Where defendant pharmacists alleged comparative fault against a doctor and filed a certificate of good faith that complied with all the necessary requirements of the statute, the trial court’s decision to deny sanctions based on the allegation that the “certificate of good faith was supported by the written statement of an incompetent expert witness” was affirmed, even though the doctor’s motion for summary judgment had been successful. The Court of Appeals explained that “nothing in the express language of section 29-26-122 requires that a party asserting fault against another guarantee that his or her expert is competent or that the claim will ultimately prevail.”

In Smith v. Outen, No. W2019-01226-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2020), plaintiff filed an HCLA suit against defendant pharmacists for dispensing the wrong medicine to plaintiff. In her complaint, plaintiff stated that when her doctor realized she had been given the wrong medicine by the pharmacists, he ordered her to stop the medicine immediately. Defendant pharmacists filed an answer alleging comparative fault against the doctor, asserting that he should have had plaintiff taper off the medication rather than stop it immediately. The pharmacists’ attorney filed a certificate of good faith supporting their comparative fault allegation, as required by the HCLA, and plaintiff amended her complaint to add the doctor as a defendant.

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Where plaintiff’s pharmacist expert was deemed incompetent to offer necessary causation testimony against the pharmacy defendants in an HCLA suit based on his inability to rule out possible causes of death in a complex medical case, summary judgment for those defendants was affirmed.

In Kidd v. Dickerson, No. M2018-01133-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2020), plaintiff was the daughter of a patient who died after a stroke. The patient had multiple health issues at the end of her life, and the proper diagnosis and medication prescribed for blood clots was in contention in this HCLA suit.

On September 30, 2014, the patient, who was 82 years old, went to Family Health Group (“FHG”) with pain and swelling. She was seen by Dr. Ball and diagnosed with a blood clot. She returned on October 7 and was seen by Dr. Farmer, who also diagnosed a blood clot and prescribed a blood-thinning medicine called Pradaxa, which the patient had filled that day by the pharmacy defendants. The patient returned to FHG on October 13 for a follow-up appointment and saw Dr. Ball again, then returned on October 20 and was seen by a nurse practitioner, who found that the patient was “ill appearing,” that she had an “irregularly irregular” cardiovascular rhythm, and that she should be referred to a cardiologist that week.

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Where the defendant in an HCLA case did not plead comparative fault, but during his testimony at trial stated that the reason he failed to take certain actions was because the nurses never notified him of the patient’s chest pain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant attempted to shift blame to a non-party and ordering a retrial.

In Kanipe v. Patel, No. E2019-01211-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2020), plaintiff filed a healthcare liability suit after his mom died from “an undiagnosed aortic dissection while in the care of [defendant].” The patient had been taken to the ER by ambulance on the morning of December 31, 2012, and after being seen by the ER physician, she was transferred to defendant, a cardiologist. Defendant examined the patient and prescribed medication, then left the hospital before lunch with an order that he “be called for questions, orders, or changes in [the patient’s] condition.” Defendant received a call from Nurse Crepo at 3:30 p.m, which proved to be “one of the most contested parts of the case.” After this call, defendant ordered medications for pain and nausea for the patient, but he never re-evaluated her. At 1:47 a.m. that night, the patient was pronounced dead from an aortic dissection.

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When an HCLA plaintiff was awarded a verdict for her health care liability claims and her husband was awarded damages for loss of consortium, the trial court correctly considered the plaintiffs separately for the purpose of applying the statutory cap on noneconomic damages.  FIRST PUBLISHED IN JUNE 2020.  SEE UPDATE BELOW.

In Yebuah v. Center for Urological Treatment, No. M2018-01652-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2020), plaintiff had surgery to remove a cancerous kidney in 2005. A CT scan was done four months after surgery, and the radiologist reported no signs of cancer. The radiology report on a subsequent CT scan noted a “tubular structure” within plaintiff’s abdominal cavity, but plaintiff’s treating physician “did not read the reference to the foreign object.” Seven years later, plaintiff required gallbladder surgery due to severe abdominal pain. During that surgery, it was discovered that a “part of a gelport device” had been left inside plaintiff during her 2005 kidney surgery. Plaintiff required another surgery to have the device removed.

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Where a daughter signed admission paperwork for her mother upon the mother’s admission to a nursing home, but the mother was mentally competent and did not give the daughter authority to sign the paperwork, an arbitration agreement included in the paperwork was unenforceable.

