Articles Posted in Premises Liability

The Supreme Court of Florida recently issued an interesting opinion. In Williams v. Davis,  No. SC05-1817 ( Fl. S.Ct.  Nov. 21, 2007) the Court initially notes that "all property owners owe a duty … not to permit the growth of foliage on their property to extend outside the bounds of the property and into the public right-of-way so as to interfere with a motorist’s ability to safely travel on the adjacent roadway."  But this case was not about foliage that extended beyond the property line but rather foliage on the property that obstructed the view of a motorist.

Here is more:  "courts must remain alert to the changes in our society that may give rise to the recognition of a duty even where none existed before. Absolute rules, while predictable in the outcomes they produce, may not be suitable to protect societal interests. This is especially true as we attempt to cope with the carnage on our highways. While a strict rule of immunity from liability for harms caused by conditions on land adjacent to roadways may have once been a practical necessity for an agrarian society and economy, it is markedly less so in Florida’s modern society and landscape. See Keeton et. al., supra, § 57, at 391. In the modern landscape it has become an inescapable fact that people rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the automobile for transportation both in rural and urban communities.  We simply cannot ignore the fact that every year highway accidents kill thousands and injure millions of our citizens, while inflicting economic costs in the billions of dollars. Under these circumstances, the dominance of the automobile and the dangers incident thereto have become a modern fact of life  that make it more likely that a dangerous condition on private property at a highway intersection may cause harm to those on adjacent roadways."

Nevertheless, the Court went on to say that "we can see little basis for imposing liability on the owner of a wooded residential lot for passively permitting the property to remain in its natural condition so long as the growth does not extend beyond the property’s boundaries. Unlike the situation in Whitt, wherein we concluded that it should be foreseeable to the operator of a commercial service station that obstructions to the vision of an exiting motorist could constitute a danger to adjacent pedestrians, we find it unlikely that a residential landowner would foresee that adjacent motorists would be endangered by the mere presence of foliage on the property."

Pharmacist persuades a female customer to stay over night at his house.  When his wife is gone.  Girlfriend is unaware he has a wife and, indeed, is told to the contrary. Wife appears at an inopportune time.  Fight ensues.  Girlfriend gets hurt.  Lawsuit follows.  Girlfriend seeks to hold wife and husband responsible for her injuries.

Husband:  "I owe no duty to that woman."   Dinner?  "Yes."  Flowers?  "Yes."  Warm B & B by candlelight while nestled in a king-size bed playfully wrapped  in a leopard skin comforter with Rod Stewart’s "Great American Songbook Collection" playing softly in the background?  "Yes."  Duty?  "Now just a damn minute."

The trial judge disagreed and a jury popped him with a percentage of fault for the injuries for her significant injuries.  Judge Lee wrote the opinion for our Court of Appeals and affirmed.  She quickly found a duty existed, and said this on the issue of breach of duty:

i wrote several weeks ago about the lawsuit Robert Bork filed against the Yale Club. I mentioned that the some issues I had with the suit, including the request for punitive damages.

Eric Turkewitz wrote a much better post than I.  As a New York personal injury lawyer, he wrote what was wrong with the complaint filed on behalf of Judge Bork. 

The original complaint has been amended, and it still does not pass muster in Eric’s mind.  Here is his latest post that explains what was wrong with the original complaint and what the amended complaint missed.

The Tennessee General Assembly has passed a new dog bite liability statute, known as the "“Dianna Acklen Act of 2007”.

Section 44-8-413. (a) (1) The owner of a dog has a duty to keep that dog under reasonable control at all times, and to keep that dog from running at large. A person who breaches that duty is subject to civil liability for any damages suffered by a person who is injured by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in or on the private property of another.

(2) Such a person may be held liable regardless of whether the dog has shown any dangerous propensities or whether the dog’s owner knew or should have known of the dog’s
dangerous propensities.

In Lane v. Atchison Heritage Conference Center, Inc., No. 94634 (March 16, 2007),  the Kansas Supreme Court held that "mmunity from liability under the recreational use exception to the [Kansas Tort Claims Act] does not depend upon the "primary use" of the property but rather depends on the character of the property in question."  Therefore, the Court ruled that "the recreational use exception to the KTCA, K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 75-6104(o), applies when property is "intended or permitted" to be used for recreational purposes. The correct test to be applied under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 75-6104(o) is whether the property has been used for recreational purposes in the past or whether recreation has been encouraged."

