While a plaintiff faced with a TPPA petition to dismiss could not make out a prima facie case for his false light invasion of privacy or intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, his defamation claim related to an allegedly false Title IX rape complaint was allowed to proceed.
In Doe v. Roe, No. M2023-00045-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2024), plaintiff had filed suit against defendant based on defendant’s allegations that plaintiff raped her on a college campus. Plaintiff’s complaint included claims for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on defendant’s statements to friends and family, postings on social media, and filing of a Title IX complaint.
After the complaint was filed, defendant moved to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the petition, finding the TPPA inapplicable to this case. In a first appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that defendant’s “filing of a Title IX complaint fell within the scope of the TPPA.” The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court “for a determination regarding whether there is a prima facie case for [plaintiff’s] claims against [defendant] insofar as they pertain to her Title IX complaint…” On remand, the trial court granted the TPPA petition to dismiss the false light and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims connected to the Title IX filing, but it denied dismissal of the defamation claim. This appeal followed, where the trial court ruling was affirmed.
In its opinion, the Court first considered the trial court’s decision to allow plaintiff limited discovery in order to respond to the TPPA petition. The filing of a TPPA petition stays discovery in a case, but the TPPA allows for “specified and limited discovery relevant to the TPPA petition upon a showing of good cause.” The statute, however, does not define good cause. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-104(d). Plaintiff argued that he needed limited discovery because he could not otherwise access the documents filed with the university. The trial court granted his motion for limited discovery, specifically ruling that plaintiff could obtain the Title IX filings and documents and statements given to the campus police department. The Court of Appeals found that this ruling was not an abuse of discretion.
Next, the Court analyzed defendant’s argument that plaintiff “relied on unauthenticated and inadmissible evidence to satisfy his prima facie burden and that the trial court erred by relying on such evidence.” When going through the TPPA burden-shifting analysis, “any evidence considered by the trial court…must be admissible.” (internal citation omitted). Defendant asserted that plaintiff’s affidavits included “statements of third parties made to MTSU employees,” and that they included references to unauthenticated documents. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that plaintiff’s affidavits referenced things that defendant testified to, but that it was not error to consider these affidavits when analyzing whether plaintiff made a prima facie case.
Third, defendant argued that plaintiff was required by the TPPA to make a prima facie case as to all his claims, not just those related to the Title IX complaint. The Court pointed out that the first appeal, which occurred after the trial court ruled that the TPPA did not apply to any of plaintiff’s claims, dealt only with those claims related to defendant’s filing of a Title IX complaint. The Court of Appeals found in the first appeal that the TPPA applied to claims related to the Title IX complaint and remanded only for consideration of the TPPA burden-shifting analysis as to those claims. The trial court was correct, then, to not demand proof related to plaintiff’s other claims.
Fourth, the Court considered whether the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had established a prima facie case of his defamation claim. “To establish a prima facie case under the TPPA, a party must present enough evidence to allow the jury to rule in his favor on that issue.” (internal citation omitted). To make a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must show that “(1) a party published a statement; 2) with knowledge that the statement is false and defaming to the other; or 3) with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the statement.” (internal citation omitted). Here, it was undisputed that plaintiff filed a Title IX complaint, which satisfied the first element. The second element, whether defendant knew the statement was false, hinged on credibility, as the parties gave opposite testimony regarding consent. The Court wrote that it was “not [its] role to determine whether [defendant] actually withdrew consent, as that is ultimately a question for the factfinder[.]” Disregarding all countervailing evidence, the Court ruled that plaintiff produced enough evidence so that a jury could rule in his favor on the defamation claim.
Finally, defendant argued that the defamation claim should have been dismissed under the TPPA because her Title IX complaint was “protected by the public interest privilege and/or the common interest privilege.” The Court explained that “[t]he common interest and public interest privileges are both qualified or conditional privileges that are recognized where the interest which the defendant is seeking to vindicate or further is regarded as sufficiently important to justify some latitude for making mistakes.” (internal citation omitted). These privileges “may be defeated if the defamatory publication was made with malice, ill-will, or for an improper purpose.” (internal citation omitted). In this case, the factfinder would make a credibility determination regarding whether the statements in the Title IX complaint were true. The Court wrote that the “same credibility finding will be required before it can be determined whether the common interest privilege or public interest privilege apply to [defendant’s] statements.”
Because the Court of Appeals found no errors in the trial court’s rulings, the judgment of the trial court dismissing only the false light and emotional distress claims was affirmed.
The Court of Appeals released this opinion six months after oral arguments.