In Manley v. Humboldt Nursing Home, Inc., No. W2019-00131-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2020), plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against defendant nursing home after her mother passed away. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement included in the admission paperwork. It was undisputed that the admission paperwork was signed by the daughter, even though the mother was “competent when she was admitted” and the daughter “did not possess a power of attorney to act on behalf of her mother.”

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Although a fee-splitting provision in an arbitration agreement was unconscionable based on the plaintiff’s financial situation, the Court of Appeals ruled that the fee-splitting provision was severable and that defendant’s motion to compel arbitration should have been granted.

In Stokes v. Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center LLC, No. W2019-01983-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2020), plaintiff filed an HCLA complaint against defendant nursing home alleging that he had contracted sepsis due to the negligence of one of defendant’s nurses, and that he had suffered severe permanent injuries. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, attaching a three-page arbitration agreement that plaintiff had signed on two occasions. The agreement contained a provision stating that the parties would split the arbitration expenses equally. Plaintiff opposed the motion on a “cost-based unconscionability defense,” arguing that plaintiff would never be able to afford paying half of the arbitration costs. Defendant responded that this argument was moot, as it had offered to cover the entire cost of the arbitration. After a hearing, the trial court refused to compel arbitration, finding that the agreement was unconscionable. This appeal followed.

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Where a plaintiff named the wrong defendant in a premises liability suit, but claimed that the proper defendant had notice of the lawsuit due to a correspondence she had sent on its website stating that she had been in contact with her legal team, the proper defendant did not have notice of the lawsuit and the amended complaint naming the proper defendant did not relate back to the filing of the original suit.

In Hensley v. Stokely Hospitality Properties, Inc., No. E2019-02146-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2020), plaintiff slipped and fell in the Edgewater Hotel parking lot. She filed suit on June 18, 2019, naming Noble House Hotels as the defendant. When she later learned that Nobel House Hotels did not own the hotel at which she fell, she filed an amended complaint on August 5, 2019 naming defendant, who was the owner of the hotel at issue.

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Tennessee Justice Programs has released it Fall 2020 on-demand video seminar CLE programs.

Former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White, former Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Joe Riley, and I started Justice Programs almost 20 years ago.  The seminar program is designed for civil trial practitioners who are interested in enhancing their legal knowledge as they earn CLE credit.

Historically, our seminar was presented in three live programs in Knoxville, Nashville and Memphis.  This year, COVID-19 has caused us to abandon the normal and film 15 hours of on-demand legal education.  The Tennessee Supreme Court now permits unlimited on-demand programs to fulfill all CLE obligations.

The American Bar Association has adopted a paper describing best practices for third-party litigation funding.

The paper does “not take a position on a number of litigation funding issues – for example, whether litigation funding should be permitted, as a matter of law or legal ethics, in any particular jurisdiction or in any particular context; or whether, when and in

how much detail a funding arrangement need be disclosed”   or on underwriting practices of the funder.   Instead, the paper focus on the lawyer / client relationship and ” is written to assist lawyers considering litigation funding – whether to provide legal fees for sophisticated, cross-border arbitration and litigation, to assist an individual plaintiff or claimant in a personal injury lawsuit or worker’s compensation claim, or any other litigation or arbitration context.”

Where plaintiffs included wife’s claim for loss of consortium in their complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission, but the wife had not given notice of her loss of consortium claim to the Division of Claims Administration within the applicable statute of limitations, dismissal of the wife’s claim was affirmed.

In Kampmeyer v. State of Tennessee, No. M2019-01196-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2020), plaintiffs were a husband and wife. The husband had been injured in a car accident allegedly caused by a TDOT vehicle and trailer parked in a roadway, and within the one-year statute of limitations, the husband filed a “Claim for Damages in the Division of Claims Administration” (the DCA). Because the DCA made no decision on his claim within 90 days, the claim was transferred to the Claims Commission.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint with the Claims Commission, including husband’s claims as well as a claim by wife for loss of consortium. The State “moved to dismiss [wife’s] loss of consortium claim on the ground that she did not file a notice of claim with the DCA within the one-year statute of limitations.” Because the complaint was filed within one year from the date of the accident, plaintiffs argued that wife’s “loss of consortium claim should not have been dismissed but should have been transferred to the Board of Claims for processing[.]” The Claims Commission agreed with the State and dismissed wife’s claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

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