In Fitzgerald v. Hickman County Government, No. M2017-00565-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 4, 2018), plaintiff brought several claims against the county and the county mayor related to his employment termination. The trial court dismissed all claims after defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all claims except plaintiff’s claim for false light invasion of privacy.

The basic facts of this case were that plaintiff had worked for the county for over fifteen years, and that the mayor fired him citing “bogus complaints.” When plaintiff attempted to use the grievance procedure, he was sent a letter from the mayor stating that his “grievance claim had been denied.” In addition, plaintiff claimed that at the time of his firing, the mayor promised to create a new job for him, but such a job never came to fruition because the county commission “determined that it could not afford to fund the new position.” Plaintiff also claimed that the mayor had made public statements regarding an alleged extramarital affair and regarding plaintiff receiving “certain compensation in his final payment” as an employee.

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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has reversed a 2005 opinion and held that a cap of $750,000 on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases is constitutional.

The female plaintiff in the case lost her arms and legs as a result of a medical error.  A jury determined that her pain, suffering, and disfigurement had a value of $16.5 million.  However, Wisconsin’s highest court deferred to legislation limiting such awards to a maximum of $750,000 in all cases, regardless of the severity of the injuries.

A dissent was filed by Justice Bradley, joined by Justice Abrahamson. “Only those with the most catastrophic injuries will be denied a full and fair damages award,” Bradley wrote. “It makes no sense that those who are injured most get the least.”

Even when a person chooses to participate in a risky sport, he or she does not “assume the risk of whatever dangerous conduct, however unreasonable, is engaged in by the [other] participants.” Instead, in a negligence case, the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct will be determined based on the circumstances of the case.

In Crisp v. Nelms, No. E2017-01044-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 28, 2018), plaintiff was the surviving spouse of a bicycle rider who died following a cycling accident. At the time of the accident, decedent and four other cyclists were riding in a paceline, which is when the riders proceed in a straight line close together with the front rider setting the pace. Plaintiff alleged that the rider in front suddenly slowed, causing the second rider to bump wheels with the front rider. The second rider then went down, and decedent was unable to avoid the accident, hitting the second rider and being thrown off his bike. Decedent “was rendered quadriplegic by the wreck,” and died a few months thereafter.

Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against the first and second rider, who both filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The trial court ruled that “paceline cycling is inherently dangerous and that Decedent was at least 50% at fault for his accident.” In its order, the trial court stated that “the ultimate conclusion is that these types of accidents are foreseeable in bicycle racing, especially this type of close racing,” and that “these parties chose to engage in this activity.” On appeal, summary judgment was reversed.

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In cases involving damages to real property, the general “measure of damages will be the cost of repair[.]” If a defendant wants to argue that diminution in value is a more appropriate measure of damages, he or she has to burden of proving the difference in value from before and after the damage occurred.

In Durkin v. MTown Construction, LLC, No. W2017-01269-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 13, 2018), plaintiff had hired defendant to put a new roof on his home. While the roof was exposed, a thunderstorm occurred, and the tarp used by defendant to cover the roof had holes and allowed a significant amount of water to leak into plaintiff’s home. After the damage occurred, defendant initially assured plaintiff that the damage would be promptly fixed, but the repairs were not made. Plaintiff filed this action, and the trial court found defendant liable for both negligence and breach of contract.

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An HCLA plaintiff who does not comply with the pre-suit notice requirements in the statute is not entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations.

In Brookins v. Tabor, No. W2017-00576-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 8, 2015), plaintiff husband originally filed an HCLA suit against several defendants, including doctors Tabor, Lamothe, and Fleenor. This first suit was filed on January 29, 2015, and was nonsuited on April 16, 2015, in order to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements found in the HCLA.

On July 6, 2015, plaintiff husband re-filed the suit based on the same negligence against the same defendants. In this second suit, plaintiff wife also asserted a loss of consortium claim. Defendant doctors moved to dismiss the claims, alleging that they were time-barred because plaintiffs had failed to meet the pre-suit notice requirements and were thus unable to rely on the 120-day extension of the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed, dismissing all claims against defendant doctors, and the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal for various reasons.

