The fungal meningitis outbreak discovered in Nashville and now spread to other states (Minnesota, Ohio,  Florida, North Carolina, Indiana, Michigan, Virginia and Maryland) will shed new light on compounding pharmacies and epidural steroid injections.  But it will also shed a light on the tort reform statutes that placed limitations on the amount of money that wrongdoers have to pay when their conduct kills or injures a human being.

Usually, the effects of tort reform remain hidden, known only to the those who get harmed and find out their rights are limited, the legal community, and of course  those members of the business and insurance communities who persuaded the General Assembly to pass the laws.  But now that we have a tragedy that is in the national spotlight, millions of people will come to know that the Tennessee General Assembly does not permit Tennesseans to put a value on human life or on suffering or pain.  Rather, the value of those losses has been arbitrarily capped by  lobbyists and business interests.

In other words, the public will soon find out that tort reform will provide yet another harm to the victims of fungal meningitis and their families.

The fungal meningitis outbreak continues to grow.  Five patients have died and over 40 other patients have contracted fungal meningitis, reportedly after each of them received the steroid  methylprednisolone acetate compounded by the New England Compounding Center ("NECC").  Each of the patients received the steroid as treatment for chronic back pain.

Allegedly, the steroid injections were contaminated with a fungus that led to meningitis, an infection of the lining of the brain and spinal cord. Fungal meningitis is very rare and presents a real risk of death to the patients who contract it.

Who has legal responsibility for this outbreak?  There is a substantial amount of investigation that must be done to fully answer that question.  The Centers for Disease Control is coordinating the multi-state investigation into the fungal meningitis outbreak and will help get to the bottom of the matter from a scientific standpoint.  At this point, the CDC has not definitively demonstrated that the steroid is the source of the infection and, while that level of certainty is not necessary from a legal standpoint (in Tennessee, a victim or a victim’s family would only have to prove that more likely than not the steroid was the source of the infection) the CDC’s work will undoubtedly be of assistance in this matter.

The Montana Supreme Court has ordered that a trial court may not order a Rule 35 psychological examination of a personal injury plaintiff who has asserted a typical pain and suffering claim.

In Lewis v. 8th Judicial District,  OP 12-0401 (Mont. S. C. Sept. 11, 2012) Lewis brought a claim for damages arising after she hit by a car while crossing the street as a pedestrian.  Lewis did not claim damages for any mental or psychological disorder or injury due to the accident, nor did she claim that a pre-existing mental condition was exacerbated by the accident or assert an independent tort claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Rather, she made only a general claim for "emotional pain, suffering and anxiety" associated with her physical injuries from the accident.

Lewis maintained that the motor vehicle/pedestrian accident is solely responsible for her current and continuing issues with pain. However, a physician who examined Lewis on behalf of State Farm questioned whether her chronic pain may be caused or exacerbated by her preexisting mental health issues.

The United States Supreme Court has agreed to consider E.M.A. ex rel. Plyler v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290 (4th Cir.2012), in which the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals said that North Carolina’s one-third cap on the state’s recovery against a Medicaid recipient’s settlement proceeds as provided in its third-party liability statutes, which inherently raised unrebuttable presumption in favor of the state that allocation of one-third of a lump sum settlement was consistent with federal law, violated anti-lien provision in federal Medicaid law.

The Court said that

As the unanimous [Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 126 S.Ct. 1752, 164 L.Ed.2d 459 (2006)] … decision makes clear, federal Medicaid law limits a state’s recovery to settlement proceeds that are shown to be properly allocable to past medical expenses. In the event of an unallocated lump-sum settlement exceeding the amount of the state’s Medicaid expenditures, as in this case, the sum certain allocable to medical expenses must be determined by way of a fair and impartial adversarial procedure that affords the Medicaid beneficiary an opportunity to rebut the statutory presumption in favor of the state that allocation of one-third of a lump sum settlement is consistent with the anti-lien provision in federal law.

The 2012 Justice Programs annual seminar has been scheduled.  The seminar will once again be held in Knoxville (Nov. 29 and 30), Nashville (Dec. 6 and 7)  and Memphis Dec. 13 and 14). Fifteen hours of CLE credit (including four hours of ethics / dual credit) will be awarded to those who register for and attend both days of the program.

