In West v. Epiphany Salon & Day Spa, LLC, No. E2016-01860-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 25, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed a large remittitur in a negligence case, reducing the jury’s award by over 61%.
Plaintiff had gone to defendant salon for a facial treatment in 2012. According to her testimony, her “face began burning upon application of the treatment” and she “rushed home in pain.” She filed this negligence action, alleging that her face never recovered from the treatment.
The Tennessee Supreme Court recently held that a contractor and subcontractor were not liable in a case where a partially constructed home burned, but the cause of the fire could not be pinpointed.
In Jenkins v. Big City Remodeling, No. E2014-01612-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. April 5, 2017), plaintiffs brought a negligence action against both the general contractor and flooring subcontractors who were building plaintiffs’ new home after the home was destroyed in a fire. Expert testimony established that the fire started on the back deck of the home, yet the specific cause could not be identified—“possible causes of the fire were arson, improperly discarded cigarettes, electrical issues, and spontaneous combustion of rags.” The deposition testimony in this case showed that the property was not fenced; that the back deck could have been accessed by any member of the public; that plaintiffs had had several construction workers on the property; and that the fire happened on Halloween, a time when “a lot of fires occur, including fires that are intentionally set.” Plaintiffs asserted that the subcontractors’ negligence caused the fire, as they had been seen smoking on the back deck before and they had been using rags to apply flammable flooring materials on the day of the fire, which could have caused the fire if disposed of in an improper manner. To prove the claim against the general contractor, plaintiffs planned to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to infer negligence.
In Haynes v. Wayne County, No. M2016-01252-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. April 19, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment, holding that the county was not liable in a wrongful death action where an inmate committed suicide shortly after his release.
The decedent was 20-years-old and had been arrested for underage consumption, public intoxication, and resisting arrest. On the night of his arrest, he was intoxicated to the point of barely being able to walk and throwing up on himself. He asked two arresting officers if their guns were real and asked the officers to shoot him. This behavior was reported to the booking officer, who asked decedent several standard medical questions. Decedent told the booking officer that “he was suffering from depression and had attempted to commit suicide several times in the past.” Decedent was put in a suicide prevention suit and in an isolated cell on suicide watch, where he slept without incident. There was a non-profit organization called Centerstone that would come evaluate suicidal inmates, but they would not come while an inmate was intoxicated. At 6:00 a.m. there was a shift change and a new officer came on duty. The officer was informed of the statements decedent had made the night before. That morning, decedent was told he was eligible for release, and the officer asked decedent if he remembered making the suicidal threats the night before, to which decedent “replied in a joking manner that he remembered making the statement but was just drunk and did not mean it.” The release process took about an hour, and decedent “seemed fine during that time.”
In Bradley v. Bishop, No. W2016-01668-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict for defendants in a health care liability case.
For eight years, plaintiff had been treated for a fibroid in her uterus that caused extensive bleeding. In 2012, another fibroid was discovered, and after an unsuccessful surgery to remove the fibroid, plaintiff decided to undergo a hysterectomy. Defendant doctor recommended a laparoscopic hysterectomy, but warned plaintiff that she might have to convert to an open procedure. During the surgery, defendant did convert to an open procedure. Defendant called for surgical back-up, but no one was available, and defendant determined that she could complete the procedure herself. During the procedure, defendant noticed a “superficial cut” on plaintiff’s colon, but she did not see or notice any signs of a bowel injury. In the days following the hysterectomy, plaintiff’s “condition deteriorated,” and she was eventually diagnosed with a bowel injury which required surgical repair, three weeks of hospitalization, and additional procedures in the following years.
Plaintiff filed this suit, alleging that defendant “negligently caused injury to [plaintiff’s] small bowel.” Throughout the litigation, causation was not contested, as defendant admitted that the bowel was injured during the surgery. Whether defendant’s actions met the applicable standard of care, however, was hotly contested, with several experts testifying for both sides. Plaintiffs’ experts testified that defendant had fallen below the standard of care, that a different type of hysterectomy would have been more appropriate, that defendant had made mistakes during the surgery, and that defendant should have noticed the bowel injury. Defendants’ experts, however, testified that the chosen procedure was appropriate, that defendant acted in accordance with the standard of care at all times, and that bowel injuries were a common complication of hysterectomies and could occur even when the surgery was done appropriately. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for defendant, finding that defendant “did not deviate from the recognized standard of care,” which the trial court affirmed as thirteenth juror. On appeal, the Court of Appeals also affirmed.
In a recent case where plaintiff was seeking damages for emotional injuries, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendant, holding that plaintiff could not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when the claim was based on the negligent destruction of property.
In Lane v. Estate of Leggett, No. M2016-00448-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017), plaintiff owned an antique and gift shop. Defendant was driving when he rear-ended the car in front of him, veered off the road, and ran into plaintiff’s store. During the accident, defendant hit a gas meter, causing a fire that completely destroyed plaintiff’s store and killed defendant. Plaintiff was not at the store when the accident occurred but arrived shortly after the fire began.
Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant’s estate for negligence resulting in property damage and emotional injuries (the property damage claim was dismissed under the doctrine of prior suit pending, as a case had already been filed by the relevant insurance company). The complaint stated that “as a result of observing the fire and the circumstances surrounding the same, including having narrowly escaped being present when the incident occurred, the Plaintiff has been caused severe mental and emotional injuries and has had to seek the assistance of a psychologist and psychiatrist…and has been diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Anxiety.” Defendant moved for summary judgment on the claims for emotional injuries, asserting that plaintiff was claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress, and that such a claim “is not a cause of action intended to permit recovery for emotional distress arising in connection with property damage.” The trial court granted summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
In Battery Alliance, Inc. v. Allegiant Power, LLC, No. W2015-02389-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2017), the Court vacated a summary judgment order for defendants because the trial court failed to state the legal grounds for summary judgment before asking counsel for defendants to draft an order.
The facts underlying this case revolved around the president and other employees of a Tennessee battery company leaving and starting a competing battery company in Florida. Plaintiff, the Tennessee company, filed suit against the Florida company and several individual defendants, citing various causes of action including intentional interference with business relationships. Defendants filed a counterclaim against plaintiff and also filed a motion for summary judgment. In response to defendants’ filings, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim.
In Goan v. Mills, No. E2016-01206-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to enforce a settlement agreement in a car accident case.
Plaintiff was rear-ended by defendant while plaintiff was delivering mail. Plaintiff brought this action, and settlement negotiations between the parties’ attorneys ensued. Plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter in April 2013 stating that plaintiff “had an agreement with comp that we can settle this case now…If there is only $100,000 in insurance, I would demand the policy limits primarily because of workers comp.” In August, plaintiff’s lawyer again wrote: “I go back to demanding the limits which I believe is $100,000 but as we discussed I need a firm number from you to figure out compromising the comp claim.” Plaintiff’s counsel wrote two more times demanding the policy limit of $100,000, and in December 2013, defense counsel wrote a letter accepting the settlement demand.
In Fletcher v. CFRA, LLC, No. M2016-01202-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2017), the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment, finding that defendant restaurant owner was not vicariously liable for the actions of its employee.
Defendant owned an IHOP restaurant, and that IHOP hired a dishwasher who was on parole for “aggravated battery and felony firearms convictions.” Plaintiff ate at the restaurant with a friend very early one morning. When plaintiff was leaving the restaurant, the dishwasher believed he had not paid for his meal and followed him to the parking lot. There was no physical confrontation in the parking lot, and plaintiff paid the bill. The dishwasher’s shift had ended, so he called his girlfriend to pick him up from work. According to both the dishwasher and his girlfriend, after they left the IHOP parking lot the car that plaintiff and his friend were driving began following them. They drove to an apartment complex with plaintiff still following, and a physical altercation ensued. There was conflicting testimony about what exactly happened, but at some point the dishwasher jumped into the car plaintiff had previously been riding in and ran over plaintiff two times, severely injuring him.
In Rogers v. Hadju, No. W2016-00850-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in a negligence case, finding that defendant companies could not be held liable for the actions for what was determined to be an independent contractor.
Ford Construction was hired by the state to perform road construction. Ford subcontracted with Traf-Mark Industries for part of the work; Traf-Mark subcontracted with Kerr Brothers; and Kerr Brothers subcontracted with RDH Contracting. On the job site, an employee of RDH Contracting was backing up a truck when he hit an employee of Ford Construction. The injured Ford Construction employee filed this negligence suit against Traf-Mark, Kerr Brothers, RDH Contracting and the driver, arguing that the defendant companies were vicariously liable for the incident because the driver of the truck “was acting in the scope of his employment with them at the time of the incident.”
Traf-Mark and Kerr Brothers filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were not liable for the driver’s negligence because RDH Contracting and the driver were independent contractors. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
In Tennessee, “the doctrine of respondeat superior permits a principal to be held liable for the negligent acts of its agent.” (internal citation omitted). “While an employer may be held liable for the negligence of its employee, however, they are generally not liable for the negligence of independent contractors.” (internal citation omitted). When determining whether an employment or independent contractor relationship exists, courts should consider “(1) the right to control the conduct of the work, (2) the right of termination, (3) method of payment, (4) whether or not the worker furnishes his own helpers, (5) whether or not the worker furnishes his own tools, (6) self-scheduling of working hours, and (7) freedom to render services to other entities.” (citing Goodale v. Langenberg, 243 S.W.3d 575 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).
In Elliott v. State, No. M2016-00392-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 13, 2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed the Claims Commission’s finding that plaintiff failed to prove that “the State was negligent in the design, construction, or maintenance of [a] roadway.”
Plaintiff had a car accident on an exit ramp that was designed and maintained by the State. The road was wet from an earlier rain, and the road on the ramp “transition[ed] from asphalt to concrete.” Plaintiff asserted that the road had deteriorated at this transition point, and that “this deterioration caused her vehicle to fly off the roadway and roll down an incline.” Plaintiff pointed out that the State had patched the ramp by putting asphalt into holes. She claimed that “the State was negligent in the design, construction, and maintenance of the roadway and in failing to erect a proper barrier at the edge of the road to prevent vehicles from rolling down the hill.”
