Georgia’s Supreme Court has weighed in the so-called “apex doctrine,” which provides courts with a framework for determining whether good cause exists to forbid or limit the

deposition of a high-ranking corporate executive or high-level government official who lacks personal, unique knowledge of facts relevant to the litigation.  The court’s 39-page opinion discusses the factors Georgia courts should consider in such cases.

General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan is a wrongful death, products case involving a claim of a defect in a GM vehicle’s steering wheel angle sensor.  The plaintiffs sought to depose the current CEO of the company.  The company objected, and urged Georgia’s courts to adopt the apex doctrine. which the court generally described as include the following factors:

Problem:  Locating reliable information about court-related issues in counties other than your “home” county (and sometimes even in your “home” county).  There is information available on the Internet, but it is spread over multiple different websites, some of it is contradictory, and there can a question about reliability of the information.

Solution: BirdDog Law’s new free resource.  BirdDog has compiled important information for trial lawyers and their teams about court operations in all 95 counties.  The information includes:

  • contact information for all court clerks.

On June 1 the Tennessee Supreme Court issued an opinion in State v. Linville, a case that required interpretation of the “drug-free zone” statutory provisions.

So, why bring that up in a tort law blog?  First, some of our readers also do criminal defense work, so a brief note about the decision is helpful to them.

Second, the new opinion gives me another opportunity to remind you of the free resource offered by my company “BirdDog Law.”  Our “Status of Cases Pending Before the Tennessee Supreme Court ” book gives you not only a list of the cases pending before the court but also lets you know the status of them.   And it’s free!

Where plaintiff died a few days before the complaint in her HCLA suit was filed, and the complaint was filed with her named as plaintiff, the complaint was a nullity that could not be corrected by amendment and dismissal of the case was affirmed.

In Owen v. Grinspun, No. M2021-00681-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2022), plaintiff wife had surgery in August 2019, and she later gave pre-suit notice to defendants of an HCLA claim based on injuries related to that surgery. After notice had been given, but a few days before the complaint was filed, plaintiff wife died. The complaint was nevertheless filed listing plaintiff wife as the sole plaintiff.

Defendants filed an answer and engaged in discovery. Plaintiff’s counsel thereafter filed a suggestion of plaintiff wife’s death on the record, and also filed a motion to substitute plaintiff’s husband as the plaintiff, which the trial court allowed. Later, however, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that “the original complaint was a nullity that did not serve to toll the statute of limitations and that the statute of limitations had now expired.” The trial court “reluctantly granted the motion” to dismiss, and this ruling was affirmed on appeal.

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Where an HCLA plaintiff sent pre-suit notice addressed to the wrong entity, summary judgment for defendant was affirmed, even though defendant was informed of the pending suit by the incorrect entity and was not prejudiced.

In Breithaupt v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, No. M2021-00314-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 1633552 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 24, 2022), plaintiff suffered antibiotic tendonitis, a traumatic rupture to a tendon in her ankle, and chronic tendonitis after being prescribed medication for a cough that had an adverse reaction with the steroids she had been taking for years. The prescribing doctor worked at defendant VUMC, and plaintiff was not warned about the possible side effects of the medication by the doctor before taking it, despite having previously treated at defendant VUMC for ankle problems. Plaintiff thereafter filed this HCLA suit.

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Where the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint was his tort claim for defamation seeking unliquidated damages, the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and the case should have been transferred to circuit court.

In Lowery v. Redmond, No. W2021-00611-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2022), plaintiff filed a petition in chancery court related to various allegedly defamatory statements made by defendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants “defamed his character in an attempt to ensure that he would not succeed in his bid for election to public office, by distributing defamatory information about him to prospective voters.” Plaintiff’s complaint sought compensatory damages for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. It also sought punitive damages, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment that defendants had violated certain statutes.

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The Tennessee Supreme Court decided the “Home Rule” case yesterday, with three of five justices finding that the Tennessee Education Savings Account Pilot Program was not unconstitutional.  Click here to find links to the majority and concurring/dissenting opinions.

The Court has accepted review of 27 other cases, 15 of them civil cases and 12 of them criminal cases.  Seven of the civil cases involve tort issues, and civil procedure issues are present in two other cases.

The current status of all of the cases may be found on BirdDog Law, which has a free book, Status of Cases Pending Before the Tennessee Supreme Court, that allows you to stay up-to-date on pending cases that can affect your clients and your practice.   BirdDog also provides free access to the rules of civil procedure, evidence, and much, much more.

Where plaintiffs averred that defendant home builders affirmatively told plaintiffs that the utility penetrations in the crawl space of the newly built home purchased by plaintiffs in August 2017 had been sealed with foam, and plaintiffs did not learn until January 2018 after an inspection by a mold remediation company that this statement was untrue, plaintiffs’ claims related to the damage allegedly caused by this failure to seal should not have been dismissed based on the statute of limitations, as plaintiff had put forth enough evidence from which a trier of fact could have found that the statute of limitations on these claims was tolled by fraudulent concealment.

In Simpkins v. John Maher Builders, Inc., No. M2021-00487-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 1404357 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2022), plaintiffs filed this pro se action that revolved around a newly built home they bought in August 2017 that had allegedly developed severe mold issues. Plaintiff asserted various claims against defendants, including breach of contract, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, and negligence, all of which the trial court dismissed as untimely pursuant to the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims of injuries to real property. (Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-105.) On appeal, dismissal was partially reversed.

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Where plaintiff submitted no expert proof to support his legal malpractice claim, summary judgment for defendant was affirmed.

In Guo v. Rogers, No. M2020-01209-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 1220917 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 26, 2022), plaintiff was represented by defendant attorney in an underlying case in which plaintiff asserted several claims, including malicious prosecution. Plaintiff’s primary complaint here was that “Defendant failed to bring to the attention of the trial judge in that matter…evidence that a criminal charge against Plaintiff had been dismissed and judicially expunged.” The trial court in the underlying case granted the opposing party summary judgment based on several legal grounds, including that while expungement by executive order was a favorable outcome for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim, plaintiff had failed to show that a judicial expungement should be treated in the same way. Plaintiff thereafter filed this pro se legal malpractice claim against defendant.

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When calculating post-judgment interest, the statutory rate in effect when the judgment is entered applies for the entire time period between entry of the judgment and its payment.

In Coffey v. Coffey, No. E2021-00433-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 1085039 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 11, 2022), plaintiff had won a large judgment against defendant based on breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. Defendant appealed the judgment, but it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court denied review. The case then went back to the trial court for calculation of post-judgment interest.

The trial court used the interest rate calculated by the Administrative Office of the Courts based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-121 for January 13, 2020, the day the judgment was entered. The court applied that rate as the post-judgment interest rate for the entire period at issue, which was January 13, 2020 through April 26, 2021. In this appeal, defendant argued that a different interest rate should have been used for a portion of this time period, as the statutory interest rate fluctuated, but the Court of Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court’s calculation.

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