Articles Posted in Motor Vehicle Cases

Successfully bringing suit in Tennessee for an injury or death allegedly caused by the acts or omissions of a governmental employee is more difficult than a claim against a private citizen or business. Consider, for example, the case of Lynch v. Loudon Cnty., No. E2013-00454-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2013).

On a cold, wet, icy winter morning, a deputy sheriff arrives at the scene of a minor, single car accident. The car’s front tires had slid off the roadway preventing the driver from backing the car up. The driver is a woman, alone, wearing a bathrobe and naked underneath. She is not injured, nor is her car damaged.

Before reaching the woman’s vehicle, the deputy encounters the passerby who first stopped to assist the woman and called 911. The passerby tells the deputy that “something is not right” with woman and that she cannot provide a phone number or answer any questions about where she was coming from or going. The passerby will later testify that the woman appeared “sleepy,” “zoned out,” and “not real steady.”

Remittiturs are court-ordered reductions in a jury verdict because the trial judge thought that the jury awarded too much money in compensatory or punitive damages.  They are a common sense, common law "tort reform" measure, designed to permit a judge who actually heard the evidence (or, in rare cases, the judges on an appellate court) to alter the amount of the jury’s verdict.

This case arises from a collision between a motorcycle and a car. Following a jury trial, fault was allocated 40% to the motorcyclist and 60% to the defendant motorist. The total damages awarded were $317,000.00 which based on fault allocations was reduced to $190,000.00. Upon motion of the defendant, the trial court granted a remittitur finding the jury’s awards for future pain and suffering and future loss of enjoyment of life were excessive. Accordingly, the court reduced those awards and approved a judgment for the motorcyclist in the amount of $54,192.10. The remittitur was accepted under protest and an appeal was taken.

Pursuant to T.C.A. 20-10-102, trial courts are statutorily authorized to grant a remittitur as necessary to cure an excessive jury verdict and avoid the expense of a new trial. When reviewing a trial court’s grant of remittitur, Tennessee appellate courts will conduct a three-step review consisting of (1) the trial court’s reasons for granting a remittitur; (2) the amount of the reduction to ensure it does not destroy the jury’s verdict; (3) the evidence related to damages to assess whether the proof is consistent with the remittitur.

The sender of a text message to a person faces potential liability if the recipient of the message negligently causes a wreck injuring others, according to a recent opinion of the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey.

In Kubert v. Best, A-1128-12T4 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 27, 2013), the Kurberts were seriously injured when a young drivers who was texting while driving crossed the center-line of the road and hit them.  Their case against the young driver was settled, but the Kuberts appealed a decision of the trial court that dismissed their claims against the young driver’s friend who was texting the driver much of the day and sent a text message to him immediately before the accident.  Texting while driving is illegal in New Jersey.

No other appellate court has addressed this issue:  whether one who is texting from a location remote from the driver of an automobile can be liable to persons injured because the driver was distracted by the text.  The court answered the question "yes," but only if the sender knew or had special reason to know that the recipient would view the text while driving and thus be distracted."  The court issued a 30-page opinion on the issue, which employs duty analysis to arrive at the conclusion that a duty should be imposed on the sender.  To reach its result, the majority of the court discusses the duty of a passenger in a vehicle at great length.

State Farm, a leading auto insurer, has sued a referral service, chiropractic  firm and others alleging, inter alia, that they engaged in a fraudulent scheme of referrals to and from a plaintiff’s firm that resulted in monetary loss to State Farm via it medical payments and personal injury protection (PIP) coverage.   

Here is a summary of the action as set forth in the federal court complaint:

 This action involves a massive fraud scheme by the Defendants to obtain from State Farm Personal Injury Protection (“PIP Benefits”) and Medical Payments Coverage (“MPC Benefits”) insurance benefits (collectively, PIP Benefits and MPC Benefits are referred to as “No-Fault Benefits”) for services and treatments purportedly rendered to patients at Physicians Group clinics in Florida, which are owned by Kompothecras [a chiropractor]. The services and treatments were not lawful when they were rendered because the Defendants intentionally violated several important criminal, civil and administrative laws to lure unwitting motor vehicle accident victims to receive the services and treatments at the Physicians Group clinics, namely the Patient Brokering Act (Fla. Stat. § 817.505), the Patient Self-Referral Act of 1992 (Fla. Stat. § 456.053), the Anti-Kickback Statute (Fla. Stat. § 456.054), the Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq.) (“FDUTPA”), the laws establishing grounds for disciplinary action against chiropractors who engage in false and misleading advertising (Fla. Stat. § 460.413(d), (f) and (l)), and administrative rules prohibiting chiropractors from engaging in deceptive and misleading advertising (F.A.C. Rule 64B2-15.001(2)(a), (b) and (k)). The driving force behind the Defendants’ scheme is to exhaust their unsuspecting patients’ limited No-Fault Benefits, without regard to whether the patients may have health insurance that might otherwise cover some or all of Physicians Group’s charges, thereby preserving their No-Fault Benefits for other medical services that the patients may truly need.