The Court then applied the statute to bar and slip-and-fall claim against the convention center which had hosted dances, card tournements, sewing demonstrations, local Bar meetings, etc.  The plaintiff in the case was injured at a New Year’s Eve Party.

Read the decision here.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has issued an opinion in Bennett v. Trevacca Nazarene University.

The summary:

"We accepted this appeal of a premises liability case to determine whether the “independent contractor rule” adopted in Blair v. Campbell, 924 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. 1996), relieves a premises owner from liability when a premises owner provides an independent contractor inaccurate information germane to the contractor’s work. We hold that a property owner has a duty of reasonable care to provide accurate information to an independent contractor if the owner provides specific information germane to the repair after engaging the contractor. Because material facts remain in dispute between the parties in this case about what information the premises owner provided, the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed a verdict in a case where a bus driver was attacked by a knife-wielding passenger, resulting a bus crash that resulted in several injuries and the death of the bus driver.  A trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff passenger.

First, the defendant challenged the admissibility of plaintiff’s experts; the Court of Appeals found no error in permitting the experts to testify.

Second, the defendant argued that prior incidents should not have been admitted into evidence.  This is the Court’s ruling on this point:

The Oregon Supreme Court has ruled that  a state recreational use statute does not bar a claim by a plaintiff who was injured while crossing the defendant’s land after engaging in recreational activity on an adjacent property.

The facts:  "Plaintiffs and their families drove on Highway 6 to a paved turnout along the highway near the "Fisherman’s Bridge" area of the Wilson River. Plaintiffs parked their cars in the turnout area and walked along an asphalt path that is parallel to the roadway and between the road’s guardrail and a chain link fence. On the other side of the fence is a steep slope. The asphalt path and the underlying land is owned by defendant, the State of Oregon Department of Transportation. Plaintiffs and their families used the path to gain access to a footbridge that crosses the river to a riverside beach area owned by Willamette Industries and Kenneth Fan Rad. Willamette and Rad had opened the beach area to the public for recreational purposes. After swimming and relaxing at the beach area, plaintiffs re-crossed the footbridge and used the path owned by defendant to return to their cars. While walking on that path, the asphalt under plaintiffs’ feet crumbled and plaintiffs slid under the fence and down the steep slope approximately 40 feet, sustaining injuries."

An Oregon statute provides that, subject to several exceptions, "an owner of land is not liable in contract or tort for any personal injury, death or property damage that arises out of the use of the land for recreational purposes, woodcutting or the harvest of special forest products when the owner of land either directly or indirectly permits any person to use the land for recreational purposes, woodcutting or the harvest of special forest products. …"

The South Carolina Supreme Court has ruled that a spectator at a hockey game may not sue when he is hit in the face by a puck, and cited Tennessee law in reaching its conclusion.

The South Carolina Court said: "Primary implied assumption of risk arises when the plaintiff impliedly assumes those risks that are inherent in a particular activity.” Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Prop. Regime, 333 S.C. 71, 81, 508 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1998) (emphasis in original).[1] The Davenport Court further explained the doctrine as follows:

Primary implied assumption of risk is not a true affirmative defense, but instead goes to the initial determination of whether the defendant’s legal duty encompasses the risk encountered by the plaintiff. . . .[T]he Tennessee Supreme Court summarized the doctrine in the following way:

Did Burger King have a duty to design its stand-alone restaurant in such a way to protect its in-house dining customers from being struck by a car that came through the building’s wall?

The Illinois Supreme Court  addressed this problem in the case of Marshall v. Burger King Corporation,  Docket No. 100372, ( Ill. S.Ct. June 22, 2006). The Court started its analysis this way:

"The touchstone of this court’s duty analysis is to ask whether a plaintiff and a defendant stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposed upon the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff.  This court often discusses the policy considerations that inform this inquiry in terms of four factors: (1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, (2) the likelihood of the injury; (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury; and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. " [Citations omitted.]

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