Where a residential tenant and property owner both knew about a leak which formed a puddle of water that caused plaintiff to slip, defendants property owner and property manager were not liable for plaintiff’s injuries and summary judgment was affirmed.

In Richardson v. H & J Properties, LLC, No. W2019-02082-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2020), plaintiff moved into a triplex apartment owned and operated by defendants in March 2014. In the following months, she reported leaks in her laundry room and adjoining room several times. On September 10, 2014, she again reported a leak in this area of her apartment. The next day, a maintenance worker was sent to the apartment to repair the leak, and while plaintiff was showing him the issue, she slipped and fell in a “small pool of water” that had been caused by the leak, breaking her ankle.

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Where plaintiff’s tort claims against the church and church elders where he was previously pastor were all connected to the church’s termination of plaintiff as pastor and his resistance to that termination, the claims were barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.

In Maize v. Friendship Community Church, Inc., No. E2019-00183-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2020), plaintiff was the former pastor at defendant church. After plaintiff had inappropriate communications with a female church member on Facebook, the church elders (also named as defendants) met and subsequently requested plaintiff’s resignation. Plaintiff refused and was then given a termination letter, which he “refused to abide by.” After a second termination letter was delivered to plaintiff, the church elders held another meeting, wherein “it was suggested that [the termination] had to be done through a church vote in order to be effective.” Because plaintiff was refusing to acknowledge his termination, the church sent an email to its members explaining the termination and stating that plaintiff was likely to attempt to hold church services.

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     Where plaintiff alleged that the law firm representing both him and his employer had him sign an engagement letter that waived conflicts of interest, but that the law firm had engaged in behavior before the representation that created a conflict of interest and which the firm did not inform him of when presenting him with the engagement letter, plaintiff had plead sufficient facts to support a legal malpractice claim and judgment on the pleadings for defendant was reversed.

In Culpepper v. Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., No. E2019-01932-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2020), plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against defendants, who had represented both plaintiff and the company for which plaintiff worked as interim CEO. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants “represented him concerning matters before the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on August 4, 2016 and August 11, 2016.” He asserted that defendants then “met with an independent forensic accountant and discussed [plaintiff] with respect to the SEC and other attorney-client privileged and confidential matters WITHOUT his knowledge” on August 15, 2016. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants had discussions with the company’s board of directors without his knowledge while representing both plaintiff and the company, that defendants “presented fabricated documentation to support his ultimate termination for cause,” that defendants had represented both him and the company simultaneously “despite an obvious conflict of interest,” and that defendants had continued representing the company after terminating representation of plaintiff in December 2016.

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Where plaintiff and defendant gave differing versions of a car accident, the photographs of the vehicles could be interpreted to support defendant’s version of events, and the jury appeared to credit defendant by finding plaintiff 60% at fault, the Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict and the trial court’s refusal to grant a new trial.

In Justice v. Gaiter, No. M2019-01299-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2020), plaintiff and defendant were involved in a car accident on December 23rd in heavy traffic near a mall. Defendant was attempting to pull onto a road separating two parking areas when the cars collided. At a jury trial, plaintiff asserted that he was sitting in traffic when he was essentially t-boned by defendant in the driver’s door, and that defendant’s car then slid down the remainder of the driver’s side of plaintiff’s car. Defendant, on the other hand, testified that a car had stopped to let him cross into traffic, that he stuck his fender slightly into the lane he was attempting to merge into, and that he was sitting still when plaintiff’s vehicle failed to stop and hit the corner of defendant’s car. The photographs offered into evidence showed “the scraping on Plaintiff’s car from the driver’s side door to the rear fender” and damage to the front of defendant’s car.

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Where the correct acreage of a piece of real property was contained on a publicly recorded plat, plaintiffs could not maintain a cause of action for misrepresentation or concealment based on the seller or realtor stating that the property was larger than it actually was.

In Archer v. The Home Team, Inc., No. M2019-01898-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2020), plaintiffs alleged that the seller and realtor of a piece of property they purchased represented that the property was 1.9 acres, when it was actually 1.16 acres. They filed suit against both the seller and realtor for multiple causes of action, including misrepresentation, concealment, and breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the fact that the correct acreage was listed on a publicly recorded plat, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

For claims of either intentional or negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show that he reasonably relied on the alleged misrepresentations. (internal citations omitted). In relation to the seller, plaintiffs alleged that the seller made one oral misrepresentation that the property was around 2 acres, but testimony showed that this statement was made “between middle of March to sometime before closing.” Plaintiffs, however, had signed the purchase and sale agreement on February 23rd, which was well before this oral statement was made. The Court thus ruled that “no reasonable trier of fact could find that Plaintiffs relied on [the seller’s] alleged misrepresentation of the acreage when deciding to purchase the property” and affirmed summary judgment.

