to the non-party.

This case concerned a wreck between a passenger bus and a concrete truck. The concrete truck took a left turn and struck the bus causing it to collide with a light pole and eject the plaintiff and resulting in a traumatic brain injury to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs settled with the concrete truck defendant before trial and then proceeded to trial against several other defendants on various theories of liability concerning the passenger bus.

In this appeal, the Court of Appeals first explained that Tennessee has a system of modified comparative fault, adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1992 in the landmark case of McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52,56 (Tenn. 1992). Under this system, fault is apportioned among all parties in proportion to their degree of culpability, and a defendant is only liable for the percentage of damages that his or her own negligence caused. In McIntyre, the court also adopted the non-party defense, allowing juries to apportion fault to non-parties with culpability. McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 58.

April 9, 2014

Not All Rear-End Collisions Result in Plaintiff’s Verdicts

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

The Tennessee Court of appeals recently affirmed a jury’s defense verdict in a rear-end car crash case in Hicks v. Prahl, No. E2013-00285-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 25, 2014). Plaintiff was driving on an entrance ramp trying to merge onto a highway when, according to her testimony, she slowed down to negotiate a sharp curve on the entrance ramp and was rear-ended by defendant’s vehicle. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that plaintiff slowed to a complete stop twice while attempting to merge onto the highway, the second of which immediately preceded the collision. According to defendant, plaintiff came to a complete stop on the entrance ramp and then began moving forward again. Defendant then rotated her neck over her left shoulder to look for approaching traffic and lifted her foot off the brake, causing her car to move forward. Defendant testified that when she returned to looking ahead she discovered that plaintiff had stopped in front of her again. Defendant stated that she quickly applied her brakes but was not able to avoid crashing into the rear end of plaintiff’s car. Defendant explained that she had no reason to suspect that plaintiff would stop a second time because the curve on the entrance ramp allowed defendant to see that there were no cars in front of plaintiff’s car and no other reason for such a stop.

Plaintiff was talking on her cell phone at the time of the crash. Plaintiff’s daughter testified that she was talking with her mother who was using the speaker phone while driving. Daughter and husband also corroborated plaintiff’s testimony about the sharp curve on the entrance ramp requiring significant deceleration. The opinion mentions that plaintiff amended her complaint to seek $1.5 million dollars in damages, although there’s no description of plaintiff’s injuries, medical expenses, or other damages. Plaintiff refused medical treatment at the scene because she did not think it was a “major accident,” but she did go to the emergency room later that day.

At trial, plaintiff testified that she did not ever stop on the entrance ramp while attempting to merge onto the highway, but instead she merely lifted her foot off the gas pedal. When impeached with the averment in the complaint that she was “stopped to wait for traffic,” plaintiff testified that the pleading was in error. Plaintiff also testified that she could not remember making the statements to personnel in the emergency room that she was rear-ended while “sitting stopped in her car.”

January 3, 2014

Nashville Tennessee Ordinance Has A Special Provision on Reckless Driving

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Many people are unaware that local governments often have ordinances that can form the basis of a negligence per se case – ordinances that may create a responsibility greater than that imposed by state statues or the common law.

Consider this ordinance from Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee:

It is unlawful for any person to drive any vehicle upon the streets of the metropolitan government or upon any private road or driveway or parking area in a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Any person who drives any vehicle at a speed of fifteen or more miles per hour than the posted speed limit upon any streets of metropolitan government or upon any private road or driveway or parking area in any residence district shall be presumed to be driving in a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property and the burden of proof shall be upon the driver to establish that they were not driving with such disregard.

Code, 12.68.180 Reckless driving(emphasis added).