Day on Torts

March 4, 2023

Tennessee GTLA removes immunity for ordinary negligence only.

In a unanimous decision, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) “removes immunity only for ordinary negligence,” not for gross negligence or recklessness.

In Lawson v. Hawkins County, Tennessee, No. E2020-01529-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2023), plaintiffs were the surviving spouse and child of a driver whose car flipped down a mountain after a portion of highway was washed out by a mudslide. The local 911 dispatch was alerted to the mudslide issue at 12:58 a.m., and a deputy arrived at the scene around 1:13 a.m. During subsequent calls to various government agencies, there was no discussion of closing the road. At 1:46 a.m., the deputy called 911 again and reported that decedent’s car had flipped down the mountain. The driver was trapped in his car for eleven hours and died before he could be reached. Shortly after decedent’s accident, another car also fell down the mountain, and only then did the deputy call for assistance to “block the road off.”

Plaintiffs filed this wrongful death suit, asserting that the “grossly negligent and reckless conduct” by defendant governmental entities caused decedent’s death. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the GTLA “provided immunity from suit for claims based on recklessness,” and the trial court agreed. The trial court ruled that the GTLA “gave defendants immunity from claims alleging recklessness and that the public-duty doctrine independently barred any claims based on negligence.” The Court of Appeals reversed dismissal. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiffs could pursue claims based on gross negligence and/or recklessness under the GTLA. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals and reversed this ruling.

March 3, 2023

Tennessee statute of limitations is based on gravamen of complaint.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where plaintiff’s claims against defendant county were based on intentional torts, a one-year statute of limitations applied.

In Anderson v. Lauderdale County, Tennessee, No. W2022-00332-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2023), plaintiff was pulled over by a sheriff’s deputy employed by defendant county. According to plaintiff, the deputy pointed a gun at plaintiff, chased him and called for backup when plaintiff tried to drive away, eventually tased plaintiff, and made false statements about plaintiff, causing him to be wrongfully charged with multiple crimes. Plaintiff further asserted that “a grand jury returned an indictment against [the deputy].”

Plaintiff filed this complaint against the deputy and defendant county more than one year after the incident, asserting that the county was liable for the deputy’s actions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-302 and -303. Plaintiff’s initial complaint listed several intentional torts, but his amended complaint removed the referral to any specific torts and instead alleged liability more generally. After plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the deputy, defendant county filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to the statute of limitations, which the trial court granted upon determining that a one-year statute of limitations applied. Dismissal was affirmed on appeal.

March 2, 2023

New Books Available – Appellate Standards of Review in Civil and Criminal Cases

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

I am happy to report that BirdDog Law is now offering two new books – Grading Papers – Civil and Grading Papers – Criminal. The books help lawyers quickly identify the applicable standard of review of multiple civil and criminal law issues.

Why does a trial lawyer care about appellate standards of review? Well, sometimes trial lawyers handle appeals. And, even if a trial lawyer never handles an appeal knowing the standard of review will help you advise your client on the appealability of an adverse decision and help you better pick your battles with our opponent and the trial judge.

And, using one of our Grading Papers books also gives you a leg up on legal research. How? If you find the standard of review in this book, the opinion (links included) will lead you to a discussion of the law on the subject. The latest law on the subject, because all opinions referenced are from January 1, 2022 or later (some TSC opinions that are cited are older).

February 27, 2023

TPPA Petition to Dismiss Does Not Survive Voluntary Dismissal.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A plaintiff may take a voluntary nonsuit even after the defendant has filed a petition to dismiss under the TPPA, and a petition to dismiss under the TPPA does not survive after voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff and is not considered a counterclaim.

In Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee, No. M2022-00553-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2023), plaintiff filed suit against several defendants asserting claims for libel, intentional interference with business, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These claims were based on statements made by defendants about plaintiff through text messages and on social media regarding plaintiff’s role as the landlord of a duplex.

In response to the complaint, the two non-governmental defendants filed separate motions to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) and the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA), Tennessee’s anti-SLAPP statute. While these motions were pending, plaintiff filed notice of voluntary dismissal. The trial court dismissed the matter without prejudice pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.01, and it held that “the TPPA was not excepted from the right to dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41.01.” On appeal, this ruling was affirmed.

February 10, 2023

TBA Journal Article – Defamation Cases: Yet Another Landmine

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Those of you interested in the filing a defamation case may want to review my latest article: Defamation Cases: Yet Another Landmine.

February 2, 2023

Intentional interference with business relationships under the GTLA.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

While a claim for intentional interference with business relationships does not “arise out of a claim for interference with contract rights” and is thus not expressly listed in the GTLA as a cause of action for which a governmental entity retains immunity, because it is an intentional tort, a plaintiff seeking to assert an intentional interference with business relationships claim against a governmental entity must still show negligent supervision or some direct negligence by the entity.

In Robinson v. City of Clarksville, Tennessee, No. M2019-02053-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2023), plaintiffs owned a restaurant in defendant City. In 2002, plaintiffs sold a portion of an empty lot next to the restaurant to defendant. Plaintiffs claim that the mayor at the time promised that the City would install utilities and build a public alleyway on the property. In 2015, plaintiffs decided to build a second restaurant on the empty lot and asked the City to build the promised alleyway, which the City refused to do. Further, while constructing a sewer line, the City inadvertently placed part of the line on plaintiffs’ property. This suit followed, asserting several contract and property claims, as well as a tort claim for intentional interference with business relationships. The trial court dismissed the tort claim against the City pursuant to the GTLA, and dismissal was affirmed on appeal.