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Where defendant pharmacists alleged comparative fault against a doctor and filed a certificate of good faith that complied with all the necessary requirements of the statute, the trial court’s decision to deny sanctions based on the allegation that the “certificate of good faith was supported by the written statement of an incompetent expert witness” was affirmed, even though the doctor’s motion for summary judgment had been successful. The Court of Appeals explained that “nothing in the express language of section 29-26-122 requires that a party asserting fault against another guarantee that his or her expert is competent or that the claim will ultimately prevail.”

In Smith v. Outen, No. W2019-01226-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2020), plaintiff filed an HCLA suit against defendant pharmacists for dispensing the wrong medicine to plaintiff. In her complaint, plaintiff stated that when her doctor realized she had been given the wrong medicine by the pharmacists, he ordered her to stop the medicine immediately. Defendant pharmacists filed an answer alleging comparative fault against the doctor, asserting that he should have had plaintiff taper off the medication rather than stop it immediately. The pharmacists’ attorney filed a certificate of good faith supporting their comparative fault allegation, as required by the HCLA, and plaintiff amended her complaint to add the doctor as a defendant.

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Where plaintiff’s pharmacist expert was deemed incompetent to offer necessary causation testimony against the pharmacy defendants in an HCLA suit based on his inability to rule out possible causes of death in a complex medical case, summary judgment for those defendants was affirmed.

In Kidd v. Dickerson, No. M2018-01133-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2020), plaintiff was the daughter of a patient who died after a stroke. The patient had multiple health issues at the end of her life, and the proper diagnosis and medication prescribed for blood clots was in contention in this HCLA suit.

On September 30, 2014, the patient, who was 82 years old, went to Family Health Group (“FHG”) with pain and swelling. She was seen by Dr. Ball and diagnosed with a blood clot. She returned on October 7 and was seen by Dr. Farmer, who also diagnosed a blood clot and prescribed a blood-thinning medicine called Pradaxa, which the patient had filled that day by the pharmacy defendants. The patient returned to FHG on October 13 for a follow-up appointment and saw Dr. Ball again, then returned on October 20 and was seen by a nurse practitioner, who found that the patient was “ill appearing,” that she had an “irregularly irregular” cardiovascular rhythm, and that she should be referred to a cardiologist that week.

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Where the defendant in an HCLA case did not plead comparative fault, but during his testimony at trial stated that the reason he failed to take certain actions was because the nurses never notified him of the patient’s chest pain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant attempted to shift blame to a non-party and ordering a retrial.

In Kanipe v. Patel, No. E2019-01211-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2020), plaintiff filed a healthcare liability suit after his mom died from “an undiagnosed aortic dissection while in the care of [defendant].” The patient had been taken to the ER by ambulance on the morning of December 31, 2012, and after being seen by the ER physician, she was transferred to defendant, a cardiologist. Defendant examined the patient and prescribed medication, then left the hospital before lunch with an order that he “be called for questions, orders, or changes in [the patient’s] condition.” Defendant received a call from Nurse Crepo at 3:30 p.m, which proved to be “one of the most contested parts of the case.” After this call, defendant ordered medications for pain and nausea for the patient, but he never re-evaluated her. At 1:47 a.m. that night, the patient was pronounced dead from an aortic dissection.

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When an HCLA plaintiff was awarded a verdict for her health care liability claims and her husband was awarded damages for loss of consortium, the trial court correctly considered the plaintiffs separately for the purpose of applying the statutory cap on noneconomic damages.  FIRST PUBLISHED IN JUNE 2020.  SEE UPDATE BELOW.

In Yebuah v. Center for Urological Treatment, No. M2018-01652-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 28, 2020), plaintiff had surgery to remove a cancerous kidney in 2005. A CT scan was done four months after surgery, and the radiologist reported no signs of cancer. The radiology report on a subsequent CT scan noted a “tubular structure” within plaintiff’s abdominal cavity, but plaintiff’s treating physician “did not read the reference to the foreign object.” Seven years later, plaintiff required gallbladder surgery due to severe abdominal pain. During that surgery, it was discovered that a “part of a gelport device” had been left inside plaintiff during her 2005 kidney surgery. Plaintiff required another surgery to have the device removed.

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Where a daughter signed admission paperwork for her mother upon the mother’s admission to a nursing home, but the mother was mentally competent and did not give the daughter authority to sign the paperwork, an arbitration agreement included in the paperwork was unenforceable.

In Manley v. Humboldt Nursing Home, Inc., No. W2019-00131-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2020), plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against defendant nursing home after her mother passed away. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement included in the admission paperwork. It was undisputed that the admission paperwork was signed by the daughter, even though the mother was “competent when she was admitted” and the daughter “did not possess a power of attorney to act on behalf of her mother.”

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