The following graphs demonstrate the resolution of personal injury, wrongful death, and other tort cases in Sumner County, Tennessee during the last six fiscal years ending June 30, 2023.
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Click on the link for more information on the Sumner County court system.
Where defendant in a negligence and premises liability case filed a motion for summary judgment just three days after filing her answer, and the trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for additional time to conduct discovery and granted summary judgment to defendant, that ruling was vacated on appeal.
In Graves v. Calloway, No. W2022-01536-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2023), plaintiff filed a negligence and premises liability claim against two defendants, including defendant homeowner, after he was injured when he fell off a ladder while accessing defendant’s attic to help her install squirrel traps. Defendant homeowner filed her answer, then filed a motion for summary judgment just three days later. Plaintiff filed a motion requesting more time to conduct discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.07, as well as a motion to amend. The trial court ultimately denied the motion for more time and granted summary judgment to defendant homeowner, but this ruling was vacated on appeal.
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals noted that the “Tennessee Supreme Court has held that after adequate time for discovery has been provided, summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” (internal citation and quotation omitted). Rule 56.07 provides that a party opposing summary judgment can request more time in which to conduct discovery, and plaintiff in this case followed the mechanism set out by the Rule. Plaintiff’s counsel submitted an affidavit stating that he had had no opportunity to conduct discovery, and that he had written defendant’s attorney requesting dates for depositions, but the request had been denied.
Where plaintiff filed suit against several governmental entities, including an emergency 911 board, based on the failure of the multiple entities to respond to and close a road that suffered a mudslide in a timely manner, the public duty doctrine barred plaintiff’s claims against two of those entities. For the claim against the 911 board, however, immunity was removed by plaintiff’s claim of gross negligence pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-108, and the claim fell within an exception to the public duty doctrine, allowing plaintiff to proceed against that defendant only.
In Lawson v. Hawkins County, No. E2020-01529-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2023), plaintiff filed a GTLA claim after her husband was killed when his car rolled down a mountain after a portion of highway on the mountain was washed away by a mudslide. On the night of the accident, a driver called 911 to warn that the road was washed away at 12:58 a.m. A sheriff’s deputy arrived at the scene at 1:13 a.m., who then called 911 again to discuss the situation. Neither the deputy nor the dispatcher suggested closing the road. The 911 dispatcher placed several calls to various agencies, but at around 1:46 am, the deputy called 911 again reporting that plaintiff’s husband’s car had flipped down the mountain. Shortly thereafter, the deputy stated that a second car had gone down the mountain, at which time the dispatcher stated that she would ask a neighboring county to block the road.
The trial court granted defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the GTLA “gave defendants immunity from claims alleging recklessness and that the public-duty doctrine independently barred any claims based on negligence.” In its first opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the GTLA “did not provide immunity for claims based on gross negligence or recklessness.” On appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that “when the GTLA removes immunity for negligence, it does so for ordinary negligence only.” The case was then remanded back to the Court of Appeals.
Where defendants filed a motion to dismiss under the TPPA and plaintiff thereafter filed a voluntary dismissal of one of the defendants, but the trial court denied the voluntary dismissal, defendants did not have the right to automatically appeal the voluntary dismissal denial under the TPPA, as the TPPA petition was still pending.
In Kent v. Global Vision Baptist, Inc., No. M2023-00267-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2023), plaintiffs filed suit against defendant church and pastor for nuisance, trespass, and violation of local ordinances. The suit largely related to the church’s use of a tent as a structure. Defendants filed a petition to dismiss the complaint under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). Thereafter, plaintiffs attempted to voluntarily dismiss the pastor without prejudice. At a hearing regarding the dismissal, the trial court denied the voluntary dismissal, and defendants argued that plaintiffs could only dismiss the pastor with prejudice. During the hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel allegedly orally agreed to a dismissal with prejudice, but then repudiated that agreement. Ultimately, the trial court denied dismissal of the pastor with or without prejudice.
Defendants filed this appeal under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-106, a provision of the TPPA which “allows a party to immediately appeal a court’s order dismissing or refusing to dismiss a legal action pursuant to a petition filed under the TPPA.” Plaintiffs argued that the Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction under this statute, and the Court agreed.
My other blog is Practical Procedure and Evidence. This is where I share new case law and practical tips on using the rules of procedure and evidence in your Tennessee law practice.
By way of example, today’s post addresses the issue of whether a plaintiff who is facing a motion to amend may amend his, her or its complaint without filing a motion to amend. The answer is “yes,” so long as the plaintiff has not previously amended the complaint and no answer has been filed. The post includes citations to the relevant case law.
There are 100 other posts similar to this one – posts the advise (or remind) you on a given issue of procedure or evidence and give you citations to the relevant case law. Each post gives you a real head start on researching evidence and procedure issues.