The Justice Programs annual review seminar is one of the largest attended seminar programs in Tennessee.  A complete schedule of the program may be viewed at www.tennjusticeprograms.com.

The registration form applies to individual registrations only.  Group discounts are available by calling Kori at 615.742.4880.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has ruled that a law firm that was admittedly aware of an ERISA subrogation interest and disbursed settlement  funds from a third-party claim  to its client could not be held personally liable for failure to pay the funds to an ERISA plan.

In Treasurer, Trustees of Drury Industries, Inc. Health Care Plan v. Goding , No. 11-2885 (8th Cir. Sept. 7, 2012), Goding was hurt in a slip and fall accident.  He received medical insurance benefits from an employer-sponsored health insurance plan.  He also brought a third-party claim and settled the case. Goding’s attorneys, Casey and DeVoti, P.C. ("Casey"), were aware of the subrogation interest but distributed all of the proceeds of the settlement (after deduction for attorney’s fees and expenses) to Goding.  The Plan pursued collection efforts against Goding, but he declared bankruptcy and the obligation to the Plan was discharged.  The Plan then pursued a recovery against Casey, asserting multiple theories of recovery.

The trial judge and appellate court rejected all theories.  The ERISA claims were rejected because the Plan had the right to seek equitable remedies only and, since Casey no longer had the money, no equitable claim could be asserted against it.  The Court noted that Casey never agreed to protect the subrogation interest – it only acknowledged the existence of it, The state law claims were rejected because they were preempted by ERISA.

The Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled that a landlord may be held liable for injuries caused by vicious dogs owned by its tenant.

In Giacalone v. Housing Authority of the Town of Wallingford, No. SC 18669 (Conn. Sept. 18, 2102), plaintiff tenant sued defendant landlord for injuries sustained after plaintiff was attacked by a dog owned by another tenant of defendant.  Defendant allegedly knew of the dog’s dangerous propensities, but did not have direct care of, or control over, the dog.  Plaintiff brought the claim against landlord on a common law premises liability theory.

Under Connecticut common law, knowledge of a domestic animal’s vicious propensity imposes a duty on the owner to restrain that animal, and failure to do so is treated as negligence, triggering liability for damage caused by the animal.   The rule has been changed by recent statutes, but those statutes do not address the liability of landlords.

The Spring 2012 edition of FDCC Quarterly has an article titled "Best Practice for Defense of Corporate Depositions."  The article is written by a Senior General Attorney for BNSF Railway Company, Mr. Thomas R. Jayne.

Those of us who are usually take depositions of corporate representatives will find the thought process of corporate defense counsel interesting and helpful.

The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that functional magnetic resonance imaging cannot be used in a criminal case to prove that the defendant’s denials of wrongdoing were true.

Defendant wanted to introduce evidence of the fMRI to prove that he was telling the truth in his criminal trial and that did not intentionally violate the law.  In an issue of first impression, the court of appeals affirmed the exclusion of the evidence.  The court said

 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the fMRI evidence pursuant to Rule 403 in light of (1) the questions surrounding the reliability of fMRI lie detection tests in general and as performed on [defendant] Dr. Semrau, (2) the failure to give the prosecution an opportunity to participate in the testing, and (3) the test result’s inability to corroborate Dr. Semrau’s answers as to the particular offenses for which he was charged.

Almost four years ago Tennessee adopted  a requirement  lawyers filing  medical malpractice (now called health care liability) lawsuits must file a "certificate of good faith."  Under the current version of the statute the certificate must be filed with the complaint.

The Tennessee pre-suit notice statute can be found at T.C.A. Section 29-26-122.  I wrote an article about the most recent version of the statute for the  Tennessee Bar Journal; the article is titled "Med Mal Makeover:  The New Medical Malpractice Notice and Certificate of Good Faith Statute."

I have assembled a list of the cases that discussed the certificate of good faith requirement.  One of the cases is pending before the Tennessee Supreme Court and an opinion is expected in the next few weeks.

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