The sudden physical incapacitation doctrine was a defense to the plaintiff’s negligence claim in Elliott v. Monger, No. W2023-01783-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2024).
In Elliott, the plaintiff and defendant were involved in a car accident. The defendant was preparing to turn left onto an exit ramp, and the plaintiff was driving in the opposite direction. The defendant’s vehicle struck the plaintiff’s, and the plaintiff filed this negligence claim against the defendant and the defendant’s employer.
Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment based on the sudden physical incapacitation doctrine. In support of their motions, the defendants attached the transcript of the defendant driver’s deposition, as well as an affidavit from a cardiologist. In the affidavit, the cardiologist opined that the defendant’s medical records showed that the defendant suffered a heart attack immediately before the accident. The plaintiff provided no expert proof in response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Summary judgment based on the sudden physical incapacitation doctrine was affirmed on appeal.
The Court of Appeals explained that the Tennessee Supreme Court “established the rule on physical incapacitation while driving in the context of negligence claims” in McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150 (Tenn. 1995). In that case, the Supreme Court stated that “[a] sudden loss of consciousness or physical capacity experienced while driving which is not reasonably foreseeable is a defense to a negligence action.” The Supreme Court also listed possible factors to be considered when determining foreseeability.
The plaintiff argued on appeal that “McCall held that a sudden medical emergency could no longer be used as a defense to a negligence claim,” as the “sudden emergency doctrine was subsumed into Tennessee’s comparative fault scheme.” The Court of Appeals explained, however, that “the sudden emergency doctrine is distinguishable from the sudden physical incapacitation doctrine, i.e., a sudden loss of consciousness or physical capacity, which the McCall court intended to adopt.” The Court wrote that it was “clear…that McCall established a sudden physical incapacitation rule, which could be used as a defense in a negligence action,” and it noted that it has applied this rule in several cases.
Having established that the sudden physical incapacitation rule is applicable in Tennessee, the Court next analyzed whether the defendant had shown that it applied here. The Court relied on the defendant’s expert’s affidavit, which took into account medical records, the defendant’s statement, and a video taken at the scene. The expert opined that all the evidence supported the assertion that the defendant had a heart attack immediately before the collision.
Because the defendant presented sufficient evidence that he was physically incapacitated, the “burden shifted to [plaintiff] to show that, at the time of the accident, [defendant] did not suffer a sudden loss of consciousness or physical capacity.” While the plaintiff submitted some articles about high blood pressure and diabetes, she presented no medical expert to refute the testimony of defendant’s cardiology expert. Plaintiff nonetheless argued that there were issues of fact regarding whether defendant lost consciousness and whether he suffered a heart attack. The Court wrote that “even if [the defendant] did not lose consciousness, the sudden physical incapacitation rule would still apply if he experienced a sudden loss of physical capacity, such as that which might be caused by a heart attack.” Further, while the plaintiff attempted to create an issue of fact out of the defendant getting himself from his vehicle to the ambulance, the Court found that this was not enough to refute the medical records and expert testimony.
Finally, the Court reviewed whether the defendant’s heart attack was reasonably foreseeable. The defendant testified that he had not been diagnosed with a heart condition and had not been told he was at risk of heart problems, and his medical records supported that testimony. Further, the defendant’s expert stated that, based on his records, defendant’s sudden heart attack was not reasonably foreseeable. The plaintiff pointed to testimony that created confusion about whether defendant took his hypertension medication on the day of the accident, but the Court noted that the defendant ultimately testified that he did take his prescription. The Court therefore found that the plaintiff offered no evidence that the heart attack was foreseeable.
Because the defendant suffered a sudden physical incapacitation that was not reasonably foreseeable, summary judgment was affirmed.
As indicated above, the Court said that “the defendant presented sufficient evidence that he was physically incapacitated, the “burden shifted to [plaintiff] to show that, at the time of the accident, [defendant] did not suffer a sudden loss of consciousness or physical capacity.” Note, however, that this is not the burden of proof but rather a burden of production. In other words, once the defendant presented prima facie evidence of a defense to the claim, the plaintiff had to marshal and present evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact or the case would be dismissed on summary judgment. Since the defendant establish the defense with a qualified medical evidence, the plaintiff would have had to attacked it via her own medical expert, admissions from the defendant’s expert that weakened his opinion, some sort of admission from the defendants that undercut the meaning of the opinion, or some stronger evidence that the event was foreseeable.
This opinion was released one month after oral arguments.