Where plaintiff’s HCLA complaint cited alleged negligent acts that occurred at different times over a period of a few months, the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint as time-barred was affirmed in part and reversed in part. Dismissal of the claims related to the care plaintiff received less than one year prior to the filing of his complaint was reversed.
In Vandergriff v. Erlanger Health Systems, No. E2022-00706-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2023), plaintiff was assaulted with a baseball bat on February 20, 2020, and he sought medical treatment from defendants on March 1. After his initial surgery on March 1, plaintiff returned several times with complications and for further treatment. On March 25, plaintiff had a second surgery; on April 6, plaintiff returned and complained about pus drainage; on May 4, he again complained about pus drainage; he was readmitted on May 8 for his third surgery; he was diagnosed with a bone infection after the third surgery; he had a seizure on June 29; and he noticed increased drainage on July 4.
Plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to four defendants on December 15, 2020, but the HIPAA release he sent with the notice did not specify which providers could release records or obtain records from each other. Plaintiff then filed his pro se complaint on April 14, 2021.
Where plaintiff was an employee of the company that leased a building, and she brought a negligence and negligence per se claim against the owner of the building after she fell off a staircase that allegedly was not up to code, summary judgment for the building owner was affirmed; plaintiff, plaintiff’s employer, and defendant landlord had co-extensive knowledge of the allegedly dangerous condition.
In Lewis v. Fletcher, No. W2022-00939-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2023), plaintiff was going down a set of stairs at the entrance of the building leased by her employer when she fell off the stairs and was injured. The stairs had a handrail on only one side.
Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting negligence and negligence per se against the building owners, who were not the original builders of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant building owners “based on the rule of non-liability of a landlord to its tenant or third parties when the landlord and tenant have coextensive knowledge of the condition of the property[.]” (internal citation omitted). On appeal, summary judgment was affirmed.
Where a trial court’s judgment did not include a finding of joint-and-several liability, a defendant against whom a judgment was entered could not be credited with payments made by another defendant or by a non-party.
In Gerrish & McCreary, P.C. v. Lane, No. W2022-01441-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2023), plaintiff originally filed suit against defendant, who was plaintiff’s bookkeeper, for fraud, misrepresentation, conversion, and negligence. Plaintiff also brought a claim against defendant’s husband for conversion. The trial court found for plaintiff, and it entered a judgment for over $600,000 against defendant. A judgment of approximately $44,000 was entered against defendant’s husband. The judgment was entered in 2003 and did not find defendant and her husband jointly and severally liable. Later, in 2005, an order of judgment satisfied was entered as to the husband, and the order specifically noted that it was “not intended, nor shall it be construed, as having any applicability to the separate judgment rendered against the other defendant in this cause[.]”
In addition to the case against defendant and her husband, plaintiff reached a confidential settlement with a bank related to the fraud. The settlement was for $140,000, but the bank was never made a party to this action.
Where an HCLA plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to a hospital and two doctors, the hospital had all the relevant documents, the doctors were independent contractors of the hospital who could only access the records for treatment purposes, and plaintiff’s HIPAA form was noncompliant and only allowed records to be released to plaintiff’s counsel, dismissal for the doctors was affirmed, but dismissal of the claim against the hospital was reversed.
In Christie v. Baptist Memorial Hospital d/b/a Baptist Memorial Hospital for Women, No. W2022-01296-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2023), plaintiffs filed an HCLA claim based on the lack of treatment received by their newborn daughter, who was born and died on the same day at defendant hospital. Before filing suit, plaintiffs sent pre-suit notice to defendant hospital and two doctors who had been involved in the baby’s treatment. It was undisputed that the HIPAA authorization sent with the notice only allowed records to be released to plaintiff’s counsel rather than to other parties receiving notice.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss based on the faulty HIPAA authorizations, which the trial court “reluctantly” granted. On appeal, dismissal of the claims against the doctors was affirmed, but dismissal of the claim against the hospital was reversed.
Where claimant tripped on a laptop cord while participating in a class activity, but she had no evidence showing how long the cord had been there or who put the cord there, the Claims Commission’s finding that the professor of the class was not negligent was affirmed.
In Bryant v. State, No. W2022-00968-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2023), claimant was a student in an occupational therapy class at the University of Tennessee Health Science Center. During one class, the teacher set up an activity which required the students to walk to different areas of the room to fill out papers. The professor testified that she checked the area for hazards while setting up the activity and that she asked all the students to move their personal belongings so that they would not be in the way. The professor further stated that both before and during the activity, she did not see a cord in the floor. The evidence showed that the other students in the class had already walked in the area of the fall without issue. In addition, the professor had done this activity three other times and never had an issue.
Claimant testified that she did not see the cord before she fell, but instead saw it several minutes after she fell. Some of her deposition testimony conflicted slightly with her trial testimony, but she testified that no other classmates reported that they had seen the cord or had an issue with the cord.