The only tort claim at issue in this case was plaintiff’s claim of intentional interference with business relationships. While governmental entities are generally immune from suit, the GTLA specifically removes immunity for certain claims. At issue here was Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205, which states that immunity is not removed “if the injury arises out of…interference with contract rights.” Based on this language, the trial court ruled that immunity was not removed, but the Court of Appeals disagreed with this analysis.

January 31, 2023

Jury award to plaintiff affirmed where defendant presented evidence that some damages were not caused by the car accident.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where plaintiff and defendant presented contradicting credible evidence regarding whether all of plaintiff’s claimed injuries were caused by the car accident at issue, the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for new trial based on her assertion that the jury’s award did not adequately compensate her for her injuries was affirmed.

In Besses v. Killian, No. M2021-01121-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2023), plaintiff and defendant were involved in a car accident when they approached traffic on the interstate that had slowed significantly and defendant rear-ended plaintiff’s car. Both plaintiff and defendant were able to move their cars to the side of the road after the accident, and both drove their cars away and declined medical treatment after the police took a report.

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that she sustained injuries including “a bruised right knee, a neck strain, a lower back strain, a concussion, and chronic headaches, including migraines.” Plaintiff sought damages for past and future medical expenses, loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. Defendant admitted fault but challenged the damages claimed by plaintiff, asserting that some of the medical expenses and injuries were not caused by the accident. After a two-day jury trial, the jury awarded plaintiff $16,720, which included $12,270 for medical expenses, $3,000 for past pain and suffering, $1,00 for past loss of enjoyment of life, and no award for future pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life. Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the jury’s award “did not adequately compensate her for her injuries and was inconsistent with the evidence offered at trial,” but the trial court denied the motion and confirmed the jury verdict. On appeal, this ruling was affirmed.

January 26, 2023

Apartment that failed to maintain wooden bridge liable to tenant in premises liability suit.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

A premises liability judgment for plaintiff was affirmed where plaintiff slipped and fell on a wooden bridge at defendant apartment complex, representatives of defendant had stated that the standard of care required that the bridge be power washed at least annually, and the evidence showed that the bridge had not been power washed in at least several years.

In Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP, No. M2021-01511-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 163547 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2023), plaintiff was a tenant in defendant’s apartment building. Plaintiff’s building was connected to the clubhouse fitness facility by a wooden bridge. On the day of plaintiff’s injury, it had rained the night before and was possibly still drizzling. Plaintiff used the bridge to access the fitness room, and when walking back across the bridge after his workout, plaintiff slipped on what he described as a clear, slippery substance that was “obviously not just water.” Plaintiff could not get his footing to stand up, and an employee of defendant could not get plaintiff back to his feet, so an ambulance was called.

Plaintiff’s fall caused severe injury to his left quadriceps tendon, requiring surgery. The first surgery was unsuccessful, and plaintiff underwent a second revision surgery. That surgery was also unsuccessful, and at the time of the trial plaintiff was left with permanent disability from the incident.

January 25, 2023

Dismissal of negligent misrepresentation claim affirmed.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

Where the attorney for an HOA wrote plaintiff landowner a letter informing him that the HOA considered him to be in violation of certain restrictions, judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant attorney on plaintiff landowner’s negligent misrepresentation claim was affirmed because there was no allegation that the attorney was providing “information meant to guide [plaintiff] in a business transaction.”

In Burgess v. Bradford Hills HOA, No. M2020-01565-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 142392 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2023), plaintiff owned property in a subdivision. Plaintiff and the HOA had a dispute regarding whether plaintiff had violated restrictions with certain signage and noise-making devices on his property.

Plaintiff filed a pro se suit against the HOA, and he eventually added a claim against the HOA’s attorney for negligent misrepresentation. The negligent misrepresentation claim was based on a letter sent by defendant attorney “reiterat[ing] that the HOA believed the conditions on [plaintiff’s] property violated the [restrictions] and warn[ing] that the HOA would take legal action if he continued to not comply with the rules.” The trial court granted defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the negligent misrepresentation claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

January 23, 2023

Misinterpretation of the law not deemed excusable neglect under Rule 6.02.

by The Law Offices of John Day, P.C.

When a party failed to file a motion for substitution for more than a year after filing a notice of death, misinterpretation of the law did not constitute excusable neglect and dismissal was affirmed.

In Joshlin v. Halford, No. W2020-01643-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2023), plaintiff husband and wife filed a healthcare liability action based on alleged negligence related to the treatment of husband’s broken hip. Husband died of unrelated causes in February 2014, and in March plaintiffs’ counsel filed a “Notice of Death.” In October 2014, opposing counsel sent plaintiffs’ counsel a letter stating that the case needed a new plaintiff. Eight months after this letter, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 25.01, which requires a party to file a motion for substitution within 90 days of a suggestion of death.

Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss three days later by filing a Motion for Substitution/Motion to Amend. Plaintiff argued that the substitution was not necessary because plaintiff wife was already a party to the matter and was also the “surviving plaintiff” under the wrongful death statutes. After several rounds of argument, the Court of Appeals eventually addressed this issue on interlocutory appeal, ruling that because plaintiff husband had died of unrelated causes, the action was eligible to be revived but did not pass automatically pursuant to the wrongful death statutes. Instead, plaintiffs needed to follow the Rule 25.01 procedure. The Court then remanded the case for the trial court to consider “whether Plaintiffs’ response to the motion to dismiss should be construed as a motion for enlargement of time, and if so, whether Plaintiff’s failure to act within the prescribed ninety-day period was the result of excusable neglect.” (internal citation omitted).