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Where a painter fell off a ladder but could not prove cause in fact or proximate cause, summary judgment on his negligence claim was affirmed.

In Epps v. Thompson, No. M2017-01818-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 15, 2018), plaintiff was hired by defendant to paint the exterior of her house. Defendant provided the painting material and two ladders, a folding ladder and an extension ladder, for plaintiff’s use. While using the folding ladder to paint the uppermost eave of the home, defendant fell and was injured. He subsequently filed this suit, claiming the “landowner was negligent for providing him with old ladders that were unsafe.”

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A surviving spouse maintains priority to file a wrongful death action, even if the surviving spouse’s alleged negligence caused or contributed to the decedent’s death.

In Nelson v. Myres, No. M2015-01857-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. March 5, 2018), decedent died in a car accident. The daughter filed a wrongful death action, naming several defendants, including decedent’s surviving husband. According to daughter, husband “was under the influence of an intoxicant at the time of the accident” and his actions disqualified him from maintaining the suit (husband was “ultimately incarcerated for vehicular homicide”). Husband filed a wrongful death action, naming only the other driver as a defendant, and the other driver asserted comparative fault against husband in his answer.

Husband moved to dismiss daughter’s wrongful death action, claiming that he had the superior right to bring the case, and the trial court agreed. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, holding that husband “had an inherent conflict of interest because, due to his conduct in bringing about the accident, he would be both a defendant and a plaintiff in [decedent’s] wrongful death action.” The Court of Appeals held that “only [daughter’s] lawsuit would fully prosecute [decedent’s] cause of action.” Husband appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which reversed the Court of Appeals decision, reinstating husband as the proper person to maintain the wrongful death action.

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Where a drainage cut in a concrete platform was visible but not open and obvious, a finding that the plaintiff was only twenty percent at fault for his fall was affirmed on appeal.

In Osborne v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, No. M2017-01090-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2018), plaintiff fell while visiting a city-owned facility for trash that was too large for regular trash trucks. The center had two levels, with the upper level being about five feet off the ground. On the edge of the upper platform there was a 26-inch-wide concrete barrier, and this barrier had 15-inch-long drainage cuts. There were signs stating “Please Use Care When You Unload Items” and telling children to stay in the vehicle, but there were no signs about the drainage cuts, no verbal warnings, and no markings or paint to draw attention to the cuts. Plaintiff had been to this center many times, but he had never been directed to this particular area. When he got out of his truck, he stepped onto the barrier and sidestepped toward the back of his truck without looking down at the barrier. As he was walking, not holding onto his truck, he stepped into the drainage cut and fell five feet, injuring his arm.

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The collateral source rule still applies in Claims Commission cases to bar evidence that a plaintiff actually paid a discounted amount on his or her medical expenses.

In both Estate of Tolbert v. State of Tennessee, No. M2017-00862-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2018) and Stevens v. State of Tennessee, No. M2017-01114-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2018), plaintiffs were awarded damages by the Claims Commission due to car accidents caused by state employees. The Claims Commission awarded plaintiffs the full amount of their undiscounted medical bills, plus other damages, and the State appealed, arguing that the damages awarded should have reflected the discounted amounts actually paid by plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the damage award of the full, undiscounted amount.

The Court noted that while these appeals were pending, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided Dedmon v. Steelman, 535 S.W.3d 431 (Tenn. 2017), in which it held that “defendants are precluded from submitting evidence of discounted rates accepted by medical providers from the insurer to rebut plaintiffs’ proof that the full, undiscounted charges are reasonable.” The issue in both of these cases, then, was whether Dedmon applied to cases under the Claims Commission Act. In answering this question, the Court in Stevens quoted extensively from and adopted the reasoning of the opinion released for Estate of Tolbert.

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