Tennessee law permits the recovery of punitive damages when a defendant has engaged in reckless conduct.  Because the standard for criminally negligent homicide mirrors the standard for recklessness necessary to recover punitive damages, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ affirmation of the guilty verdict against a criminal defendant in a recent case could be pertinent to a punitive damages claim in a personal injury or wrongful death case.

 
In State of Tennessee v. Christopher Vigil, No. E2011-00259-CCAR3- CD (Tenn. Crim. App. February 9, 2012), the Court  summarized the evidence supporting the verdict:
 
Leading up to the incident, the proof showed that Appellant and the victim had a rather torrid relationship. The victim was staying with a friend because she had been arguing with Appellant. The two were seen arguing on the day of the offense and at least one witness saw Appellant swipe his open hand toward the victim, causing

U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood  has announced a final rule specifically prohibiting interstate truck and bus drivers from using hand-held cell phones while operating their vehicles. The joint rule from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is the latest action by the U.S. Department of Transportation to end distracted driving.  The new rule went into effective on January 3, 2012.
 
The final rule prohibits commercial drivers from using a hand-held mobile telephone while operating a commercial truck or bus. Drivers who violate the restriction will face federal civil penalties of up to $2,750 for each offense and disqualification from operating a commercial motor vehicle for multiple offenses. Additionally, states will suspend a driver’s commercial driver’s license (CDL) after two or more serious traffic violations. Commercial truck and bus companies that allow their drivers to use hand-held cell phones while driving will face a maximum penalty of $11,000. Approximately four million commercial drivers would be affected by this final rule.

While driver distraction studies have produced mixed results, FMCSA research shows that using a hand-held cell phone while driving requires a commercial driver to take several risky steps beyond what is required for using a hands-free mobile phone, including searching and reaching for the phone. Commercial drivers reaching for an object, such as a cell phone, are three times more likely to be involved in a crash or other safety-critical event. Dialing a hand-held cell phone makes it six times more likely that commercial drivers will be involved in a crash or other safety-critical event. 

New York’s highest court has ruled that the claim of bus passengers injured in a single-vehicle bus wreck which sought to hold the bus manufacturer liable for the failure to install  passenger seatbelts on the bus were not preempted by federal regulations promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA).

 
In Doomes v. Best Transit Corp.,  No. 170 (N.Y.Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2011),  several bus passengers were injured after a dozing bus driver caused a single-vehicle bus crash.  The Doomes plaintiffs and several other passengers sued several defendants and reached settlements with some of them.  The claim against the bus manufacturer Warrick was not settled.  
 
The jury found the bus manufacturer partially liable for the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs due to lack of seat belts.  On appeal, Warrick asserted several points, including an argument that the jury was improperly allowed to consider that the bus was defective or that it was negligent due to a lack of seatbelts because  FMVSS 208 (49 CFR 571.208), which did not require the installation of passenger seatbelts, preempted any claims of liability for failure to install such seatbelts.

The old "every dog gets one free bite" rule was severely limited as a result of legislation enacted by the Tennessee General Assembly several years ago.  In fact, the new law works to protect motorcyclists and bicyclists, too.  Here are the new rules:

44-8-413.  Civil liability for injury caused by dogs. 

  (a)  (1) The owner of a dog has a duty to keep that dog under reasonable control at all times, and to keep that dog from running at large. A person who breaches that duty is subject to civil liability for any damages suffered by a person who is injured by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in or on the private property of another.

The California Supreme Court has ruled that a truck driver may be held liable for parking his vehicle along a freeway to have a snack where regulations permitted only emergency parking.

The entire opinion has a fascinating discussion of the law of duty, but the following gives you a flavor for the balance of the opinion:

If stopping 16 feet from the traffic lanes exempts a driver from the duty of care, does the same hold for parking six feet from the lane?  Six inches?  If we are to create immunity for a truck driver stopping for a few minutes to have a snack, should we also do so for one who decides to sleep for hours by the roadside rather than pay for a motel room?  Would the categorical exemption Ralphs seeks still apply if a tractor-trailer driver parked an inch from the traffic lanes, on the outside of a curve, leaving the rig there all night without lights?  To ask these questions is to see why a categorical exemption is not appropriate.  The duty of reasonable care is the same under all these circumstances; what varies with the specific facts of the case is whether the defendant has breached that duty.  That question, as discussed earlier, is generally one to be decided by the jury, not the court.

The Board of Commissioers on Grievances and Discipline of The Supreme Court of Ohio has released an opinion of the issue of whether, during settlement of a matter, it is ethical for a lawyer to propose, demand, and or agree to personally satisfy any and all claims by third persons as to settlement funds. 

Here is the Syllabus of the Opinion 2011-1: 

It is improper for a plaintiff’s lawyer to personally agree, as a condition of settlement, to indemnify the opposing party from any and all claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such agreements are not authorized by Prof. Cond. Rule 1.15(d) and violate Prof. Cond. Rules 1.8(e) and 1.7(a)(2). Further, it is improper for a lawyer to propose or require, as a condition of settlement, that a plaintiff’s lawyer make a personal agreement to indemnify the opposing party from any and all claims by third persons to the settlement funds. Such conduct violates Prof. Cond. Rule 8.4(a). The Board recommends that this advisory opinion be prospective in application.

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