Summary judgment based on immunity under the GTLA was reversed where plaintiff was injured when he had a car accident due a road washout.
In Roberts v. Carter, No. W2023-01316-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2023), plaintiff was driving during rain when he had an accident caused by a washed out road. The speed limited for this road was 45 miles per hour, but plaintiff had slowed to 25 miles per hour before the accident. Although the area had sustained heavy rains, plaintiff left his home while it was not raining, but the rain resumed while he was driving. His visibility was thus reduced.
Three weeks before this accident, a county employee noted the presence of erosion at the outlet end of the culvert on this road. The county corrected this problem by “laying down riprap stone on the outlet end.” Plaintiff’s accident occurred at the opposite inlet end of this same culvert.
Plaintiff filed suit under three sections of the GTLA. The trial court granted defendant summary judgment, finding that plaintiff had no evidence to prove actual or constructive notice. The trial court found that “the presence of potholes, history of water overtopping the road, and presence of erosion on the outlet end was not sufficient to put Benton County on notice of a defect in Blackberry Road that would have caused the washout that injured [plaintiff].” The trial court also found that all plaintiff’s claims were barred by the public duty doctrine, and that plaintiff was at least fifty percent at fault. On appeal, summary judgment was reversed.
Although plaintiff cited three GTLA sections in his complaint, he only appealed summary judgment as to two sections. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-203 removes immunity for injuries caused by an unsafe “street, alley, sidewalk or highway, owned and controlled by such governmental entity.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-204 removes immunity for injuries caused by dangerous conditions of “any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other public improvement…”
The Court of Appeals first considered whether summary judgment was appropriate based on plaintiff’s inability to show notice. Both code sections cited above require a plaintiff to show that the governmental entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Plaintiff offered testimony from an expert witness who opined that notice of erosion anywhere related to the culvert put the county on notice of issues existing on both sides of the culvert. This expert “noted that a reasonable individual would notice erosion if they conducted an inspection of the culvert.” The Court of Appeals ruled that, through this testimony, plaintiff had presented enough evidence to show constructive notice in this case.
Next, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether summary judgment should be granted based on the public duty doctrine. The Court noted that it had “previously discussed the inapplicability of the public duty doctrine to section 29-20-203” because all claims that arise under this section “necessarily stem from a breach of a duty owed to the public at large.” The Court “conclude[d] that the public duty doctrine could not apply to section 29-20-204 for the same reasons it is inapplicable to section 29-20-203.” Applying the public duty doctrine to these sections would “render [them] useless and a nullity,” and therefore summary judgment should not have been granted based on the public duty doctrine.
Finally, the Court looked at the trial court’s comparative fault findings, noting that “granting summary judgment based upon the affirmative defense of comparative fault is reserved for those situations where reasonable minds could only conclude that the plaintiff was at fault, and that the plaintiff’s fault was equal to or greater than the fault of the defendant.” (internal citation omitted). Although there were facts from which a jury could find fault on the part of plaintiff, there were also facts indicating that plaintiff took reasonable care. The rain had stopped when he left his house, he had significantly reduced his speed, and he was familiar with the road. The Court ruled that reasonable minds could differ as to plaintiff’s fault here, and thus comparative fault was not an appropriate basis for summary judgment. Summary judgment was therefore reversed.
The Court of Appeals analyzed this case correctly. Its finding that the public duty doctrine does not apply to GTLA claims brought under sections 29-20-203 and -204 is especially notable for Tennessee plaintiffs injured on government owned property.
The Court of Appeals released this opinion 2.5 months after oral arguments in this matter.